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ABSTRACT 
Like many contact sports, rugby union has danger at its core, and those acts deemed 
acceptable within rugby would likely be termed ‘violence’ were it to happen away from the 
sporting arena. This thesis embarks on an exploration of legal interference in on-field 
‘violence’ cases in English rugby union. The seemingly sporadic intervention by the 
criminal law in on-field ‘violence’ incidents was examined, whilst also considering both the 
complications encountered when applying criminal proceedings to participator ‘violence’, 
and whether the RFU might better serve as regulator. The perspectives of twenty 
participants, nine of whom were interviewed, and eleven of which completed an online 
questionnaire, were utilised to examine the most effective means of regulation in English 
rugby union, and the issues attached to using the criminal law as a method of governance. 
Out of the nine interviewed, three were legal professionals, two were currently referees in 
the Aviva Premiership, and four were presently RFU disciplinary panel members. The 
eleven who completed the online questionnaire were all professional players for a club 
currently competing in the Aviva Premiership. Thematic analysis revealed four major 
themes, these were: 1) dangerous play is part of the game; 2) disciplinary sanctions and 
cards are effective deterrents but inconsistent; 3) the courts have a role to play, yet, the RFU 
may be better suited to regulate; and, 4) establishing a formal link between the law and RFU 
could help find equilibrium. It was concluded that the RFU seems to be better suited to 
dealing with all but the most egregious incidents of participator ‘violence’. The borders of 
suitability were found to be breached when intent to cause serious harm was present. For 
participants, this was when the criminal law should interfere. Participants also proposed the 
use of an RFU referral system, whereby the RFU can refer particularly deplorable cases to 
the police for investigation. Moreover, the disciplinary devices used by the RFU, sanctions 
and cards, were seen as effective deterrents and punishments, yet, their issuing was seen as 
inconsistent and in need of reform.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. 1. Background 
 
The examination of the relationship between the criminal law and sporting regulation has 
become an area of growing interest in both academic and sporting discourse. The need for 
increased legal intervention has arisen from views the law should be the ultimate adjudicator 
(MLRA, 1976), an omnipresent legal entity which branches out into all areas of society, 
including the regulation of sport (Livings, 2016). Lord Justice Ebsworth provides a 
statement fitting to the recent developments in sport and the law: 
 
There are likely to be many people who take the view that the processes of the 
law have no place in sport and the bodies which run sport should be able to 
conduct their own affairs as they see fit. … However, sport today is big business. 
Many people earn their living from it one way or another. It would be, I fear, 
naive to pretend that the modern world of sport can be conducted as it used to 
be not very many years ago. (Jones v The Welsh Rugby Union [1996] QB 1591 
(HC), 11).  
 
 
Ebsworth’s words are reminiscent of the popular statement made by Lord Justice Bramwell 
in the case of Bradshaw: “[n]o rules or practice of any game whatever can make lawful that 
which is unlawful by the law of the land” (84). In short, sport cannot expect to be what 
Livings (2016: 8) aptly describes as a “zone of legal exemption”, whereby the criminal law 
operates prosecutorial discretion when it comes to sporting contests. Commentators of 
sports law have provided discussions over the necessity for legal interference in areas such 
as crowd disorder and football hooliganism (James, 2013), the corruption of global sporting 
mega events (Lewis and Taylor, 2008), match fixing and sports gambling (Gardiner et al., 
2012), and anti-doping in sports (Lewis and Taylor, 2002). Yet, the area of participator 
‘violence’ seems to suffer from a dearth of attention, particularly when it comes to providing 
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remedies or analysis as to the best method for regulating participator ‘violence’. Such a lack 
of research may be attributed to the numerous complications arising when attempting to 
apply legal doctrine to the sporting arena.  
The first problem is one of definition. How exactly do we define ‘sports violence’? 
Defining ‘violence’ has been a centre for debate over the last century (Smith, 1988 and 
Hamby, 2017), with each discipline constructing bespoke interpretations of the concept. The 
central question: What is ‘violence’? remains differentially defined and understood by legal 
experts, criminologists, sociologists, animal biologists, law enforcement officials, and 
policy makers. Such ambiguity is not absent when attempting to define ‘sports violence’, 
particularly that of participator ‘violence’. Especially in contact sports, where both 
aggressive and violent behaviours are intrinsic to the very nature of the contest. Numerous 
scholars (Smith, 1988; Young 2012; and, Coakley and Pike, 2014) have attempted to 
provide a definition of ‘sports violence’ that reflects the aggressive manner of contact sports. 
However, such definitions, when viewed from the perspective of the law, would also fall 
unequivocally under definitions of unlawful ‘violence’ provided by the law. Of course, 
participants of contact sports are to expect more ‘violence’ than a member of the public 
walking down the street. Yet, to provide a useful definition of participator ‘violence’, and 
one that can work effortlessly with the criminal law, would require an exploration into the 
breadth of consent in contact sports.  
Delineating consent in contact sports has perhaps received the most deliberation by 
academics in the field of participator ‘violence’ (MRLA, 1976, James, 2001, and Fafinski, 
2005). The topic has come under such debate that some have called for the boundaries of 
consent to be defined by the rules of the given sport (MRLA, 1976). By using the rules alone 
as a boundary of consent, demarcation of unlawful and lawful would be relatively 
straightforward. Nevertheless, such a notion has been described as “untenable”, since “the 
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acceptability of ‘violence’ is a matter of legal policy not of private regulation” 
(McCutcheon, 1994: 273). Therefore, “[t]o use the rules of the sport as a test would be to 
confer on a private agency, the sport's governing body, the power to license ‘violence’” 
(McCutcheon, 1994: 273). Moreover, it has been widely recognised that “the courts have 
been clear that transgression of the rules will not automatically attract criminal liability, and 
neither will it necessarily preclude the availability of the defense consent” (Livings, 2006: 
497). As such, others have referred to the “unwritten conventions” (Dunning and Sheard, 
2005: 29) of sport as offering definitions of consent. Such conventions are not easily 
captured by reference to the rules alone, but only understood by those who fully understand 
the culture of a respective sport. Yet, this leads on to the question: what is the limit of such 
unwritten conventions, and therefore the point to which one doesn’t consent? As of yet, no 
one has been able to provide a definition of consent for contact sports. Therefore, the 
appliance of criminal law to sporting incidents has maintained ambiguity.  
Due to the enigmatic nature of defining both ‘sports violence’ itself and the limits 
of consent, applying legal doctrine to the sports setting has been troublesome. Such 
complications mainly arise when attempting to establish mens rea. For Ormerod (2007: 
105), “[t]he word ‘rea’ refers to the criminality of the act, not its moral quality”; this means 
that “English courts focus on the accused’s cognitive state – whether he foresaw risk, etc – 
rather than whether he was acting in a morally culpable manner”. As such, establishing mens 
rea in contact sports requires the assessment of whether an act was reckless, insofar as the 
perpetrator knew there was a possibility that the requisite harm may occur, or intentional, 
whereby the defendant intended to cause the requisite harm (OAPA, 1861). Prosecuting 
under recklessness would prove impractical in contact sports. Lord Woolf proposes that 
“anyone going to tackle another player in possession of the ball can be expected to have the 
necessary malicious intent” (Barnes, 915).  Thus, there would be a proliferation of relatively 
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minor offences clogging up the courts. As such, most cases which go through the courts 
have been attempts to prosecute under intention. Establishing intent can prove problematic 
when applying it to a matter of everyday life, let alone in an arena where harm is implicit to 
nearly all aspects of the game.  
The issues associated with applying the law to the sports setting have led some to 
propose prosecutorial discretion as the answer. In Barnes, Lord Woolf discusses such 
possibilities:  
 
In determining what the approach of the courts should be, the starting point is 
the fact that most organised sports have their own disciplinary procedures for 
enforcing their particular rules and standards of conduct. As a result, in the 
majority of situations there is not only no need for criminal proceedings, it is 
undesirable that there should be any criminal proceedings (911).  
 
In the case of sport, it is often considered that, not only are there alternative methods to the 
criminal law, but also that these alternatives may prove more effective at achieving the aims 
of sport than the criminal law itself. Cohen (1990: 322) indicates that, “[t]he decision not to 
prosecute does not mean that a professional athlete acting violently during a game goes 
without punishment”. Cohen (1990: 322) continues referring to how the “[v]arious 
alternative dispute resolution methods, including civil mechanisms, game officiating, 
league fines and suspensions” may actually “control violent behavior in sports more 
effectively than the imposition of criminal liability”. Some commentators see the regulatory 
tools used by sporting bodies as the most effective method. For Anderson (2013: 57), “there 
is little doubt that a speedy, consistent and fair internal disciplinary regime within a sport is 
the most effective deterrent against unnecessarily violent play, as opposed to the more 
distant and unpredictable applicability of the criminal law”. Despite this, as mentioned 
previously, sport cannot become a “zone of legal exemption” (Livings, 2016: 8) whereby 
the criminal law leaves it to become its own private government. However, to the 
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researcher’s knowledge, there has yet to be a study which aims at finding equilibrium 
between the law and internal regulation for contact sports.   
 
1.2. Research Problem  
 
As mentioned, applying the law to participator ‘violence’ can prove arduous, especially in 
contact sports, where violent behaviours are inherent to the playing of the game. Such issues 
are reflected in the paucity of on-field incidents in rugby union going to court, and the 
current reliance placed on the national governing body of the sport, the Rugby Football 
Union (RFU), for regulation. The scarcity of cases attracting legal interference calls for an 
inquiry into the complications which the Crown Prosecution System of England and Wales 
(CPS) face when attempting to prosecute on-field rugby incidents. Moreover, the RFU as 
an internal regulator needs to be assessed. Is the RFU suitable to deal with all incidents of 
‘violence’ on the rugby pitch? Or could incorporating the criminal law be a more effective 
approach? Indeed, such queries are imperative when attempting to find the most effective 
means of regulation in rugby union. However, such questions can also provide an 
understanding of how contact sports should or could be regulated, and how far legal doctrine 
penetrates sport. 
 
1.3. Overview of Study  
 
The present thesis will investigate the most effective means of regulating participator 
‘violence’ in English rugby union. Rugby union, as a contact sport, encounters similar 
problems to those discussed in Section 1.1, whereby the aggressive nature of the sport has 
made it difficult to establish an effective method of incorporating the criminal law 
effectively. Therefore, rugby union was seen as an ideal opportunity to engage in a 
discussion about the most effective means of regulating a contact sport, and the how might 
the law be involved in such. Furthermore, by focusing on a singular case, one can provide 
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a more meticulous analysis when compared to the use of numerous cases. This notion is 
discussed by Durkheim (1976: 95) when explaining the value of focusing on a singular case, 
rather than multiple: 
 
[T]he value of … facts … is much more important than their number. … to 
establish relations it is neither necessary nor always useful to heap up numerous 
experiences upon each other; it is much more important to have a few that are 
well studied and really significant. One single fact may make a law appear, 
where a multitude or imprecise and vague observation would only produce 
confusion  
 
 
As such, English rugby union was seen as being both representative of contact sports 
generally, whilst also offering the opportunity for a comprehensive examination of how the 
criminal law can be incorporated into a contact sport. 
Within such an examination, the issues discussed in regard to applying the criminal 
law to contact sports will be investigated further. The literature review is split into four 
chapters: Defining Sports Related ‘violence’; Theorising the Occurrence of ‘sports 
violence’; The RFU: Disciplinary Structure and Review; and, Legal Doctrine: Applying the 
Law to Sports. Each chapter will provide a review of previous research, revealing areas of 
interest and those requiring further discussion. Moreover, the views of current stakeholders 
within both the Rugby Football Union (RFU) and the criminal law will be compared to the 
literature. Here, it is hoped that the opinion of the participants can provide a more realistic 
inspection of the literature, whilst also revealing any unique perspectives which could push 
the current body of knowledge forward.   
 
1.4. Who Am I, and What Led me to this Research?  
 
Before one embarks on the socio-legal discourse contained within this thesis, it is important 
that the social identity and social presentation of the researcher is considered. Metacognition 
of one’s previous experience is critical to the research process as “our personal biographies 
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shape our research interests, access to the field, relationships with the researched, and our 
interpretation and representation of the culture under examination” (Poulton, 2014: 4). In 
the present context, being aware of my position as a researcher may prove beneficial when 
contemplating my standpoint on the relationship between the criminal law and english rugby 
union.   
Having been a participant in rugby union since the age of five, the acceptance, and 
even encouragement of severe on-field violence has been both observed and performed on 
numerous occasions. I have been in the changing room during the half time of a very close 
and heated game, and witnessed my coach encourage us to get more ‘aggressive’, even if 
that means ‘throwing a few punches’ at the opposition.  I have also seen my teammates be 
sent off for delivering such aggression, only to be back the following week, ready to 
administer another serving of violence. As a young rugby player progressing from the 
grassroots level of Chester RFC to the elite arena of England and GB Sevens, I was shocked, 
on many occasions, by the lack of intervention by the courts in extreme violence cases. Such 
acts, if performed outside the protective sphere of organised sport, would indubitably spark 
judicial castigation. However, when performed on the rugby pitch, all but a few go 
unnoticed by the courts. As I progressed through the ranks of elite rugby, my confusion 
deepened, as I experienced not only more acts of violence on the pitch, but also the 
encouragement of such acts by senior coaches and players. However, this was not all, there 
seemed to be a marked reluctance that the law should get involved in such cases, and even 
at times, a sense of invincibility from the courts.  
My bewilderment of such inconsistent juridical structures led to me seek further 
understanding through my undergraduate dissertation, where I was hopeful that the 
incongruity would be explained or where such structures could be developed. Yet, I found 
myself asking more unanswered questions. It quickly became apparent that answering such 
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a question is both complex and multidimensional. With the boundaries of consent constantly 
in motion, judicial intervention needs to be able to adapt in accordance with the lines of 
consent. However, such flexibility also adversely effects its practicality. Furthermore, it was 
proposed that a relationship between the RFU and the CPS of England and Wales would be 
prudent, however the means of developing such a relationship remained illusive. Thus, I 
believed that a larger scale examination would reveal vital details of how such questions 
can be answered. Moreover, with my background in elite rugby, obtaining access to those 
individuals directly involved in the performing and regulation of violence would prove 
relatively painless. Thus, I hope that this research will offer an opportunity to discuss the 
inconsistencies I have experienced during my time as an elite rugby player, and perhaps 
uncover solutions which can be implemented in the future.  
 
1.5. Implications of Study 
 
It is hoped that this thesis can provide a remedy for the complications of applying the 
criminal law to contact sports. Such a proposal will not only be a result of an academic 
review, but also the outcome of an analysis of the viewpoints of current stakeholders in both 
the criminal law and RFU. As such, this research has the capacity to inform the regulatory 
bodies of the RFU on the most appropriate means of regulating ‘violence’ in English rugby 
union. Furthermore, the information uncovered may aid in understanding how the 
relationship between the RFU and the CPS can be established or possibly redefined. From 
an academic perspective, this work will add to the body of research viewing the alliance 
between sports and the law as necessary and unavoidable. Moreover, this study may spark 
the start of a new field of research within sports law, where the lines between criminal 
liability and sporting deviance in rugby union are further explored.   
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10 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW INTRODUCTION 
 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
The review of salient academic literature, as well as other pertinent resources, will be split 
into three chapters: 1) Defining Sports Related ‘violence’; 2) Theorising the Occurrence of 
‘sports violence’; and, 3) Legal Doctrine: Applying the Law to Sports, with an additional 
chapter, The RFU: Disciplinary Structure, to provide further contextual background. 
Segregation of chapters was implemented as it allowed for a more detailed dissection of 
topics in a manner which granted a more straightforward read. Similarly, splitting up topics 
also offers the opportunity to reference sections of the review when discussing participant 
opinion, without the reader having to search through the entirety of the review. Of course, 
separation of chapters does not mean that associations cannot be made between topics. Each 
chapter, when appropriate, will establish links to alternative subjects, whether this be within 
different chapters or outside the discourse of the thesis.  
 Chapter 3, Defining Sports Related ‘violence’, will focus on the complications 
associated with constructing a definition of ‘sports violence’. Within this, key ideas from 
Smith (1988), and the more contemporary work of Hamby (2017), will provide an insight 
into how composing a generalised definition of ‘violence’ can prove troublesome, let alone 
a translation appropriate to the violent arena of contact sports. Moreover, discrepancies in 
the interpretation of ‘violence’ between the RFU and CPS will be examined, revealing how 
easily one can fit into the other, and thus, what factors might be affecting such fluidity. 
Through the use of academic discourse, it is hoped that an applicable definition for ‘sports 
violence’ can be established, and the issues arising when doing so can be further understood.  
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Chapter 4 will discuss how social theory can aid in understanding why participator 
‘violence’ materialises during contests on the pitch. Theoretical explanations for the 
occurrence of ‘violence’ will be explored, with the aim of providing an illustration of the 
factors pushing an individual to perform ‘violence’ on the pitch. Such a discussion will 
utilise a composition of Norbert Elias’ (1969) figurational sociology and elements of Karl 
Marx’s (1818-83) assumptions to explain how the processes of society throughout history 
has created the conditions for legitimate ‘sports violence’. This will be complimented with 
an interactionist approach broached by George Mead (1934) and Herbert Blumer (1969) to 
aid in understanding how individual interactions with such societal structures establish a 
sports ethic that contributes to the reproduction and maintenance of ‘sports violence’.  
Chapter 5, Legal Doctrine: Applying the Law to Sports, includes an extensive 
discussion of how the criminal law can be applied to participator ‘violence’ in rugby union, 
and the problems associated with doing so. Firstly, the demarcation of consent will be 
investigated. The playing rules as a stringent limit for consent (MRLA, 1976) will be 
scrutinised, proposing the development of a playing culture (Gardiner, 2012; and, Livings, 
2016) as a means of delineating consent coterminous with the “unwritten conventions” 
(Dunning and Sheard, 2005: 29) of a sport. Secondly, the intertwining issues arising out of 
establishing a prima facie case in contact sports will take centre stage, paying particular 
focus to the mens rea requirements of the statutory assaults in the OAPA 1861. Here, the 
ontological implications of consent, intention and recklessness will be dissected, whilst the 
efficacy of prosecutorial discretion will be reviewed as a remedy for such ontological 
complications. Finally, the various other dispute resolution approaches will be examined, 
but most importantly, the applicability and capability of internal regulation will be put under 
inspection, and whether such regulation would prove more effective with absolute legal 
discretion.  
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The final chapter, The RFU: Disciplinary Structure, will provide a meticulous 
review of the current RFU disciplinary system, assessing for any possible areas for 
improvement. Within the review, the transformation of RFU discipline with the turn of 
professionalism will be explored, whereby the increased commercial pressures associated 
with the growth of the sport led the RFU to reform its disciplinary structure and become a 
more legalistic entity. Moreover, the hierarchical system of RFU discipline will be 
explained to make understanding the process as a whole more straightforward. Further to 
the hierarchical structure, the sanctioning process and its entry points will be discussed, 
offering an explanation of how the RFU works towards issuing a sanction. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEFINING SPORTS RELATED ‘VIOLENCE’ 
 
 
 
3.1. Defining ‘sports violence’ 
 
Defining ‘violence’ has been a centre for debate over the last century, with each discipline 
constructing bespoke interpretations of the concept (Smith, 1988). The central question 
regarding the composition of ‘violence’ remains differentially defined and understood by 
legal experts, criminologists, sociologists, animal biologists, law enforcement officials, and 
policy makers. Indeed, noteworthy advances have been made in the study and prevention 
of ‘violence’. However, in a statement by Smith (1988: 1), which is as applicable to the 
subject today as it was then, is that “the concepts of ‘violence’ have come to have so many 
meanings that they have lost a good deal of their meaning”. Jackman (2002: 388) concurs, 
suggesting how many scholars “bemoan the lack of cohesion in research on ‘violence’ … 
(yet) most scholars have proceeded without hesitation as though the conceptual tangle has 
been cleared”. Jackman (2002: 388) continues, proposing that “researchers commonly refer 
to phenomenon called ‘violence’ that implies a clearly understood, generic class of 
behaviours, and yet no such concept exists”.   
The following section will explore the problems associated with establishing a 
definition of ‘violence’, particularly player ‘violence’ in contact sports. When considering 
the problems associated when interpreting ‘violence’, the facets of ‘violence’ provided by 
both sport sociologist Smith (1988) and the more recent socio-psychologist Hamby (2017) 
will be applied. Additionally, Smith’s (1988) typology of player ‘violence’ will be assessed 
to see how it has aged, and if it can still be applied to definitions of ‘sports violence’ today. 
Finally, the definition of ‘violence’ provided by the RFU and CPS will be compared for 
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aligning or contrasting features, and therefore, if there are any obstacles affecting the 
application of such definitions to the sports setting.   
 
3.2. Broader Definitions of ‘violence’ and Aggression  
 
As mentioned, authors of ‘violence’ have tended to focus on certain elements of ‘violence’ 
when constructing definitions to make it more applicable to their academic discipline. One 
scholar provides a narrow definition, describing ‘violence’ as “the threat or exertion of 
physical force which could cause bodily injury” (Ball-Rokeach, 1972: 101). Another 
presents a broader definition: “any violation of the human rights of a person” (Riga, 1969: 
145). A third theorist defines it in more abstract terms as “extensive and radical changes 
within a short interval of time produced by given forces in the qualities and structures of 
anything” (Gotesky, 1974: 146).  
Observation of just these three examples displays the vast variations in definition. 
For Smith (1988), such conceptual confusion is caused by two interrelated factors. Firstly, 
each discipline tackles the definition of ‘violence’ from their own unique perspective, 
hoping to make it applicable to their domain. These disciplines explore various aspects of 
the phenomena, or the same aspect from a different angle. Secondly, scholars are mistaken 
if they view ‘violence’ and aggression from a unitary outlook, as if all their forms were 
merely aspects of the same phenomenon. Rather, Smith (1988: 1) proposes that “different 
dimensions of these behaviours stem from different sources, not any single source, such as 
instinct or frustration, as has been claimed in the past”. Therefore, if forms of aggression 
and ‘violence’ are more dichotomous than alike, then an inquiry into a single, universally 
purposeful definition may prove trivial.  
Exploring definitions of aggression is not within the scope of this discussion, 
however, a brief clarification can only aid in understanding the disparities between 
 
 
16 
aggression and ‘violence’. Aggression is widely considered a generic concept, forming a 
collective term for “any form of behaviour directed toward the goal of harming or injuring 
another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment” (Baron and Richardson, 
1994: 37). ‘Violence’ on the other hand, is a form of aggression which is typically identified 
as behaviour in which “extreme harm is its goal” (Anderson and Bushman, 2002: 29). To 
provide a sporting example, a rugby player pushing another player after a ruck is a form of 
aggression, but not ‘violence’. This would only turn violent once serious harm is the aim – 
a concept which will be explored later on in the analysis. In an attempt at making defining 
‘violence’ for given disciplines clearer, both Smith (1988) and Hamby (2017) provide 
elements which are essential for consideration. The ensuing sections will encompass a 
review of both authors’ perspective, comparing them to the setting of sport for reliability.    
 
3.2.1 ‘Violence’ and Intent 
 
Intent is a concept under much deliberation to those who study ‘violence’ due to the 
ambiguous nature of determining it. Intentions are exclusive to the individual, not directly 
observable and difficult to establish. Some scholars, such as Toch (1980), consider the 
notion ‘intent to injure’ in their discussions. Yet, this immediately encounters several 
difficulties as to the meaning of ‘intent to injure’. Baron and Richardson (1994) propose 
that one common characteristic of intent is that the harm-doer voluntarily injured the victim. 
But this raises the complex question of whether human behaviour is really a matter of free 
will, in a world where all decisions are influenced, however so mildly, to some degree. This 
convoluted question is best left to philosophical minds, however, it does raise awareness as 
to the degree to which an individual’s violent behaviour is a result of direct or indirect 
means.  
Smith (1988: 4) condemns the idea of ‘intent to injure’ suggesting it “diverts 
attention from what is often called instrumental ‘violence’, in which harm doing is not an 
 
 
17 
end in itself, but only a means of achieving some other end”. Of course, it could be proposed 
that all forms of ‘violence’ have external motivators outside of simply causing the harm 
itself. Yet, it is the divergent nature of the ends sought which may separate the intent. For 
example, in the game of rugby, a player may employ the use of ‘violence’ to target a 
particularly talented player on the opposition team. In this instance, the subsequent harm 
caused is only a means of achieving a tactical aim – removing the player from the pitch, 
thus making the probabilities of winning greater – not an end goal in itself. Moreover, such 
aims may be the consequence of vicarious liability, whereby the individual is coached, or 
even ordered to inflict such harm, despite it not necessarily being their desired intention.  
This is not also to say that incentives for ‘violence’ cannot change prior or during a 
violent act. Smith (1988) considers how the prospect of rewards or punishment for violent 
behaviour can alter the probability of the behaviour occurring, and the severity of the act. 
This notion is observed by Toates, Smid and van Den Berg (2017) in their study on the 
impact of incentive-motivation and hierarchical control on sexual ‘violence’. Toates et al 
(2017: 241) suggest that “inhibitory factors arise from … cognitions (e.g. concern about the 
consequences of sexual transgression)”. This concern for the consequences of action can be 
observed in the rugby setting, where, as in the previous example, the player is planning on 
using ‘violence’ to target a proficient opposition player. The perpetrator may lift the 
opponent into the air, with the plan of dropping them on their head. However, the possibility 
of the referee giving a red card for such action causes the player to drop them on their lower 
back instead. Here, the probability of punishment caused the individual to change their 
incentive and goal, and thus their intent.  
 Although the tackle in the previous example may not have had the intent to cause 
serious injury, dropping another player onto their back with force could still be seen as 
violent as the probability of serious injury resulting was high. Hamby (2017: 175) advocates 
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that “intent cannot be limited to incidents when the perpetrator admits to a desire to cause 
the specific resulting harm”, thus, it needs to be expanded to include “intent to engage in 
reckless and dangerous behaviour, where the harmful outcome could have been foreseen” 
(Hamby, 2017: 175). Acknowledgment of reckless and negligent behaviour can be seen in 
the realms of public health and law and needs to be acknowledged when considering 
definitions of player ‘violence’. The legal sphere has shown willingness to define intent in 
terms of intent to cause the outcome, but also of knowing that in achieving such an outcome, 
certain actions may be inevitable. This is outlined in the 1993 document Legislating the 
Criminal Code: Offences Against the Person and General Principles Report (Law 
Commission, No. 218: 8):  
 
[A] person acts . . . ‘intentionally’ with respect to a result when-  
 
(i) it is his purpose to cause it; or  
(ii) although it is not his purpose to cause that result, he knows that it would 
occur in the ordinary course of events if he were to succeed in his purpose of 
causing some other result. 
 
 
Here, intent is not stringently attached to the presence of purpose, but rather includes aspects 
of recklessness, insofar as the individual acted intentionally if they had knowledge that such 
an action may occur when attempting to achieve their goal. Such a definition may prove 
insightful when constructing a definition of ‘violence’, particularly in the sport setting, 
where acts of aggression are inherent to the nature of the sport. As such, it becomes 
incredibly important to recognise that some acts which fall under reckless, may constitute 
‘violence’, and thus, deserve their place in definitions of ‘violence’ on the pitch.  
 
Further complications arise when considering the various levels of a sport, as those 
actions considered deliberate at one level may not be similarly regarded at another. For 
example, due to the proficiency of players at the top level of rugby, the occurrence of a 
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tackling player swinging their arm into the face of an opposition attacking player, might be 
considered intentional. Here, the tackling player would have been expected to tackle 
appropriately considering their competence in the game. As such, the most likely 
explanation is that it was intentional. In contrast, a similar incident at the lower level of the 
game, may be more likely to be labelled as reckless, as individuals can easily make a 
seemingly dangerous mistake due to their inefficiency in the sport. Thus, when considering 
the inclusion of intent in definitions of ‘violence’, particularly ‘sports violence’, one must 
acknowledge its circumstantial nature, and the need for an interpretation that can be adapted 
accordingly.  
 
3.2.2. ‘Violence’ and Harmful Outcomes  
 
The outcome of a violent act, similar to that of intent, is a hotly debated issue when 
considering definitions of ‘violence’. Smith (1988) discusses how the inherent problems 
when talking about intent could be completely bypassed if the definition focused purely on 
the outcome. Olweus (1999: 12) defines ‘violence’ as “aggressive behaviour in which the 
actor or perpetrator uses his or her own body or an object to inflict injury or discomfort upon 
another individual”. This definition displays the problems associated with what Toch (1980) 
describes as ‘product-centred’ interpretations. Olweus’ (1999: 12) definition broadly 
includes acts which may not necessarily be seen as ‘violent’, such as accidental occurrences 
or acts with universally accepted prosocial ends (e.g. surgery).  Product-centred definitions 
can also run the risk of being too narrow.  
When considering his definition of ‘violence’, Smith (1988: 3) refers to ‘violence’ 
as ‘physical’, proposing that “physical ‘violence’ is qualitatively different from other forms 
of ‘violence’, it has a finality that others do not”, while also advocating that “physical 
‘violence’ represents the end point on a continuum of aggressive behaviour: it is the most 
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extreme form of aggression”. While physical ‘violence’ may have a severity that other forms 
of ‘violence’ do not, this is not to say that it is the only form of ‘violence’ that should or can 
be acknowledged. Hamby (2017: 174) agrees, stating that those “definitions that suggest 
that harm requires visible physical injury or death are defining harm too narrowly”. For 
Hamby (2017), those acts which cause adverse health implications long after its occurrence 
– such as domestic or caregiver ‘violence’ – need to be categorised as ‘extreme’ harm.  
When contemplating outcome in ‘sports violence’ definitions, it should be noted that 
in contact sports, particularly in light of the recent evidence on concussion (Marshall and 
Spencer, 2001; Strain et al., 2013; and Piertrosimone and Mihalik, 2015), the understanding 
of acceptable force is constantly being redefined. The recent efforts by World Rugby to 
clamp down on dangerous play, particularly high tackles and ‘tip tackles’ (tackles where 
the focal of the force is around the head area), is an example of this. Here, World Rugby 
(2016) adopted “a zero-tolerance approach to reckless and accidental head contact”, 
whereby the minimum sanction for a reckless tackle is now a yellow card rather than a mere 
penalty. Therefore, when defining ‘violence’ in sport the rules of the game, and the general 
attitude towards certain dangerous play within the sporting community should be taken into 
account.  
 
3.2.3. ‘Violence’ and Legitimacy  
 
One reason for why definitions of ‘violence’ vary considerably between disciplines may be 
due to the extent ‘violence’ is perceived as necessary, justified or good by the labeller. For 
instance, institutionalised ‘violence’ – that performed by individuals and groups backed by 
the state, such as the police – is largely referred to as force, and therefore ‘appropriate’ 
‘violence’ (Smith, 1988). Whereas, when looking from the eyes of the victim, one might 
perceive institutionalised ‘violence’ to be unjustified or unnecessary. This phenomenon is 
discussed by Scott (2015) in his review on police brutality towards black people in America. 
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Here, Scott (2015: 16) refers to the “knot in their (black population) chests when a squad 
car slides up next to them in traffic is the twinge of sheer terror”. Yet, Scott states how many 
of the cases of police brutality – although seen as violence by the black community – were 
either dismissed completely, or those officers involved received very light or unspecified 
punishment. This creates a situation which leaves the “police feeling comfortable in 
deploying any act of violence in their toolbox, no matter how reckless” (Scott, 2015: 16). 
Indeed, Scott’s focus is very different to that framed in this essay, however, sports, 
particularly contact sports, can also be considered to have contrasting views of legitimate 
‘violence’. The behaviour deemed acceptable, and therefore non-violent, in sports like 
rugby, would most definitely be viewed as ‘violence’ if performed outside the sporting 
arena. Therefore, even though agents within the institution of sport see contact in their sport 
as legitimate, when viewed from an outside perspective, one might have a contrasting 
opinion on such legitimacy.  
The legitimacy of potentially violent behaviour can also be considered from an 
alternative perspective; what Hamby (2017) terms ‘nonessential behaviour’. This kind of 
behaviour would constitute those acts where the force used was maladaptive and “does not 
serve a legitimate function that could not also be obtained by nonviolent means” (Hamby, 
2017: 170). This concept was observed in Thomas and Louis’ (2014) study on the 
effectiveness of violent and non-violent collective action. They found that violent forms of 
protest were deemed more unnecessary and less effective in most situations than their non-
violent counterparts. This idea of ‘nonessential behaviour’ may prove important when 
considering definitions of ‘violence’, as it “provides more insight into acts that are 
appropriately considered human aggression, but not ‘violence’” (Hamby, 2017: 170).  
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3.2.4. ‘Violence’ as Unwanted Behaviour  
 
It may seem obvious that ‘violence’ is unwanted, but it is an important point for 
consideration when distinguishing ‘violence’ from other prosocial or innocuous behaviour. 
Some forms of physical force, even injurious force, have the possibility to not be unwanted 
(Hamby, 2017). In contact sports, players participate in the sport knowing and willingly 
subjecting themselves to sometimes extreme physical acts. Indeed, this is not to say that a 
player cannot step onto a rugby pitch and deem a tackle unwanted. However, by simply 
agreeing to play the sport, that person is showing that they want, and accept, that a certain 
amount of force is going to be used. Such a notion is termed ‘volenti non fit injuria’ in the 
legal domain (James, 2001), and is literally translated to: ‘to a willing person, injury is not 
done’. Within the sphere of legal principle, volenti non fit injuria refers to the obligation of 
an individual to accept the contact implicit to an activity if they are to be a participator in 
such activity (Young, 1991). In reference to sport, this concept suggests that by simply 
agreeing to participate in the sport, an athlete is consenting to the inherent dangers 
associated with that sport. In the case of Hamby’s (2017) approach, the athlete would be 
implying that any dangers are not ‘unwanted’. It must be noted, although this seems 
relatively straight forward in its approach, the extent of force which is deemed legitimate 
and thus ‘wanted’ in contact sports is a particularly enigmatic area, and one discussed in 
Chapter 6. Nevertheless, such questions regarding unsought behaviour is a must 
consideration when applying an annotation to ‘violence’, even more so in the context of 
sport where the lines of expected behaviour may become blurred.  
 
3.2.5. A Definition of ‘violence’  
 
After considering the elements discussed in the previous sections – intent, outcome, 
legitimacy and unwanted – it is now possible to establish a definition of ‘violence’ which 
takes into account the fundamental facets discussed, but also the complications attached to 
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the sport setting. Young (2012: 14) proposes that the definition provided by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO, 2018) presents a particularly applicable definition:  
 
[T]he intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in 
or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment, or deprivation.  
 
 
The WHO’s (2018) interpretation of ‘violence’ addresses the issue of intent. It refers to “the 
intentional use of physical force or power” while also referring to acts with a “high 
likelihood of resulting in injury” (reckless). Moreover, it includes a specific list of outcomes 
- injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, and deprivation - which can be 
considered ‘harmful outcomes’ of a violent act. Despite this, it lacks attention to the 
unwanted facet of ‘violence’. One reason for this may be to include self-harm within its 
definition, as it explicitly refers to ‘violence’ “against oneself”. However, this leads to the 
tricky question of whether those who self-harm truly want to experience the violent 
behaviour, or whether it is something that is unwanted but the individual feels like it is 
needed or deserved. Such queries are not within the scope of this discussion, but, for the 
purpose of establishing a definition of ‘violence’ the present study will propose that the 
WHO’s definition does not account for the unwanted element. As such, the definition has 
been redefined below to recognise the unwanted facet of ‘violence’:  
 
[T]he intentional use of unwanted physical force or power, threatened or actual, 
against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either 
results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological 
harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.  
 
 
Such a definition accounts for all the elements of ‘violence’, whilst also providing enough 
breadth to account for the convoluted nature of ‘violence’ in the sporting arena. As such, 
for the purpose of this study, when discussing ‘violence’, one will be referring to the 
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definition provided above. Following this definition, the various formations of ‘sports 
violence’ (Young, 2012), which are found under such a definition can be considered. As 
will be proposed, formations of ‘sports violence’ not only include those actions performed 
by participators, but also include a vast landscape of harmful, or abusive, behaviours. A 
fully comprehensive discussion of all formations is not within the ambit of this study, 
however a brief mention of what Young (2012) refers to as ‘sports related ‘violence’’ (SRV) 
will be presented.  
 
 
3.3. Defining ‘violence’ in Sport 
 
3.3.1. Formations of Sports Related ‘violence’  
 
In his seminal work on ‘sports violence’, Young (2012) proposes not only the sociological 
usefulness, but also the sociological necessity to approach ‘sports violence’ as a vast 
landscape of multiple forms of ‘violence’ which are all connected under the banner of 
‘sport’. This is in contrast to simply focusing on the obvious and highly researched 
individual areas of ‘sports violence’. For Young (2012) these various forms, or formations 
as he refers, make up the components of SRV. Young (2012: 98) submits what he terms the 
‘SRV matrix’, comprising of eighteen cells (formations) as a method of “expanding 
understanding of behaviours that threaten, harm and victimise in and through sport”. This 
matrix is provided in Table 1, which is an extract from Young (2012). When analysing the 
matrix, one should avoid looking at the cells as mutually exclusive. Rather, the cells can be 
used in combination with one another to “account for the genesis, manifestation and 
ramification of sport cultures in many settings and … at different levels” (Young, 2012: 99). 
Indeed, the present study aims its focus towards player ‘violence’, however, Young’s (2012) 
concept of sports related ‘violence’ and its subsequent formations, is a useful method for 
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understanding that ‘sports violence’ is a complex, multidimensional phenomena that is not 
restricted to the confines of player and crowd ‘violence’.  
The ensuing sections will centre discussion on how the legitimacy of player 
‘violence’ can be characterised, despite the enigmatic complexion of legitimacy that 
accompanies contact sports. Smith’s (1988) typology of player ‘violence’ will be examined 
and compared to contemporary perceptions of legitimacy in an attempt to understand the 
boundaries of acceptability.  
 
 
 
3.3.2. A Typology of ‘sports violence’  
 
The preceding sections outlined the complications when constructing a definition of 
‘violence’, even more so when applied to the sport setting. In his seminal work on legitimate 
‘violence’, Smith (1988) developed a typology which may aid in understanding and defining 
on-field player ‘violence’ in rugby. Smith (1988) proposes four forms - brutal body contact, 
borderline ‘violence’, quasi-criminal ‘violence’, and criminal ‘violence’ - under two 
headings: relatively legitimate and relatively illegitimate. A brief summary of each category 
can be found in Table 2. Within this work Smith (1988) considers the viewpoints of the law, 
the players and the public. The following discussion will review Smith’s work in the context 
of modern sport to assess how the typology has matured, and thus, how it might be altered 
to reflect contemporary perceptions of player ‘violence’ in contact sports.  
Table 1: Formations of sports-related ‘violence’ (Young, 2012) 
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Relatively Legitimate  
 
Brutal Body Contact  
 
This category of ‘violence’ “comprises all significant body contact performed within the 
official rules of a given sport” (Smith, 1988: 10). Actions within this class encompass the 
normative actions of a sport, and it is taken for granted that by simply playing the sport, 
players accept that this form of behaviour will occur. From a legal perspective, the term 
Table 2: Smith’s (1988) typology of ‘sports violence’  
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volenti non fit injuria (to a willing person, injury is not done) will apply as a defence, as 
players are said to have consented to such force by agreeing to play the sport. This type of 
‘violence’ is relatively unproblematic, as the behaviour one can expect is clearly defined in 
the rule book. As such, when considered brutal body contact in rugby union, one would 
refer to the collisions found in tackles, rucks and mauls as examples.  
Nevertheless, it becomes of interest when it develops into what Smith (1988) terms 
‘brutality’. This is where there is a pandemic of a particular act, which has become so 
frequent in the sport that it may demand review. This is best seen in World Rugby’s 
tightening on the laws surrounding high tackles in response to evidence regarding 
concussion (Marshall and Spencer, 2001; Strain et al., 2013; and Piertrosimone and Mihalik, 
2015). Such changes were introduced as a means of “changing the culture in sport to ensure 
that the head is a no-go area” (World Rugby, 2016).  
 
Borderline ‘violence’  
 
Borderline ‘violence’ includes actions that, although prohibited by the formal rules of a 
sport, is very much accepted as ‘part of the game’ (Smith, 1988). Dunning and Sheard 
(2005: 29) describe this category of behaviour as comprising the ‘unwritten conventions’ of 
a sport. Here, such conventions are not easily captured by reference to the rules alone, but 
only understood by those who understand the culture of a sport. Behaviour in this category 
can occasionally result in serious injury, nonetheless, such injury is usually dismissed as an 
unfortunate consequence of the sport. Borderline ‘violence’ very rarely goes beyond the 
realm of the referee, with higher authorities – such as the disciplinary officers of the sport, 
or law enforcement – leaving it to be dealt with on the pitch. Gardiner (1994, cited in 
Gardiner, 2012: 50), justifies this sense of discretion by referring to the ‘working culture of 
a sport’:  
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An injury caused due to an illegal tackle that amounts to a foul within the rules 
of the sport is also likely to be seen as consensual. It may be contrary to the rules 
of the game but may well be inside … the ‘working culture’ of the sport. 
Consent is not limited solely by the formal rules in contact sports. 
 
 
An example of a rule within these ‘unwritten convention’ in rugby, could be the high tackle. 
Many players will view the high tackle as simply being a by-product of a fast paced, physical 
game. However, it should be made apparent that similar to the tightening of certain acts in 
brutal body contact, the actions comprising this category of ‘violence’ is flexible. For 
instance, World Rugby (2016) introduced a “zero tolerance approach” to contact with the 
head in rugby, increasing the sanctions for a high tackle to a minimum of a yellow card. As 
a result, this has meant more and more high tackles, which were once considered acceptable 
as part of the game, are making their way into rugby disciplinary hearings. Therefore, this 
section of Smith’s typology is constantly in motion, with many of the acts once considered 
firm residents, now moving more towards the Quasi-Criminal category.  
 
Relatively Illegitimate  
 
Quasi-Criminal ‘violence’  
 
This group of ‘violence’ consists of those actions that not only violates the formal rules of 
a sport, but also breaches the ‘unwritten conventions’ (Dunning and Sheard, 2005) of the 
sport. Often leading to serious injuries, these type of acts are deemed so inappropriate by 
players, referees and sporting officials, that there is no question that it should go through 
the sporting disciplinary process. An example would be punching or kicking in rugby, which 
is forbidden under law 9, section 12, of World Rugby’s Laws of the Game. Committing 
either a punch or a kick would almost certainly be deemed worthy of the grant of a red card 
from the referee, and a ban from the sporting authorities. For Smith (1988) such incidents 
can cause public outrage, because of the injury caused or from the inappropriateness of the 
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act, that it puts pressure on both the victim and legal authorities to go down the criminal law 
route. Despite Smith’s (1988) considerations of the law, criminal authorities are still 
reluctant to get involved. In Barnes, Lord Woolf suggests that most cases of sporting 
‘violence’ should be kept within the sport:  
 
In determining what the approach of the courts should be, the starting point is 
the fact that most organised sports have their own disciplinary procedures for 
enforcing their particular rules and standards of conduct. As a result, in the 
majority of situations there is not only no need for criminal proceedings, it is 
undesirable (911). 
 
 
This tier of Smith’s (1988) typology is still largely applicable to modern contact sports, but, 
as mentioned in the previous section, many of the acts which would have constituted 
borderline ‘violence’, have no moved more towards the quasi-criminal end of the scale, 
largely due to the efforts of many sports and the legal authorities to clamp down on 
dangerous play.  
 
Criminal ‘violence’  
 
Smith (1988: 21) refers to this category as comprising of “‘violence’ so serious and 
obviously outside the boundaries of what could be considered part of the game that it is 
handled from the outset by the law”. It could be suggested that this category of Smith’s 
(1988) typology is relatively outdated, as he suggests that “death is often involved” and that 
“almost all incidents, though closely tied to the game events, take place prior to or after the 
contest itself” (Smith, 1988: 21). Indeed, there are cases where death occurs, such as the 
infamous incident involving the death of Australian cricketer Philip Hughes (NSW State 
Coroners Court, 2016), or there is an assault off the pitch, yet, this is not an exhaustive 
account of all incidents that go down the route of the law. Those acts which constitute 
criminal ‘violence’ are no longer the obscene acts of ‘violence’ referred to by Smith (1988). 
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Rather, it now encompasses less extreme incidents, such as severe assaults. In the case of 
Calton, a young rugby player was convicted of GBH after kicking an opponent in the face. 
Another example would be the case of Gingell, where repeated punches to an opposition 
rugby player resulted in six months imprisonment.  
 
 
3.3.3. Usefulness of Smith’s Typology  
 
Smith’s (1988) classification system provides a useful framework for understanding and 
defining player ‘violence’ in contact sports. Yet, the categories quasi-criminal and criminal 
‘violence’ may need alteration, in that modern sport is more sensitive to violent acts than it 
was in 1988. Moreover, sporting regulatory bodies are much more active in the modern, 
professional game. This may be due to external societal pressures, whether that be from the 
courts or fans. However so, sporting disciplinary bodies regulate far more stringently than 
previous. As such, some acts which fell into borderline ‘violence’ when Smith (1988) 
created the typology, would now potentially fall under the heading of quasi-criminal 
‘violence’ (e.g. the high tackle in rugby). In a similar manner, some incidents that Smith 
(1988) would have regarded as quasi-criminal (e.g. repeated punching or kicking), may find 
themselves being categorised as criminal ‘violence’ in the modern era.  
Nevertheless, Smith’s (1988) typology can help towards understanding how the 
boundaries of acceptability may be categorised in contact sports, whilst also offering an 
opportunity to reveal how perceptions of legitimate behaviour are constantly being 
redefined in accordance with societal pressures. Indeed, legal intervention into the sporting 
arena has become more frequent (Young, 2012), but, this is not to say that establishing legal 
liability is now effortless or homogeneous. Generally, the boundaries of legal intervention 
are still shrouded in ambiguity and debate, as will be explored in Chapter 6. The following 
section will briefly consider the similarities in definition between the RFU and CPS, in an 
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attempt to reveal how the ambiguity in applying legal liability to English rugby union is not 
a problem of definition. 
 
3.3.4. The RFU and CPS Definitions of ‘violence’  
 
Now definitions of ‘violence’ and ‘sports violence’ have been considered, one can compare 
the definitions of ‘violence’ provided by World Rugby and the CPS to look for aligning or 
problematic features affecting the application of each. World Rugby does not refer to 
‘violence’ explicitly in their Laws of the Game, however, they provide details of what they 
label as ‘dangerous play’, which is largely behaviour that is unacceptably dangerous in the 
sport. Thus, for the purpose of comparison, dangerous play shall be used interchangeably 
with ‘violence’.    
In Law 9, section 11 of the Laws of the Game, World Rugby (2018) state that 
“[p]layers must not do anything that is reckless or dangerous to others”, continuing in 
section 12 to propose that: 
 
A player must not physically or verbally abuse anyone. Physical abuse includes, 
but is not limited to, biting, punching, contact with the eye or eye area, striking 
with any part of the arm (including stiff-arm tackles), shoulder, head or knee(s), 
stamping, trampling, tripping or kicking.  
 
 
Law 9 then goes onto describe a wide array of other forms of behavior which are prohibited, 
such as, but not limited to, late tackles (s. 13), tackling an opponent in the air (s. 17), and 
‘tip’ tackles (s. 18). Nonetheless, sections 11 and 12, are the areas of most relevance when 
discussing what most people refer to as ‘violence’.  
When comparing World Rugby’s interpretation of dangerous play to definitions of 
‘violence’ in English criminal law, it becomes apparent that those actions proscribed by 
section 12 of the Laws of the Game comfortably coincide with that of the law. For instance, 
section 47 of the Offences Against the Persons Act, 1861, states that “[w]hosoever shall be 
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convicted upon an indictment of any assault occasioning actual bodily harm shall be liable 
… to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding five years” (OAPA, 1861). In Donovan, 
actual bodily harm (ABH) is referred to as “any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with 
the health or comfort of the victim”. This definition of ABH is relatively broad and doesn’t 
offer much in the way of delineating specific acts. The CPS Charging Standard only 
suggests that there has been indication of ABH when “[m]ore than minor injury is caused 
by kicking or head-butting” (CPS, 2018).  
The definition of section 12 provided by World Rugby would fall directly into this 
category. World Rugby’s definition would even fall straight under the more serious s. 18, 
where wounding or inflicting GBH is required. Wounding is characterised in Moriarty v 
Brooks as “a breaking of the inner and outer skin”, while GBH is interpreted as “serious 
injury” (Saunders, 1985). Brooks et al (2005) in their study on the epidemiology of injuries 
in English rugby union reported that of 1000 player-hours, there were 56 fractures, 588 
serious joint and ligament issues, and 18 serious lacerations. This displays the vast array of 
incidents which, in the eyes of the law, would be deemed serious enough to fall under either 
s. 47, 2. 20, or s. 18 of the OAPA 1861). This then brings us to the question: what is stopping 
all these incidents from being brought under scrutiny from the courts? Such a topic is 
discussed later in the study, where Chapter 6 will focus on why prosecutorial discretion has 
made sport a “zone of legal exemption” (Livings, 2016). The following chapter will 
consider how sociological theory can aid in understanding the occurrence of player 
‘violence’ in rugby. 
 
3.4. Summary  
 
Defining ‘violence’ is not unequivocal, it is subject to ambiguity due to the term holding 
various interpretations in different academic disciplines. Each discipline, such as 
criminology, biology and law, hope to create a bespoke interpretation whereby the facets of 
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such a definition best describe their outlook on ‘violence’. The socio-legal realm of sport is 
no different. As can be seen in the preceding discussion, constructing a definition of 
‘violence’ in sport requires certain attention not only to the formal rules but also to the 
‘unwritten conventions’ (Dunning and Sheard, 2005) of a sport. Moreover, as was 
postulated by Young (2012), ‘sports violence’ is not limited solely to crowd and player 
‘violence’. Rather, ‘sports violence’ includes a wide array of formations of ‘violence’ which 
are all linked under the general banner of sport. As such, rather than referring to ‘violence’ 
in sport as sport ‘violence’, it was concluded that Young’s (2012) term of sports-related 
‘violence’ is more suitable. Through consideration of Smith’s (1988) and Hamby’s (2017) 
four key elements of ‘violence’ – intent, harmful outcome, legitimacy, and unwanted 
behavior – and Young’s (2012) examination of relevant definitions, it was determined that 
the WHO’s (2018) definition acknowledged by Young (2012) best describes sports-related 
‘violence’ in sport. As such, when discussing sports-related ‘violence’, one will be referring 
to the WHO (2018) definition.  
Yet, when discussing player ‘violence’ in contact sports, applying the WHO’s 
(2018) definition can face some issues, such as the confinements of acceptability, and 
therefore what constitutes illegitimate and unwanted ‘violence’. This is where Smith’s 
(1988) typology of player ‘violence’ becomes useful. The four categories of ‘violence’ 
provided by Smith (1988) – brutal body contact, borderline ‘violence’, quasi-criminal 
‘violence’, and criminal ‘violence’ – separated under two titles, relatively legitimate and 
relatively illegitimate, helps understand how ‘violence’ can be interpreted in contact sports. 
However, Smith’s (1988) typology is not immune from scrutiny. It is suggested that Smith’s 
(1988) typology may be slightly outdated, insofar as what constituted legitimate and 
illegitimate has changed in the thirty years since its conception. Legal intervention in sport, 
particularly in contact sports such as ice hockey, American football, rugby union and rugby 
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league, has increased (Young, 2012) over the years meaning those acts that fall into quasi-
criminal may perhaps now fall under criminal ‘violence’. Similarly, disciplinary bodies of 
sports are also more willing to provide a stringent system. As such, those acts suggested by 
Smith (1988) to fall under borderline ‘violence’, may now find themselves in the quasi-
criminal category. Despite the adaptations needed to Smith’s (1988) typology, it still 
provides a useful framework for considering how player ‘violence’ in contact sports can be 
categorised and defined.  
Finally, the definitions of ‘violence’ provided by the World Rugby and the CPS were 
compared. It became clear that not only do World Rugby’s and the CPS’s definitions of 
‘violence’ fall hand in hand, but also that out of all the countless injuries in rugby, that most 
would fall under definitions of ‘violence’ required by the law. The viewpoint of the current 
literature as to why reality does not display such fluidity between World Rugby and CPS 
will be explored in Chapter 6. Whilst the perspective of those presently involved in 
regulating rugby union within and outside of the RFU will be examined in Chapter 8. For 
now, however, the study will turn to the realm of theory, and particularly that of figurational, 
Marxist and interactionist, to help explain why ‘violence’ occurs in sport, despite it being 
rejected in the sphere of everyday life.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
CHAPTER 4 
THEORISING THE OCCURRENCE OF ‘SPORTS VIOLENCE’ 
 
4.1. Theoretical Overview 
 
It is typically agreed that there is no single cause of ‘violence’ in society. This is easily 
observed in the countless number of theories spread across a diverse array of academic 
disciplines. Similar to definitions of ‘violence’, approaches towards explaining it can be 
hugely dependent on the domain and reason for such investigation. Yet, if we truly want to 
gain an understanding of the social world one must adopt a broader view and acknowledge 
what Mills’ (1959) termed ‘the social imagination’. Giddens (2009: 6) refers to the social 
imagination as the ability to “break free from the immediacy of the personal circumstances 
and put things in a wider context”, this is achieved by “thinking ourselves away from the 
familiar routines of our daily lives in order to look at them anew”. In other words, one must 
be willing to view a phenomenon from a different perspective, a perspective which requires 
the mind to be open to views outside of our everyday lives.  
Such perspectives can be at the micro-level, such as the interactions between 
individuals, or at the macro-level, such as the social climate of societies. Some theorists 
subscribe to single approaches, criticising the other for either being too narrow or too broad. 
However, one could argue that a supplementation of both is needed to fully understand the 
inner workings of the social realm. It must be recognised that structures of society are 
established through the interaction of individuals, while the interaction between persons is 
subtly informed by larger social configurations. As such, the ensuing sections will utilise a 
composition of Norbert Elias’ (1969) figurational sociology and elements of Karl Marx’s 
(1818-83) assumptions to explain how the processes of society throughout history has 
created the conditions for legitimate ‘sports violence’. This will be complimented with an 
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interactionist approach broached by George Mead (1934) and Herbert Blumer (1969) to aid 
in understanding how individual interactions with such societal structures establish a sports 
ethic that contributes to the reproduction and maintenance of ‘sports violence’.  
 
4.2. Figurational (Process) Sociology 
 
Based centrally on the work of Norbert Elias (1969), figurational, or ‘process’ sociology, 
refers to the “complex chain of interdependencies and power relationships that exist in, and 
across, human communities” (Layder, 1986: 370). Life itself is a process where human 
beings form figurations through interdependencies and interactions both with each other 
and the environment, in attempts to secure the production and reproduction of their lives 
(Dunning, 1993). Figurational sociologists attempt to bridge the divide between the macro 
and micro, viewing the individual and society not as dichotomous, but rather two divergent 
yet inseparable levels of the human world. Elias (1978: 129) proposed that in order to 
understand mankind, rather than focusing on discrete people, or the figurations of many 
independent people, one must constantly consider both or the “level of observation will 
suffer”. Elias (1978: 130) explains the nature of such figurations, referring to a game of 
cards as an example:  
 
[T]he course of a game is relatively autonomous from every single player. … 
But it does not have substance; it has no being, existence independently of the 
players. … The ‘game’ is no more abstract than the ‘players’. The same applies 
to the figuration formed by the four players sitting around the table. … By 
figuration we mean the changing pattern created by the players as a whole – not 
only by their intellects but by their whole selves, the totality of their dealings in 
their relationships with each other.  
 
 
Observation of the game of cards illuminates how it is the relationship between 
individuals, in this case the players, which make the game. We learn nothing about 
the intricacies of the game if we look at the game itself without the players, and we 
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learn nothing if we focus on an individual player. The following section will explore 
one of the key concepts of Elias’ figurational approach, the civilising process. Firstly, 
a brief overview of the civilising process will be provided. Then, the process will be 
examined against the development of sport to help understand how sport, in the 
modern world, has become a social enclave for legitimate ‘violence’. 
 
4.2.1. The Civilising Process 
 
Fundamental to Elias’ theories of figuration is the concept of a civilising process in 
society, which is said to have occurred just after the middle ages. Dunning and Sheard 
(2005: 7) explain the civilising process as:  
 
an elaboration and refinement of social standards regarding the control of 
‘natural’ functions and the conduct of social relations generally; a 
concomitant increase in the social pressure on people to exercise self-
control; and, at the level of personality, an increase in the importance of 
‘conscience’ as a regulator of behaviour. In the course of this, external 
constraints grew more subtle and all pervasive, and the use of direct force 
was pushed increasingly behind the scenes. At the same time, social 
standards were more deeply and firmly internalised 
 
 
Elias and Dunning (1986) further this, suggesting that the Occident has experienced a 
gradual decline in people’s propensity for obtaining pleasure from directly engaging in and 
witnessing violent acts. This is suggested to have entailed, firstly, due to the lowering of the 
threshold of repugnance regarding bloodshed and other direct manifestations of physical 
‘violence’, and secondly, the internalisation of a stricter taboo on ‘violence’ as part of the 
‘superego’. Elias’ explanations for why such a process would occur are focused around the 
level of state formation, and how this affects the development of manners and repression. 
Elias (1982) links the level of state formation to his figurational perspective, suggesting that 
the increased interdependencies between the aristocracy and the working class produced a 
civilising effect: 
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 As more and more people must attune their conduct to that of others, the web 
of actions must be organised more and more strictly and accurately, if each 
individual action is to fulfil its social function. The individual is compelled to 
regulate his conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more 
stable manner.  (Elias, 1982: 232).  
 
The web of actions grows so complex and extensive, the effort required to behave 
‘correctly’ within it becomes so great, that, beside the individual’s conscious self-control, 
an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly established.  
 
 
4.2.2. The Civilising Process and Sport  
 
Figurational sociologists have considered sport a “collective invention” (Coakley and Pike, 
2014: 51) that provides people with a form of excitement. As such, theorists have focused 
on sport as a means of displaying how the chains of interdependencies have influenced 
society. Much of figurationalist work has been to explain how ‘sport’ acquired its modern 
meaning, which is generally accepted to have developed in eighteenth-century England 
(Murphy et al., 2000). Central to Elias’ (1971) explanation was the link between what he 
termed the ‘sportisation’ process and the process of ‘parliamentarisation of political 
conflict’. 
Elias (1971) used the term ‘sportisation’ to refer to the process whereby the 
framework for sport became more formalised. Rules applying to sports became stricter, the 
rules governing sport became more explicit, precise and written down, while the regulation 
and enforcement of such rules expanded. Moreover, in conjunction with this, people 
developed a greater level of self-restraint while playing sports (Elias and Dunning, 1986), 
finding a balance between combat-tension and protection from injury. Dunning and Sheard 
(2005) document the development of rugby from its polymorphous folk forms, to the 
modern system we see today. Dunning and Sheard (2005: 27) refer to the early forms of 
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football as “rough and wild, closer to ‘real’ fighting than modern sports”. The rules of these 
early forms of football have been described as “virtually non-existent” (Reyburn, 1971: 2), 
with local variations to the way in which the game was played. Howsoever the games were 
played, it is clear that ‘violence’ was at the centre, with Reyburn (1971: 2) describing how 
“the players … went at it with such verve that there was always much property damage, not 
to mention injury to persons”. According to Elias (1986), this notion of a ‘sportisation 
process’ was also linked to the level of state formation in England. Dunning and Coakley 
(2000) reference the seventeenth-century Civil War and the demand for a powerful naval 
force as factors abolishing movements towards a highly centralised state. This then 
contributed to the “landed ruling class not only retaining a high degree of autonomy relative 
to the monarchical state but, via parliament, sharing with the monarch in the tasks of ruling” 
(Dunning and Coakley, 2000: 95). With more people informing the ruling of the state, it 
meant that the interdependency chains between people grew stronger, requiring more 
civilised behaviour if people we going to work together effectively. Elias also describes how 
the more civilised habits developed by the gentry and aristocracy found way into their 
leisure time in the form of organised sports clubs. This in turn added fuel to the ‘sportisation 
processes’ of games. The progression of the rule system, from its local variation in the 
public schools, to the formal inauguration of rules that accompanied the establishment of 
the RFU in 1871 (Dunning and Sheard, 1979), is an example of Elias’ process of 
sportisation.   
From this position, it would be fair to question why sport has remained a social 
enclave for legitimate ‘violence’ considering the seemingly linear nature of the civilising 
process. Such queries have been the primary focus for attack by critiques such as Curtis 
(1986) and Redner (2015), who are keen to label the theory as following a ‘unilinear 
evolution’. Yet, Elias makes particular emphasis on the relative autonomy of the process. 
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Such autonomy is maintained because of the significance of learning on human processes. 
Dunning et al (1993: 42-43) suggest that individuals may “lead it to become more 
differentiated and integrated at a higher level, less differentiated and integrated at a lower 
level, or to remain for a greater or lesser length of time fixed”. Elias (1982: 253) postulated 
the fact the civilising process is fully attuned to the occurrence of short and long-term 
regression:  
 
This movement of society and civilisation certainly does not follow a straight 
line. Within the overall movement there are repeatedly greater or lesser counter-
movements in which the contrasts in society and the fluctuations in the 
behaviour or individuals, their affective outbreaks, increase again.  
 
 
As such, the continued popularity of contact sports such as rugby, mixed martial arts 
(MMA) and boxing, could be said to be a slight regression or slowing in the civilising 
process of sport. However, a regression which Elias’ predicted would accompany the wider 
civilising process (Van Bottenburg and Heilbron, 2006). With all other aspects of social life 
succumbing to the pressures of the civilising process, it is not surprising that societies cling 
on to the competitive, war like contests we see in sport. This is reinforced by the fact that 
sport is closely linked to the state in monetary terms (Young, 2012), insofar as sport can 
generate high amounts of revenue for the state through the use of state-controlled facilities 
and the marketing of land. This then leads on to Marxist assumptions of sport, whereby the 
state, or others, feeding off sport for power or monetary factors, accentuate the ‘violence’ 
in contact sports to make the sport more popular and thus increase their revenue. Such 
notions will be discussed further below, where the ideas of Karl Marx and the exploitation 
of athletes will be used to clarify why sport has become this seemingly anomalous entity in 
the civilising process.  
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4.3. Marxist Sociology  
 
The Marxist theoretical approach is rooted in the work of Karl Marx, 19th-century German 
philosopher, economist and political revolutionary. Marx developed a theory of social 
development based on the analysis of class and class conflict and social change (Collins and 
Jackson, 2007). Central to Marx’s work was socio-economic and political relations, 
interdependencies and power imbalances, paying particular focus to how the bourgeois 
system (capitalism) was “characterised by increased efforts to establish a totalitarian form 
of social differentiation and integration” (Dunning and Coakley, 2000: 30). Marx’s ideas 
are vast and complex, and it is difficult to do the complexity of his work justice in the 
relatively brief overview of this discussion. Nevertheless, at the risk of oversimplication, it 
could be considered that the ensuing sections were central to his work.  
The following sections will discuss Marx’s idea of the economic structure of society 
as a pivotal tool in understanding all aspects of social life, including sport. Within this, the 
exploitative relationships between capitalists and workers will be linked to the way in which 
societies are controlled and class struggles maintained. Yet, the primary message of such 
discussions will be to demonstrate how Marxist assumptions can help explain why 
‘violence’ has been maintained as an emblematic feature in sport, despite the backdrop of a 
civilising society. Firstly, however, it is vital to clarify the fundamentals of Marx’s work 
before it can be examined in relation to sport. Such discussions are the focal point of the 
ensuing section.  
 
4.3.1. The Centrality of the Economic Structure of Society and the Exploitation of the 
Proletariat 
 
Marx (1859/1951) emphasises the importance of the economic structure for understanding 
all aspects of social life. For Marx (1930), it is the ‘mode of production of material life’ – 
the organisation of social processes for producing goods and services – that forms the ‘real 
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foundation’ of society. If we are to understand what Marx terms ‘superstructures’ – those 
not related to the base economy such as the legal system, sport, culture, politics - then we 
need not focus on such structures explicitly, but rather, pay attention to the ‘base’ or 
‘substructure’ of society, as such superstructures can only be fathomed as indirect or direct 
reflections of the economic architecture of society.  
In his work, Marx (1951) distinguishes between various mechanisms for producing 
goods and services, or ‘modes of production’ as he refers to them. Collins and Jackson 
(2007: 30) reference the numerous terms of such modes of production, paying attention to 
the “pattern of relationships between those involved in the production of goods and 
services”. Rigauer (2000: 31) emphasises such relationships as one of “conflict”. Rigauer 
(2000) continues, suggesting that capitalistic economic structures provide a setting for 
socio-economic conflict between the ‘direct producers’ (proletariat, or workers; owners of 
labour power) and the ‘masters of production’ (bourgeoisie, or capitalists; owners of the 
means of production). This in turn produces a class struggle for power, as the “owners of 
the means of production exploit the direct producers financially and supress them 
politically” (Rigauer, 2000: 31). This power imbalance is also characterised by alienation 
and impoverishment. The worker is divorced from the product of labour, they no longer live 
to work, but must work to live. Marx and Engels (2008: 43) refer to such alienation, 
proposing that “the work of the proletarian has lost all individual character, and 
consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine”.  
Marx argued that all existing and previous modes of production have been based on 
an exploitative relationship between the direct producers and masters of production. In such 
modes, the surplus value is benefitted to the bourgeoisie at the expense of an exploited 
proletariat, who, in order to fulfil primary needs, must sell their labour power (Johnston and 
Dolowitz., 1999). As a result of this exploitative relationship of production, an ever-present 
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class struggle arises, one which establishes the central cause of historical development and 
social change. As Marx and Engels (2008: 33) stated in The Communist Manifesto, “the 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”.  
The presence of an exploitative model of production contributes to the maintenance 
and reinforcement of the capitalists’ dominant position. As mentioned previously, Marx 
(1972) emphasises the idea that the economic ‘base’ or substructure of society determines 
the superstructures, such as ideologies or political structure. Therefore, by controlling the 
means of economic production, the bourgeoisie could also be said to have a certain amount 
of control over the state and, as such, the production of ideas. For Tant (1999), having so 
much control in various forms of superstructures meant they had a significant degree of 
control over the social dynamics of the lower classes. This enforcement of control can lead 
to a sense of “false class consciousness” (Collins and Waddington, 2007: 30) in lower 
classes that involves the acceptance of their exploitative position, thus, reinforcing the 
dominant position of the bourgeoisie.  
 
4.3.2. Marxism and Sport  
 
It should be noted that the following discussion will focus on what could be considered the 
orthodox or traditional form of Marxist theory. Scholars adopting the conventional 
approach, such as Brohm (1978), Rigauer (1981), Carrington (2008) and McDonald (2008), 
focus on the dynamics of class relationships in sport, paying particular attention to sport as 
a reflection of the exploitative character of capitalism in society. The following analysis will 
consider the fundamentals of Marx’s theory of power imbalances and class struggles and 
link it to how this is presented in sport. Moreover, such theories will be used to help fathom 
why ‘violence’ has enjoyed a certain degree of maintenance despite the increasing 
sophistication of the outside world.  
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It is largely agreed that Marxist approaches to sport assume that the sporting sphere 
is used as a tool for preparing labourers for capitalist industrial work by encouraging 
acceptance of the type of discipline that is demanded in modern production. Rigauer (2000) 
argues that capitalism dampens creativity and spontaneity, making sport just another form 
of work. Athletes, just like any worker, must sell their labour power to meet their primary 
needs for living. This notion is perhaps best epitomised by Brohm (1978) who describes 
sport as a ‘Prison of measured time’. By this, Brohm (1978: 67) is referring to how 
“principles of capitalist, commercial society structurally determine sport” by transitioning 
it from a symbol of freedom to one of constraint. Such a transition is characterised by the 
abolishment of enjoyment and playful impulse. Moreover, the buying and selling of players 
for their labour power reinforces the idea of players as commodities, making players a unit, 
just like any other commodity under capitalism (Collins and Jackson, 2007).  
As discussed in Section 4.2, with seemingly the entirety of society succumbing to a 
civilising process (Elias, 1982), whereby a repugnance for violence has grown, it is 
unsurprising that high powered entities saw sport as an opportunity to display violence and 
make profits from such. Therefore, it may be that athletes, particularly in contact sports, are 
encouraged to display forms of ‘violence’ as this is what the capitalists believe will create 
more revenue (McDonald, 2008). Such believes may be appropriate considering websites 
such as RugbyDump, who advertise themselves as showing “big hits, great tries, funny 
moments, dirty play, amazing skill” (RugbyDump, 2018), have amassed almost 400,000 
likes on Facebook. The athletes, attempting to meet their primary needs for living, act on 
such encouragements, believing that by doing so they could have a more illustrious sporting 
career.  
The belief by athletes within contact sports, that by displaying ‘violence’, they may 
increase their success as an athlete, is discussed more in an alternative strand of Marxism. 
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This strand of argument is centred on how sport can be used to provide strong 
superstructural support to the capitalist forms of production. Here, it is argued that under 
capitalist influence, sport reinforces and perpetuates capitalistic ideology, such as 
achievement, competition, and persistence (Carrington, 2008). Brohm (1978: 59) makes 
reference to the sporting ideology as a “direct reflection of the competition between 
sportsmen and women who compare their performances (their ‘commodities’) on the 
‘market’ of records and sporting achievements”. Here, capitalists reinforce and perpetuate 
an ideology where competition, determination and achievement are at the forefront. Again, 
such an ideology is conceived as a means of creating more fierce, competitive and 
potentially violent confrontations in sport, as a way of increasing revenue and popularity in 
the sport. The athletes are left with no choice but to conform to such an ideology if they 
want to push their athletic career forward and thus provide the basic necessities of life. 
Remnants of this capitalist ideology can be seen in the many motivational quotes reiterated 
by athletes around the globe, such as ‘whatever it takes’ or ‘no pain no gain’. However, one 
prominent example is that by Lance Armstrong is his book It’s Not About the Bike: My 
Journey Back to Life (2001: 269) who stated:  
 
Pain is temporary. It may last a minute, or an hour, or a day, or a year, but 
eventually it will subside and something else will take its place. If I quit, 
however, it lasts forever. 
 
The rhetoric uttered in this quote directly affirms the fiercely competitive nature of the 
capitalist ideology, where in this case, pain is just a derivative on the path to success. Indeed, 
such a culture does not necessarily forebode violence in a sport. Yet, it could be seen to 
offer encouragement for athletes to do whatever they can to be successful.    
This idea that a capitalist structure of sport influences and reproduces an ideology 
which helps maintain the capitalist system can perhaps be better understood when looked at 
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through a micro-level approach, particularly that of an interactionist outlook. In particular, 
George Mead’s (1934) and Herbert Blumer’s (1969) symbolic interactionism and how this 
explains what Young (2012) terms a ‘sports ethic’. By discussing the concepts postulated 
by such scholars, it may be clearer as to why athletes conform to the capitalist ideology, 
despite the ideology being of capitalistic endeavour. The notions of Mead (1934), Blumer 
(1969), and Young (2012) are considered in the following section.  
 
4.4. Symbolic Interactionism and the Sports Ethic  
 
The ensuing discussion will firstly provide a brief examination on the fundamentals of 
Mead’s (1934) and Blumer’s (1969) concept of symbolic interactionism. Then, how 
symbolic interactionism can link into Young’s (2012) idea of a ‘sports ethic’ when 
attempting to explain why athletes conform to the capitalist ideology will be provided.  
Symbolic interactionism is a micro-level approach first developed by George Herbert Mead 
(1934) and then later by Herbert George Blumer (1969). For Blumer (1969) the theory rests 
in the analysis of three simple premises. Firstly, “that human beings act towards things on 
the basis of the meanings that the things have for them” (Blumer, 1969: 2). Secondly, that 
“the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one 
has with one’s fellows” (Blumer, 1969: 2). Finally, all these meanings are “handled in, and 
modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he 
encounters” (Blumer, 1969: 2). Central to symbolic interactionism is the fact that, because 
of their high level of development compared to other animals, humans are able to interpret 
or define one another’s actions, rather than simply reacting in a mechanistic stimulus-
response pattern.  
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Mead (1934) advocated that through interaction with symbols, a ‘self’ develops 
which allows humans to be the object of their actions. This is fundamental to the theory of 
symbolic interactionism, as it is this ‘self’ which determines how we act in everyday 
situations. Mead (1934: 167) explains how the ‘self’ is produced:  
 
The self … arises when the conversation of gestures (symbols) is taken over 
into the conduct of the individual form. When this conversation of gestures can 
be taken over into the individual’s conduct so that the attitude of the other forms 
can affect the organism, and the organism can reply with its corresponding 
gesture and thus arouse the attitude of the other in its process, self arises. 
 
 
Here, Mead (1934) refers to how the symbols of a conversation – this can be a verbal 
conversation or a physical conversation – is assessed by the individual, who then alters the 
output of their symbols to produce a certain outcome in the conversation. An example of 
this is found in Young’s (2012) perception of the sports ethic.  
Young (2012: 12) proposes that from an early age athletes “are taught to strive for 
distinction, accept no limits as players, make sacrifices for their sports and play through 
pain and injury”. As some will notice, the sports ethic is incredibly similar to the 
aforementioned capitalist ideology. For Young (2012), this axiom is so pervasive in modern 
sport, that most athletes will encounter it, and must conform to it, at some points in their 
career. Here, it could be argued that athletes are adopting a sporting ‘self’, whereby they 
interpret discourse among agents as having the meaning that athletes must portray the sports 
ethic, or capitalist, characteristics in order to have a lucrative sporting career. In other words, 
athletes are attaching meaning to the sports ethic as a requirement if they are to succeed in 
the sporting sphere. Yet, this ‘sporting self’ which athletes adopt is not the only ‘self’ in 
their repertoire, for an individual may have many selves for many different confrontations. 
Mead (1934: 175) terms this the ‘me’:  
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“Now, in so far as the individual arouses himself the attitudes of the 
others, there arises an organised group of responses. And it is due to the 
individual’s ability to take the attitudes of these others in so far as they 
can be organised that he gets a self-consciousness. The taking of all those 
organised sets of attitudes gives him his ‘me’; that is the self he is aware 
of. He has their attitudes, knows what they want and what the consequence 
of any act of his will be, he has assumed responsibility for the situation”. 
 
 
This idea of adopting a ‘front’ for a certain situation is perhaps best encapsulated by former 
England International rugby player Johnny Wilkinson (2008: 1) in his book Tackling Life: 
Striving for My Type of Perfection, where he stated that: “[w]riting this book has been a 
pretty big deal for me. I have never been the most expressive person. I have the habit of 
hiding the revealing stuff inside, and just telling people what I think they want to hear”.  
The development of what Mead (1934) terms the ‘self’ and how this causes athletes 
to adopt an ideology despite it not necessarily defining their ‘me’, is an idea which can help 
explain the occurrence of ‘violence’. As agents within the sport put pressure on the athletes 
to adopt an ideology, in this case the ‘sports ethic’ (Young, 2012), an athlete feels the need 
to act accordingly to the ideology, even when on the pitch. For instance, Young (2012) 
mentions playing through pain as an aspect of the sports ethic. Here, due to the pressure 
from coaches, spectators and even other players, an athlete will fill need to play through 
injury if they want to be regarded as a ‘dedicated’ and ‘talented’ athlete. The same could be 
said for ‘violence’. As agents within the sport put pressure on an athlete to show ‘violence’ 
and aggression, an athlete conforms, believing by doing so they are propelling their identity 
as a successful athlete upwards. 
 
4.5. Summary   
 
When considering the civilising process of sport, and how sport moved towards being a 
more formalised entity, one must also acknowledge the role of the state, and how it used 
leisure time as a means of controlling the working population. Upon observation of how the 
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bourgeoisie pushed sport down the route of what Elias’ (1971) terms ‘sportisation’, it 
becomes apparent that sport was used a vehicle to achieve capitalist goals of suppression 
and control over the proletariat population, an idea postulated by Marx. 
The eighteen-hundreds was a time of change in the field of leisure and recreation, 
with Brailsford (1999: 161) writing of the Georgian period as “the age when sport first 
became a matter of institutions and systems almost as much as of people”. The work of the 
rational recreation reformers took place against this backdrop of rapid societal change, and 
a shift in social attitudes underpinned the movement. Recreational games were becoming 
increasingly popular, but were also becoming a favoured working-class past-time. The 
disruption caused through such games were one problem, but the potential for protest and 
political movement was another, more threating prospect for the middle-class bourgeoisie 
movement. As Brailsford (1999: 63) notes, the politics were such that “the mass football 
found few articulate friends”.  
As such, the bourgeoisie looked to control the nature of recreational games by 
making more formalised structures and rules whereby such games could be used as a tool 
for creating productive labourers, rather than revolutionaries. The higher classes could 
utilise a variety of legal mechanisms as a means of supressing and regulating the ‘working-
class revolution’ of recreational sports. One such effective weapon was the national 
Highways Act, 1835, which imposed a criminal penalty on any person who obstructed the 
highway by playing “football or any other game on any part of the said highways, to the 
annoyance of any passenger or passengers”. Magistrates and judges gave the police force 
consistent support in the enforcement of such acts. The extent of such support quickly turned 
the police into what Storch (1976: 496) describes as “domestic missionaries”, employed in 
order to “act as a lever of moral reform on the mysterious terrain of the industrial city's inner 
core”; “an all-purpose lever of urban discipline” (Storch, 1976: 481) which could be 
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deployed in order to enact the “attitudes, prejudices, and momentary reformist enthusiasms 
of the municipalities, magistrates, and local elites who employed them”.  
As can be seen, the ‘sportisation’ of games was a change which occurred not only 
in conjunction with the civilising of society in general but was also directed by capitalist 
influence to create a capitalist entity which could not only create productive laborer’s, but 
eventually lead to increased revenue. This capitalistic ‘sportisation’ of games eventually led 
to the ideas produced by Marxist sports scholars such as Brohm (1978) and Rigauer (1981, 
2000), whereby athletes became a commodity to capitalist structures. With the civilising 
nature of the outside world, capitalists quickly noticed that sport offered the ideal enclave 
to present legitimised, acceptable ‘violence’, to which spectators and athletes alike could 
participate free from the civilising shackles of the outside world. Therefore, a capitalist 
ideology, or what Young (2012) labels the ‘sports ethic’, was established as means of 
ensuring that athletes displayed aggressive and violent acts on the pitch, and thus increasing 
the revenue accrued.  
The concepts developed by Mead (1934) and Blumer (1969) on symbolic 
interactionism helped explain why athletes, despite the capitalistic drive of the sports ethic, 
conform to such an ideology. Here, it was suggested that athletes develop a sporting ‘self’ 
through the assessment of symbols in a conversation, who then alter the output of their 
symbols to produce a certain outcome in the conversation. In other words, athletes interpret 
the capitalist pressure exerted on them as a means of achieving an illustrious sporting career, 
and as such conform.   
In the final analysis, adopting both a figurational (Elias, 1969, 1971, 1978, 1986; 
Dunning et al., 1993; Dunning and Sheard, 2005) and Marxist (Marx, 1972; and Marx and 
Engels, 2008) viewpoint allows us to view the development of sport as a capitalist driven 
machine, with the goal of moulding the working population into efficient labourers who can 
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enhance surplus value for the bourgeoisie. Leisure time was of particular focus by the 
bourgeoisie, as by transforming the past time of the working class, they were able to make 
every area of working class life a means of producing effective labourers (Dunning et al., 
1993; and Marx and Engels, 2008). A result of this endeavour was that a capitalist ideology 
was adopted in sport that encouraged and maintained a certain level of ‘violence’, as 
violence was understood to increase the revenue potential of sport (Young, 2012). By 
referring to the work of George Herbert Mead (1934) and Herbert George Blumer (1969) 
on symbolic interaction, it was understood how athletes may attach positive meanings to 
this capitalist ideology, whereby it can be used as a means of bolstering their athletic career. 
As such, players will adopt a ‘sporting self’ which conforms to the capitalist sports ethic, 
displaying acts of ‘violence’ to prove themselves as sportspeople (Hughes and Coakley, 
1991). Moreover, sport has become a social enclave for legitimate ‘violence’ in a society 
where repugnance for ‘violence’ is high and extreme self-control is demanded as a result of 
the civilising process. Therefore, sport is one of the only (apart from war) times when the 
interdependency chains between individuals are strengthened by controlled ‘violence’, 
rather than weakened.  
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CHAPTER 5 
LEGAL DOCTRINE: APPLYING THE LAW TO SPORTS 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
The focal point of the ensuing section will be on the boundaries of legitimate 
behaviour in sports, particularly contact sports, and thus, the demarcation of consent. 
Firstly, the notion that the rules of a sport can act as device for delineating the breadth 
of consent will be explored. Here, it will be shown that using such a method, may 
result in too specific an intervention from the criminal law. As such, Gardiner’s (2012) 
emphasis on the playing culture will be examined, whereby the limits of consent are 
not coterminous with the rules of the sport. Rather, they can be found in the “unwritten 
conventions” (Dunning and Sheard, 2005: 29) of a sport. Adopting such a culture may 
allow for a more relevant and applicable definition of consent in contact sports. Yet, 
such an approach is not without its limitations. The playing culture will be critiqued, 
paying particular attention to the seemingly paradoxical nature of applying such a 
culture.  
 
6.2. Contemporary Sport and the Playing Culture  
 
6.2.1. Rules and Injury as Accepted Risk 
 
Rules are paramount to sport. Connor (2011: 146) suggests that “they determine the purpose 
of the game, what it means to win, and the way it is to be played”. Vamplew (2007:844) 
expands on the rules as a fundamental concept:  
 
Generally, rules can define the size of the space on which the sport is played; 
the length of time that a contest can last; the actions that are permitted; and how 
a result is determined. They identify the legitimate means by which targets can 
be attained”  
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The rules of a sport serve not only to sculpt how a game is played, but also to impose 
boundaries on the normative expectations of the participants. Rugby anticipates and 
legitimises a degree of ‘violence’, and its rule systems are devised to demarcate the expected 
standard of players and to provide sanctions for those participants who are held to have 
transgressed. For instance, the foreword to the 2015 edition of World Rugby’s (2015:3) 
Laws of the Game recognises the overt physicality intrinsic to rugby, referring to the risks 
that this may pose: “Rugby Union is a sport which involves physical contact. Any sport 
involving physical contact has inherent dangers”. A further example can be found in Law 
10.4, which proscribes ‘dangerous’ conduct; ‘retaliation’; ‘acts contrary to good 
sportsmanship’; and ‘misconduct while the ball is out of play’.  
The rules and safety provisions described above, when added to the considerations 
provided in Chapter 3, shed some light on the degree of ‘violence’ anticipated in rugby. It 
is empathically clear that the modern forms of rugby are less violent, and as such, less 
dangerous than their antecedent forms, as was discussed in Chapter 4. However, it is equally 
clear that, despite the rules seeking to manage it, ‘violence’ is a fundamental component. In 
R v Brown [1993] UKHL 19, the House of Lords sought to differentiate contact sports from 
the sado-masochism with which the case was interested. Within this, Lord Jauncey notes 
that during contact sports “any infliction of injury is merely incidental to the purpose of the 
main activity” (p. 241), while Lord Templeman suggested there to be a fundamental 
difference between “‘violence’ which is incidental and ‘violence’ which is inflicted for the 
indulgence of cruelty” (p. 237). There have, of course, been developments in the judiciary 
outlook on contact sports since Brown, however the statement used in Brown displays the 
problematic nature of distinguishing legal and criminal acts on the rugby pitch. One such 
technique, which will be discussed further below is the ‘playing culture paradigm’ 
(Gardiner, 2012). 
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6.2.2. Beyond the Rules 
 
It is evident from the rules and provisions relating to violent conduct and participant safety 
that physical contact is anticipated in the modern form of rugby union, and that such conduct 
fulfils the portrait of ‘sports violence’ presented in Chapter 3. It is also clear that the violent 
conduct seen in the game of rugby can frequently fall into the quasi-criminal category, as 
described by Smith (1988) in Chapter 3. Which category each form of conduct falls into is 
generated from within the sport. They point both to accepted practice at a general level, and 
the normative expectation of those who participate. The challenge for the criminal law is 
whether and, if so, how to calibrate responses to ‘sports violence’ in reference to the simple 
categories laid out by Smith (1983).  
There have been egregious examples of violent conduct on the rugby pitch going to 
court. One such case is that of R v Garfield [2008] EWCA Crim 130, where the appellant 
had been convicted of unlawful wounding, contrary to s 20 of the OAPA 1861, after 
“stamp[ing] on the head of a defenseless man” (62) during a game of rugby, causing what 
was described as “a 10cm laceration between his left eye and the back of his head” (365), 
requiring 30 stitches. Despite acknowledging that there were “substantial mitigating 
factors” (366) the Court of Appeal upheld his sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment. 
Another example is that of R v Calton [1999] 1 Cr App R (s) 64, in which the defendant 
kicked the prone victim in the face, resulting in a broken jaw and 12 months detention in a 
in a Youth Offenders’ Institution. These cases illustrate that even if it can be suggested that 
there is a ‘zone of legal exemption’ operating in contact sports such as rugby, it is not 
exhaustive, and so simply crossing the touchline will not bring exemption from the criminal 
law. Beyond this, however, such cases offer little in terms of insight in to substantive law, 
for two reasons. Firstly, the defendant had pleaded guilty in each case, meaning the appeal 
only concerns sentencing. Secondly, each are particularly egregious examples of behavior 
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unequivocally outside of the rules, so much so that there is very little contest surrounding 
the absence of consent. What is of more interest, when it comes to establishing criminal 
liability, is how the criminal law attaches liability to conduct less serious, that of a quasi-
criminal nature. In other words, those actions which are not as clear cut in their prosecutorial 
approach.  
It has been argued that the breadth of consent should be coterminous with, and 
defined stringently, by the rules of the given sport. Thus, the notion of ‘legitimate sport’ 
would be easy to quantify (MRLA, 1976). While some have subscribed to such an approach, 
McCutcheon (1994: 273) describes it as “untenable”, since “the acceptability of ‘violence’ 
is a matter of legal policy not of private regulation”. Therefore, “[t]o use the rules of the 
sport as a test would be to confer on a private agency, the sport's governing body, the power 
to license ‘violence’”. Furthermore, Livings (2006: 497) reminds us that “the courts have 
been clear that transgression of the rules will not automatically attract criminal liability, and 
neither will it necessarily preclude the availability of the defense consent”.  
Opposition to such a strict interaction between the rules and criminal liability can 
also be found much earlier, in the nineteenth-century case of R v Bradshaw [1878] 14 Cox 
CC 83. Here, it was stated that: “No rules or practice of any game whatever can make lawful 
that which is unlawful by the law of the land” (85). This approach is, in some ways, redolent 
of the contemporaneous case of R v Coney [1882] 8 QBD 534, in that, in spite of the rules, 
liability still depends upon “malicious motive or intention” as to the likelihood of “death or 
injury”. Therefore, as was the case in Coney, the courts will willingly look beyond the 
formal constitution of the sport and assess the lawfulness of the contest according to its 
underlying nature when judging how to view the behavior of the defendant. A similar issue 
was revisited by the Court of Appeal in the more recent case of R v Barnes [2004] EWCA 
Crim 3246, in which Lord Woolf declared:  
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[T]he fact that the play is within the rules and practice of the game and does not 
go beyond it, will be a firm indication that what has happened is not criminal ... 
conduct outside the rules can be expected to occur in the heat of the moment, 
and even if the conduct justifies not only being penalised but also a warning or 
even a sending off, it still may not reach the threshold level required for it to be 
criminal. (P. 914-915) 
 
The comments made in the Barnes judgement could be seen as an acceptance of the ‘playing 
culture’ of sport as a standard in which the courts can establish the suitability of criminal 
sanction. Gardiner (2012) advocates the use of such a culture, arguing that this would 
provide an effective tool to which to delineate the extent of a player’s consent. Livings 
(2006: 500) describes the aspects of such a culture:  
Such a playing culture would take account of all of the relevant circumstances 
of the sport, including the level of ability of the players concerned, in order to 
determine at what point criminal liability should be imposed. 
 
A playing culture would accommodate those acts which are not only found as within the 
rules of the game, but also those that are coterminous with the culture, or ‘unwritten’ rules 
of the sport. Gardiner (1994, cited in Gardiner, 2012: 50) talks about the relationship 
between criminal liability and these unwritten rules:  
 
An injury caused due to an illegal tackle that amounts to a foul within the rules 
of the sport is also likely to be seen as consensual. It may be contrary to the rules 
of the game but may well be inside… the ’working culture’ of the sport. Consent 
is not limited solely by the formal rules in contact sports. 
 
Such ‘unwritten rules’ to which the playing culture pays homage, can be found in most 
sports, and rugby union is no exception. Despite World Rugby prohibiting dangerous play, 
particularly high tackles, as is stated in Law 10.4(e):  
A player must not tackle (or try to tackle) an opponent above the line of the 
shoulders even if the tackle starts below the line of the shoulders. A tackle 
around the opponent’s neck or head is dangerous play. 
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When a high tackle occurs on the pitch, this does not necessarily mean it is not accepted as 
an unfortunate by-product of the game. This can be seen in players reactions to high tackles. 
The circumstances of the tackle will vary widely between incidents, and all effect the 
acceptability of the act. Nevertheless, if the high tackle is accidental, and does not result 
from an aggressive behavior, then it is usually accepted at part of the game, and will equate 
to a penalty or yellow card, but no grief from those involved in the sport. For Gardiner 
(2007: 24), it is imperative that the criminal law acknowledges and respects this playing 
culture, as “[b]y ignoring the wider playing culture in specific sports and reifying the rules 
alone as a determining guide, what may be seen as being an attempt to provide consistency 
in application of the law may well lead to “too specific” an intervention by the criminal 
law”. 
6.2.3. Usefulness of the Playing Culture Standard 
 
The notion of a playing culture as a standard by which to measure criminal liability may 
prove fruitful in a number of ways. Firstly, as discussed above, the rules alone cannot be 
used as an exhaustive means of measuring liability as they do not signify the full extent to 
which the game will be played. Dunning and Sheard (2005: 29) refer to “unwritten 
conventions” that are not easily captured by reference to the rules alone, but only understood 
by those who fully understand the culture of the sport. An example of this is given by 
Riesman and Denney (1954), who suggest that the invention of American Football can be 
attributed to a lack of clarity in the written rules of rugby which had been imported from 
Britain, making it difficult for those unfamiliar with the game to understand how it should 
be played. This indicates how an understanding beyond the literal interpretation of the rules 
is required to grasp fully how a sport is played, and the normative expectations of those 
participating.  
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As the playing culture helps present a realistic portrait of a sport, Gardiner (2007: 
27) suggests that it can be used to “help demarcate what is legitimate and illegitimate”. In 
terms of the criminal law, understanding the ‘working culture’ of a sport, and as such the 
reciprocal normative expectations this creates on its participants, may help develop consent 
in concert with the playing culture of the sport in question. The playing culture of sport has 
been referred to on occasion by the criminal courts elsewhere in the world, as seen in 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R v Cey [1989] 48 CCC (3d), where Gerwing JA pointed 
out that in certain sports (in this case ice hockey), “intentional bodily contact and … the risk 
of injury therefrom” is typical to the sport, and thus expected by its participants. In 
delineating the legitimacy of such contact, the court held that “[t]hose forms sanctioned by 
the rules are the clearest example”, but continued, suggesting that this can be expanded to 
cover “[o]ther forms, denounced by the rules but falling within the accepted standards by 
which the game is played” (490).  
In a more recent Canadian case, the Provincial Court of British Columbia applied 
the argument in Cey in R v TNB (2009) BCPC 0117. This case concerned injuries inflicted 
during a game of rugby between two high school teams. The judge held that it was necessary 
to look beyond the rules when establishing criminal liability, and to decide whether the 
conduct of the defendant was “legitimate play within the amalgam of the ‘rules’ of this 
game” (22). This ‘amalgam’ was considered to encompass the “written rules, unwritten code 
of conduct and guidelines set by a referee in a particular game” (93), and the court was 
notably liberal in its construction of this, holding it to include “the legitimate strategy of 
intimidation of the opposite team by head-butting, eye gouging, elbowing, raking and 
punching” (94). Indeed, the judge accepted that “[n]one of these infractions is permitted by 
the written rules”, however, he also held that they were “accepted by the unwritten code of 
conduct at this level of play in the game of rugby” (94).  
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A second advantage of the playing culture standard can be drawn from its 
constitutionally contingent nature, which “would allow for flexibility of approach” 
(Livings, 2006: 501) when assessing the acceptability of physical contact, and whether such 
contact might warrant the attention of the criminal courts. Brailsford (1999: 7) writes of 
“definitions of sport” as “never easy and seldom stable”, illustrating the dynamic and ever-
changing practices that exist within, and across, sports. Acknowledging and attempting to 
accommodate such variations in the normative expectations of participants, the court in Cey 
held that the expected conduct of the players would “vary, for example, from setting to 
setting, league to league, age to age, and so on”, and thus it was necessary “to have regard 
for the conditions under which the game at issue is played” (490). In this way, assessments 
of the playing culture can be accustomed to align with the normative expectations of the 
participants. Such expectations are likely to be different in a top-level professional game to 
that of one which takes place between teams comprising of a mixture of both junior and 
senior players. Such a malleable line of acceptability offers the flexibility needed to 
accommodate for the “unwritten conventions” (Dunning and Sheard: 29) of contact sports. 
However, having such a pliable culture also holds its disadvantages.  
 
6.2.4. Limitations of the Playing Culture  
 
Firstly, the most obvious problem with the playing culture is that of definition: it may be 
difficult to know exactly what the culture is in any particular set of circumstances. On a 
practical level, such issues may become more apparent when considering less formal forms 
of a sport, such as training. Lumer (1995: 269) concurs, stating: 
 
Often it is not clear what game the players have agreed to play, and even the 
players themselves may have divergent opinions about this. This divergence 
may give rise to moral reproaches or indignation because one player thinks that 
another player acts contrary to his (moral) duties, as is the case in soccer if the 
other player follows rougher informal rules. 
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The ramifications of this are twofold. Firstly, variation in the limits of acceptable conduct 
between players can potentially make inducing consent problematic in the criminal law. 
Secondly, any such uncertainty threatens to attenuate the playing culture’s primary asset of 
flexibility. Livings (2006: 501) concurs, suggesting that “Gardiner’s standard … appears 
paradoxical, and indeed oxymoronic”. Livings (2006: 501) expands suggesting:  
 
The degree of flexibility that the standard purports to offer would ... appear 
contrary to the characteristic of certainty with which Gardiner ... imbues the 
concept: the two virtues are difficult to reconcile ... the greater the degree of 
flexibility, the less predictable the outcome; the more certain a rule, the less this 
allows for flexibility.  
 
Following this statement, it is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal in Barnes did little 
to mitigate the possible uncertainty in accommodating the playing culture standard of 
soccer. Lord Woolf notes, that “[t]he jury were not given any examples of conduct which 
could be regarded as ‘legitimate sport’ and those which were not ‘legitimate sport’ for the 
purposes of determining whether they were criminal” (918). However, this seems to be of 
little concern to him as goes on to suggest that “[t]he jury did not need copies of the rules, 
but they did need to be told why it was important to determine where the ball was at the 
time the tackle took place” (918). Here, the Court of Appeal emphasise that understanding 
the rules and practices of a sport, and how they should be viewed under the eyes of the 
criminal law, is not a proposition to be decided within sport, but instead is a standard that 
will be established by the courts. As such, whilst the criminal law might be inclined to be 
informed by the wider knowledge of sport (e.g. normative expectations of players, managers 
etc.), it appears unwilling to defer to external standards of conduct.  
A further issue when adopting such a standard is the source of the norms from which 
the playing culture is established. Put simply, what is it that gives a particular sport its 
playing culture? If the playing culture standard is to be of any use to the criminal law, the 
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courts must accept a legally significant connection between the playing culture and the 
choices, attitudes and practices of those playing the sport in question. Such a contention 
may prove particularly useful when discussing matters in relation to the quality of consent 
that is said to be given by those players involved in a contact sport. 
The participants of modern professional sports are now seen as a minority. As early 
as the mid twentieth century, Stone (1955: 86) pointed towards the “unique occupational 
morphology” of professional sport:  
Those engaged first hand in the production of the commodity – the game or the 
match – constitute a minority within the industrial complex, while those 
engaged in the administration, promotion, and servicing of the production 
constitute a sizable majority. 
 
Rigauer (1981: 16-17) follows Stone (1955) in Marxist assumptions about the exploitative 
character of work in capitalist societies, asserting that “the individual who resolves to 
participate in top-level sports has already subordinated himself to a high degree to the 
reigning system of values and conventions of behavior”. Therefore, it could be said that 
sporting authorities in general and the law do not have shared goals when it comes to 
deterring and reducing instances of overtly violent and dangerous conduct. In some sports, 
it may be the case that ‘violence’ beyond that which is permitted by the rules is encouraged 
for entertainment and commercial purposes. For instance, when referring to ‘violence’ in 
the NFL, Adubato (2016: 23) proposes that “‘violence’ tantalizes the fans. Promising 
‘violence’ guarantees viewers”. Moreover, Tyler Shipley, founder and editor of the Left 
Hook, a website which publishes articles on politics in sport, stated in his interview with 
Simon Black, that “we are structured to be passive recipients of whatever spectacle the NHL 
or NBA wants us to buy into” as it “provides a perfect space to push a particular political 
line, because there is very little possibility of anyone pushing back” (Black, 2013: 42). Thus, 
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it could be argued that the normative expectations of a particular playing culture are not a 
realistic portrayal of the desires and expectations of the participants, but rather of those 
accruing revenue from the sport. As such, this may affect the consent given by participants 
in respect of the risk of harm. 
Despite the scrutiny provided in the present section, the playing culture standard 
could be considered a useful tool in delineating consent in sports. Indeed, one needs to 
understand the ‘working culture’ of the sport – which is an aim of this study. Nevertheless, 
once such information has been yielded, providing a demarcation of consent seems closer 
than ever.  
 
6.3. ‘sports violence’ and Criminal Offences 
 
Now the breadth of consent in sports, particularly in rugby union, has been discussed 
with reference to the playing culture, one can begin to assess how such information 
can be attached to the criminal law. The following section will pay reference to the 
statutory assaults and how applying such offences can prove troublesome and 
complex when in the context of contact sports. A key focus will be on the mens rea 
of such offences, specifically intention and recklessness, and the difficulties 
establishing these in the seemingly violent arena of contact sports.  
 
6.3.1. Violent Conduct in Sport and the Statutory Assaults  
 
The offences to which violent conduct during the game of rugby may be susceptible is 
encapsulated by the Court of Appeal in Barnes:  
 
When criminal proceedings are justified, then, depending upon their gravity, the 
prosecution can be for: assault; assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary 
to Section 47 of the 1861 Act; unlawfully wounding or inflicting grievous 
bodily harm contrary to Section 20 of the 1861 Act; or wounding or causing 
grievous bodily harm with intent contrary to Section 18 of the 1861 Act. If, 
unfortunately, death results from the assault, the charge could be one of 
manslaughter or even murder depending upon the defendant's intent 
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In this statement, Lord Woolf refers to a broad spectrum of offences against the person. He 
firstly introduces the summary offence of assault, which can comprise one or both of a 
technical assault (intentionally or recklessly causing the victim to apprehend the immediate 
infliction of unlawful personal force) and a battery (intentionally or recklessly inflicting 
unlawful force) (Fagan v MPC [1969] 1 QB 539 (DC)). In relation to ‘sports violence’, 
assault has been seen as relatively unproblematic. It is a minor offence that causes very little 
or even no harm to the victim, and as such is easily contained within the context of sport. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, liability for homicide may arise in the event of a death 
on the pitch. However, discussing the death of participants (and thus the potential liability 
for homicide) is beyond the scope of this work.  Thus, those discussed by Lord Woolf as 
comprising of the middle of the spectrum are the indictable offences outlined by ss 18, 20 
and 47 of the OAPA 1861.  
Sections 18, 20 and 47 could be said to form a “ladder of offences graded in terms 
of relative seriousness” (Ashworth and Horder, 2013: 313). Such seriousness is determined 
by a combination of the gravity of the resultant injury and the requisite mens rea, a concept 
discussed in Section 6.3.2. At the lower end of the ladder is s 47. The actus reus requirement 
for s 47 is that the defendant ‘occasion’ actual bodily harm (ABH) to the victim. ABH can 
comprise any harm that interferes with the comfort or health of the victim (R v Miller [1954] 
2 QB 282 (DC)); in R v Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552 (CA), Hobhouse LJ stated that the 
word ‘harm’ is synonymous for ‘injury’ and that ‘actual’ illustrates that, despite there being 
no specification that the injury be permanent, it should not be so trivial as to be wholly 
insignificant. ABH can therefore refer to a wide range of injuries, such as fractures or serious 
bruising. Indeed, these can be relatively minor or more serious. In R v Davies [1991] Crim 
LR 70 (CA), the defendant punched another player who had just fouled him during a game 
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of soccer, fracturing his cheekbone. The defendant was found guilty of an offence under s 
47 and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.  
The mens rea for an offence under s 47 is intention or recklessness as to whether 
contact is made with another person (R v Venna [1976] QB 421 (CA), however there is no 
requirement that any degree of harm be intended or even foreseen. The required level of 
injury for s 20 and 18 are the same and are typically more serious than that in s 47, as ss 18 
and 20 require either a ‘wound’ or ‘grievous bodily harm’ (GBH). A wound is when the 
skin has been broken (Moriarty v Brooks (1834) 6 C&P 684), whereas GBH means “really 
serious harm” (DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 (HL)). In contrast however, the mens rea for s 
18 is intent to do GBH, whereas the lower-level offence provided for by s 20 requires an 
intention or recklessness as to the causing of some harm. 
Sections 47, 20 and 18 have received a considerable amount of judicial and academic 
scrutiny, perhaps due to their widespread use, breath of application and longevity. Whilst 
the view is not universally assented, Gardiner (2007: 33) alludes to the fact that the 
provisions are “much disparaged by today’s criminal lawyers”, while Livings (2016: 115) 
suggests they are “anachronistic and confused, and their nomenclature barely suited to the 
modern world”. Other commentators, such as Jefferson (2012) and Ashworth (2008) invoke 
the rudimentary interrelation between the sections and questions their ability to apprehend 
gradations in the seriousness of offences. Ashworth (2008: 236) focuses on s 47 in 
particular, criticizing its lack of conformity to the ‘correspondence principle’, stating: 
 
[I]f there were a crime with a conduct element of “causing serious injury”, the 
correspondence principle would require that the fault element should be 
intention or recklessness as to causing serious injury and not as to some lesser 
degree of harm. 
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Ashworth’s comments are particularly admissible when it comes to sport ‘violence’ where 
a high degree of physical ‘violence’ is normalised, and the fast-paced nature of the game 
can result in small errors of judgment which can easily lead to more severe consequences 
than that foreseen by the participants. For instance, a defending player in rugby union can 
easily misjudge the speed of height of an opposition attacking player. Thus, the probability 
of a high tackling occurring in rugby is probably quite high. With the speed and strength of 
players in the game, such high tackles also have a likelihood of causing serious injury to the 
victim. Nevertheless, as discussed previously, such acts are normalised as unfortunate 
consequence of the game. 
The concerns outlined above have necessitated a flexible approach to the translation 
and use of ss 18, 20 and 47. For example, when it comes to the enigmatic nature of the 
language used, coherence has been added to make the meaning of such language clearer. 
The current view is that ‘occasion’ and ‘inflict’ can be viewed as effectively synonymous 
with ‘cause’, and that such cause has been expanded to include more injury-causing 
behavior. In light of the pragmatic interpretation that has been added to these offences, the 
application of them to instances of ‘sports violence’ has proven relatively unproblematic. 
As seen in the straightforward and inclusive approach taken in Barnes, the elements of a 
statutory assault can be defined relatively easily, since establishing a prima facie case 
needed no more than satisfaction of causation of the requisite level of harm, allied to the 
presence of the requisite mens rea. Despite the mens rea requirements of ss 18, 20 and 47 
causing little controversy in the courts when applied to ‘sports violence’, they have the 
potential to be somewhat more complex than they at first appear. A such, this will take focus 
in the upcoming sections of this chapter.  
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6.3.2. The Legal Principle of Mens Rea 
 
Intention and ‘sports violence’  
 
The concept of mens rea underpins the liberal ethos of the law. Its function is outlined by 
Ormerod (2007: 105):  
The literal meaning of ‘mens rea’ – ‘a guilty mind’ – is misleading unless it is 
kept in mind that we are concerned with legal, not moral, guilt. A person may – 
though only in exceptional circumstances – have mens rea even though neither 
he, nor any reasonable person, would regard this state of mind as blameworthy. 
Mens rea is the mental element required by the definition of the particular crime 
– typically, intention to fulfill the actus reus of that crime, or recklessness 
whether it be fulfilled. 
 
Ormerod (2007: 105) continues, suggesting “[t]he word “rea” refers to the criminality of 
the act, not its moral quality”, and this means that “English courts focus on the accused’s 
cognitive state – whether he foresaw risk, etc – rather than whether he was acting in a 
morally culpable manner”.  
Following on from the orthodox subjectivist approach, it is no surprise that intention 
to cause harm initiates the highest form of censure from the courts. This is an intuitive 
approach insofar as the individual who causes harm intentionally might be seen as more 
culpable than that person who does so recklessly. Establishing intent is enough to suffice 
the mens rea for any of the statutory assaults, however, intent alone is required to ground 
an offence under s 18, where such intent must be to cause some GBH to a person. 
Inaugurating intent in ‘sports violence’, particularly in violent contests, may become 
complicated when intentions are difficult to discern, either due to evidential reasons, or 
more principally, from divergent intentions existing concurrently. Such complexities are 
highlighted by Gardiner and Jung (1991: 579), and discussed in greater depth below:  
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The fact that I act intentionally under a given description ... does not entail that 
I act intentionally under other descriptions which may apply to what I am doing. 
One and the same action may be both the moving of my foot (intended) and the 
kicking of the cat (unintended). But the individuation of intentions and other 
mental states, the isolation of a particular description under which what I do is 
intended or foreseen or known or whatever, will often be extremely difficult. 
 
The issues raised in this passage have led to the construction of legal definitions of direct 
and indirect intention. In its primary construction, the legal definition of (direct) intention 
is broadly synonymous with purpose, whereby an individual could be said to have acted 
intentionally if he acts with the purpose of causing a particular consequence. Duff (1990) 
propounds a test, whereby a defendant who acted intentionally to harm would regard their 
actions as failed if no harm was caused. Conversely, a defendant for whom intention to 
cause harm is not a priority, would consider resultant harm itself to be a ‘failure’. To provide 
a context for such concepts, when a defender in rugby goes to tackle but also injure an 
attacking opponent, the defender would refer to their efforts as failed if injury was not 
caused during the tackle. Here, we can undeniably say that the defender is displaying direct 
intention to cause harm. However, when there is digression between the outcome desired 
and their intentional conduct, an indirect form is suggested. This concept is derived from 
the writings of Bentham (1996) and refer to situations where the defendants purpose was 
not necessarily to initiate the consequences that eventuated, but where such consequences 
were nevertheless seen as an inevitable feature in achieving their primary goal. 
However, despite the attempt to increase clarity, issues may still arise when 
establishing intent in ‘sports violence’. For instance, the current authority on indirect intent 
derives from the House of Lords’ judgment in R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL), wherein 
it was held that intention may be inferred where the defendant viewed the outcome as a 
‘virtual certainty’. As such, asserting indirect intention on the part of a rugby player making 
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a tackle or committing a foul which seemingly injures the opponent, demands satisfaction 
of ‘virtual certainty’ that outcome would have occurred. Anticipating that there might be a 
risk, even a risk with a high probability, will not be enough.  
 
Recklessness and ‘sports violence’  
 
As discussed, intention is enough for any of the statutory assaults, however, recklessness 
alone will suffice for ss 20 and 47 of the OAPA 1861. As would be expected, there can be 
complications when applying recklessness in contact sports. An investigation of Barnes 
uncovers some of the limitations of recklessness as a mens rea standard when applied to 
liability in contact sports, a sphere where dangerous physical contact between the players is 
inexorable, and the likely consequences of such contact is known by most, if not all, of its 
participants. Lord Woolf in Barnes (915) gives a relatively straightforward characterisation 
of recklessness in sports, stating:  
‘Recklessly’ in this context means no more than that the defendant foresaw the 
risk that some bodily harm (however slight) might result from what he was 
going to do and yet, ignoring that risk, the defendant went on to commit the 
offending act. (915) 
 
Lord Woolf then continues, suggesting that “anyone going to tackle another player in 
possession of the ball can be expected to have the necessary malicious intent” (915). This 
statement applies only where this matter has not been raised by the defence. where it is an 
issue, the criminal law is governed by s 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, which states:  
 
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,  
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his 
actions; but  
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all 
the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the 
circumstances.   
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Notwithstanding this caveat, the approach taken by Lord Woolf in relation to the issue of 
foresight in recklessness ostensibly points towards a willingness to attach prima facie 
liability to incidents of ‘sports violence’. Moreover, under this approach, recklessness seems 
to be a disembodied concept, existing mainly outside the social context in which conduct 
occurs. If this is the exhaustive means of recklessness, it is inevitably the case that many 
sportspersons will potentially be in a permanent state of prima facie liability. However, it 
could be argued that the Court of Appeal in Barnes omitted an important qualifying clause 
that is central to what many would view to be the accepted test of recklessness. Ormerod 
(2007: 118) acknowledges such concerns, suggesting that “[n]ot all risk-taking constitutes 
recklessness”; the risk taken must also be deemed “unreasonable” in the circumstances. 
The House of Lords in R v G [2003] UKHL 50 overruled the objective R v G [2003] 
UKHL 50 test of recklessness, with what could be considered the authoritative and 
definitive statement of recklessness as a mens rea standard. It was declared that “a person 
acts recklessly ... with respect to (i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists 
or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the 
circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk” (1057). As such, in the game of 
rugby, if an attacking opposition player is stumbling whilst running, meaning that their 
body, and thus their head, is lower than usual, and a defending player decides to go in for a 
powerful tackle to the chest area of the attacker, which results in a dangerous high tackle. 
Then it could be suggested that the tackling player acted recklessly as they knew that the 
risk of a high tackle was higher than usual (due to the attacker stumbling), and that such a 
risk was magnified by the fact that they went for a chest tackle. Intention may be difficult 
to establish, as it cannot be proven that the tackler wanted and intended to make a high 
tackle. Nevertheless, recklessness may still be established as it was a reasonable risk that 
accompanied the action, and as such, the tackler was more than likely aware of such risk 
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before performing the tackle.  
6.4. The Doctrine of Consent   
 
The following section will focus on the legal principle of consent. Within this, the 
ontological foundations of consent will be discussed, whereby the notions of attitudinal and 
expressional consent will be explored. Moreover, the idea that consent forms a legal fiction 
when observed in the context of sport will be investigated. Here, it will be proposed that 
consent is implied by simply agreeing to play the game. As such, consent is de-
individualised; an entity which does not vary between players, but rather is given to players 
through agreed participation. Finally, the ‘unreasonable’ limb of recklessness will be 
examined to see if it could be used as a more effective method at attaching culpability to 
‘violent’ conduct on the pitch.  
 
6.4.1. The Ontological Foundations of Consent   
 
Consent can have a significant moral and legal effect, however, for it to become an effective 
doctrinal mechanism that can negate prima facie offences it must do more than provide a 
philosophical basis for distinction. It must also acquire a granularity which allows it to be 
of aid when delineating between the lawful and unlawful. To do this, it is necessary to delve 
deeper into the realities of consent: at its ontological and empirical foundations. Wertheimer 
(2003: 7) considers the legal and moral place of consent, suggesting “the content of the 
morally impermissible and the legally impermissible can be captured by the concept of 
consent. The hard work will be to say what that means”.  
In an attempt to understand the ontological concepts of consent, Westen’s (2016) 
division in what he terms ‘attitudinal’ and ‘expressive’ consent will be explored. Westen’s 
(2016) two concepts of consent display variant priorities. Attitudinal consent induces an 
acknowledgment for the autonomy of a person who is willingly involved in conduct that 
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might otherwise be an offence. Expressive, on the other hand, refers to the lack of culpability 
of the defendant who genuinely believed that the individual was willing. Hurd (1996) 
discusses how the transformative power of consent lies in a respect for autonomy, of which 
the corollary is that the moral core of consent must be found in the subjective mind. An 
example of this approach, found in surgery, would be how effective consent would be 
measured by reference to the attitude of the patient. Attitudinal consent from the patient 
would render the normally illegal conduct of the surgeon legal. Establishing the existence 
of attitudinal consent amounts to questions like, “did this particular individual (expressly or 
otherwise) desire, permit or acquiesce (consent) to this particular conduct on the part of the 
defendant?” (R v Cey, 490). In contrast, the expressive construction would judge the 
effectiveness of consent by reference to its outward manifestation, and thus from the 
viewpoint of the individual being offered the consent, or possible through the eyes of a 
‘reasonable observer’. Returning to the example of the surgeon, consent would be judged 
not by the attitudinal consent of the patient, but rather by articulation of consent on the part 
of the patient. Put simply, consent would be determined in reference to the defendant in 
whether they honestly believed the individual to be consenting. In effect, constituting 
expressional consent turns to queries such as: ‘Did the defendant believe (or would a 
reasonable person have believed) that this particular individual was (attitudinally) 
consenting to this conduct?’.  
Using attitudinal consent alone can prove problematic, as it “tells us only about the 
moral situation of the person who inflicted the harm” (Dempsey, 2013: 13). However, the 
moral position of the defendant is also of importance in order to understand how consent 
can absolve them of wrongdoing. It may also be that in a given situation there is no conflict 
between the two constructions, since expressional and attitudinal consent can exist 
concurrently. If the patient considered above is actively willing to undergo the procedure, 
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and also signs forms to declare this willingness, then it could be said that both attitudinal 
and expressional consent are present. However, the existence of expressive consent is not 
entirely dependent upon the presence of attitudinal, and so may exist independently. In this 
light, when an individual nods or signs a consent form when asked whether they consent to 
their ears being pierced, it is that form of consent that is operative, not the subjective mindset 
of the person getting pierced. The fact that the person concerned may have been coerced 
through peer pressure into getting the procedure done would hold no weight in negating 
consent if it had not come to the attention of the person performing the piercing.  
When considering which form of consent might be most effective at establishing 
liability, it could be suggested that the prevailing preference for subjective constructions of 
liability make expressive favourable. Despite this, the umbilical connection between 
consent and autonomy points towards the fact that attitudinal conceptions cannot be ignored, 
as they are woven through dialogues of consent and its legal accommodation. Despite this, 
applying either attitudinal or expressive consent to sports is not as straightforward as 
providing medical services. It encounters problems associated back to the flexibility of the 
playing culture of a sport.  
When considering notions of consent in rugby union, establishing attitudinal consent 
may seem relatively straightforward, whereby an individual will imply consent to 
occurrences of the game by simply agreeing to play. Indeed, this is true. However, it may 
prove more difficult to attach attitudinal consent to actions outside of the official rules. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the breadth of consent stretches further than the rules of the sport, 
to the ‘unwritten conventions’ (Dunning and Sheard, 2005). Yet, finding a limit to such 
conventions is both ambiguous and enigmatic, as the culture is in constant flux, and 
therefore so is a participant’s consent. Similarly, when attempting to assign expressive 
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consent as a means of justifying the action of a player, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
locate for those actions outside of the official rules. Of course, expressive consent will be 
provided for actions within the rules, such as a safe, low tackle. However, as the line of 
consent is in constant flux, expressive consent can become enigmatic. Such deliberations 
are the subject for discussion in the ensuing section.  
 
6.4.2. ‘sports violence’, Consent and Legal Fiction   
 
The preceding section outlined the ontological constructions of consent, and how these have 
been practiced in relation to medical treatment. Yet, when considering cases of ‘sports 
violence’, a key differentiator is the concept of a playing culture and how this demarcates 
the quality of consent in terms of ‘legitimate sport’. It is undoubtedly possible to argue that 
the rules and the expected standard of behaviour created by such rules, as well as the 
normative ‘unwritten conventions’ of a sport, fail to differentiate sport from other contexts 
in any meaningful way. Of course, implied consent in sexual relations can occur in 
numerous behavioural cues which must be interpreted by the courts. In such instances, 
jurors will utilise their understanding and experience of the facts and disputes with which 
they are faced, and the evidence supporting them. But, the qualitative difference between 
the individualised constructions of consent when considering other contexts, such as sexual 
offences or medical treatment, and that of ‘sports violence’, lies in the normative role of the 
‘legitimate sport’ standard. As discussed, in relation to medical treatment, consent is aimed 
to be established by attitudinal and/or expressive conceptions by reference to an 
individualised construction of consent. As such, the criminal law accentuates aspects such 
as coercion or deception which would impair its effectiveness.  
In sports, however, consent is established according to whether it comprised 
‘legitimate sport’, which makes the subjective view of attitudinal or expressive consent 
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unnecessary. The court in Cey, advocate an approach that produces a multilateral and 
objective measure of consent, and which is established by considering all the relevant 
circumstances of a case:  
 
[C]onduct which is impliedly consented to can vary, for example, from setting 
to setting, league to league, age to age, and so on... The conditions under which 
the game in question is played, the nature of the act which forms the subject 
matter of the charge, the extent of the force employed, the degree of risk of 
injury, and the probabilities of serious harm are, of course, all matters of fact to 
be determined with reference to the whole of the circumstances. In large part, 
they form the ingredients which ought to be looked to in determining whether 
in all of the circumstances the ambit of the consent at issue in any given case 
was exceeded. (490)  
 
What is interesting about the approach adopted in Cey is that although it seemingly sets out 
to define the consent of the participant’s, there is no reference to their individual attitudes 
or beliefs, which appear inferior to the circumstances of the sport, to the constructions of 
‘legitimate sport’. Although Cey was a Canadian case involving ice hockey, it seems the 
approach adopted can also be equally applied to other sports.  Another excerpt, from 
Gerwing JA (490), states:  
It is clear that in agreeing to play the game, a hockey player consents to some 
forms of intentional bodily contact and to the risk of injury therefrom. Those 
forms sanctioned by the rules are the clearest example. Other forms, denounced 
by the rules but falling within the accepted standards by which the game is 
played, may also come within the scope of consent.   
 
Gerwing JA’s comments de-individualise the participant, referring to them as a “[ice] 
hockey player”, not as an individual. Moreover, the grounding of consent is attributed to a 
question of voluntary participation, of simply agreeing to play the game. Livings (2016) 
concurs, suggesting that the consent assigned to a rugby player could be defined as fictitious. 
Livings (2016: 194) expands:  
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It does not need to rely upon a construction of consent that amounts to anything 
more than participation, since consent is imputed to a player on the basis of his 
participation. In other words, those taking part will be treated ‘as if’ they had 
consented to that which is deemed legitimate. This effective ‘de-
individualisation’ sets imputed consent apart from most other instances of 
consent. 
 
Upon observation, it becomes apparent that in the sporting context, and therefore within 
rugby, that consent is de-individualised. Rather than each individual providing their own 
delineation of consent, an individual is deemed to have consented to the parameters of 
legitimacy by simply agreeing to play the game. This is a particularly unique stance, and 
one which seems to solve none of the issues surrounding the actual limits of a player’s 
consent. Indeed, by saying that a player is implying consent to the legitimate behaviors of a 
sport, makes it seem as if consent is unequivocal to establish. Yet, it seems to ignore the 
nature of the playing culture, whereby the line of legitimacy is in constant flux, and one 
which is incredibly hard to define. As such, more research is needed as to the confinements 
of legitimate behaviour in sport. A topic with which the present study hopes to provide a 
degree of insight when considering the sport of rugby union.  
 
6.4.3. The ‘Unreasonableness’ Limb of Recklessness  
 
As suggested in the preceding section, the orthodox view surrounding consent appears to be 
fictitious due to the de-individualised approach adopted from the courts. This leaves an 
opening for alternative ways of framing the criminal law of ‘sports violence’ which may 
prove more effective. One such approach was discussed in the Law Commission 134 (LCCP 
134), which was suggested to have been needed because although Brown “had confirmed 
the broad outlines of the law”, there remained “considerable disagreement about its basis, 
policy, detailed limits and possible future development” (para 1.5). However, despite this, 
the Commission seemed to follow the structure of the majority opinions in Brown, with 
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consent forming a tripartite construction of defense which effectively supported ‘rule-plus-
exceptions’ approach utilised by the House of Lords, going as far as to say that it was 
“conceptually necessary” (8.2). 
The Commission proposed that, as Lord Mustill outlined in Brown, consent is not 
the dispositive consideration when it comes to the lawfulness of ‘sports violence’:  
[T]he actual consent of the victim is not the dispositive consideration, but rather 
that the law will formulate a series of rules as to the permitted conduct of the 
inflictor of injury. The effect of those rules may be expressed as representing 
the limits of the deemed consent of the injured party, but in truth they are 
objective criteria imposed by the courts to limit the field of intervention of the 
criminal law. (para 10.9) 
 
The Commission then continued, advocating that the straightforward and implicitly flexible 
approach to ‘sports violence’ founded in the objective, ‘unreasonableness’ limb of 
recklessness. This can be seen in the following comments:  
 
[A]pplying the normal approach to recklessness, based on unreasonable risk- 
taking, and without formulating any special exception for sports and games, it 
seems clear that even non-intentional aggression or dangerousness, which one 
would expect to be outside the rules laid down for the playing of the game, can 
lead to criminal liability. That is a conclusion not based in any real sense on the 
consent of the victim, but on a more general assessment of what, in those 
particular circumstances, constitutes reasonable conduct. Like all questions of 
reasonableness, its resolution is essentially a jury question. (para 10.17) 
 
 
Thus, the reasonableness of risk would be determined in reference to the activity, meaning 
that “[g]ratuitously aggressive and dangerous conduct ... may well be characterised as the 
unreasonable taking of a risk, even within the extended limits of normally acceptable 
behaviour that apply when playing a contact sport” (para 10.16). As such, the ‘general test’ 
of recklessness would be: “whether the defendant took a risk of injury of which he was 
aware, and in the circumstances, it was unreasonable for him to take that risk” (para 46.1). 
An immediate advantage of this proposal can be found in its applicability to a broad 
spectrum of sports and contexts. For instance, it allows for the variances in consent between 
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amateur and professional players. In sports such as rugby union, where the probability for 
error is high and the consequence of such error can sometimes be severe, those who are not 
as adept in the sport may be more likely to make mistakes. As such, there may be more acts 
of ‘violence’, or unintentional ‘violence’, in the lower leagues than in the top leagues – 
purely due to the incompetence of the players in the lower leagues.  
By adopting the reasonableness standard, one may be able to apply the law 
situationally by adapting it to fit what the player would have, or should have, viewed as 
unreasonable in the given circumstances. Which would be different for each level of the 
game. Moreover, it operates under a loose definition of sport, which also accommodates the 
player’s consent through a holistic appraisal of the acceptability of the conduct in a 
particular circumstance. Such an advantage was acknowledged by Ormerod (1994: 934), 
who considered it to “strike a good balance in protecting all players”, while also attempting 
to create a “straightforward workable test, involving concepts with which the courts are 
already familiar”.   
In contrast, Leng (1994: 487) refers to the report as “entirely misconceived”, 
suggesting the report appears paradoxical. Leng (1994) points to how the statement, despite 
advocating that sport should be treated as unexceptional under the eyes of the criminal law, 
frames it analysis in accordance with exceptional treatment, and as such awards sport a 
unique standing. Nonetheless, the approach taken in the Commission can be considered a 
clarification, presenting illustrations of, and guidance as to, how reasonableness might be 
understood in cases of ‘sports violence’. 
 
6.5. Prosecutorial Discretion the Answer?  
 
The enigmatic nature of attaching the criminal law to ‘sports violence’, as demonstrated in 
the preceding sections, has led some to look at alternative regulatory mechanisms as a more 
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effective strategy in tackling ‘sports violence’. In Barnes, Lord Woolf discusses such 
possibilities:  
 
In determining what the approach of the courts should be, the starting point is 
the fact that most organised sports have their own disciplinary procedures for 
enforcing their particular rules and standards of conduct. As a result, in the 
majority of situations there is not only no need for criminal proceedings, it is 
undesirable that there should be any criminal proceedings. Further, in addition 
to a criminal prosecution, there is the possibility of an injured player obtaining 
damages in a civil action from another player, if that other player caused him 
injuries through negligence or an assault. (911) 
 
In the case of sport, it is often considered that, not only are there alternative methods to the 
criminal law, but also that these alternatives may prove more effective at achieving the aims 
of sport that the criminal law itself. Cohen (1990: 322) indicates that “[t]he decision not to 
prosecute does not mean that a professional athlete acting violently during a game goes 
without punishment”. Cohen (1990:322) refers to how the “[v]arious alternative dispute 
resolution methods, including civil mechanisms, game officiating, league fines and 
suspensions” may actually “control violent behavior in sports more effectively than the 
imposition of criminal liability”. The following sections will discuss the regulatory and 
governing bodies of sport as a ‘private government’ (Macaulay, 1986, cited in Livings, 
2016), while examining the potential benefits of using the civil law for redress and 
deterrence.  
6.5.1. Sport as a ‘Private Government’  
 
As discussed previously, sport encompasses a set of normative expectations upon its 
participants. Such expectations are etched by a sophisticated rule structure, as well as 
numerous other factors, such as commercial pressures, level of play and desire for 
competition, all of which generate a playing culture for the sport. This culture is stringently 
regulated by a composite of both tribunals and in-game adjudication that could be seen to 
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resemble the criminal justice system. Macaulay (1986, cited in Livings, 2016) refers to this 
arrangement as following a system of ‘private government’. It is recognised that the 
disciplinary limbs of governing bodies have broad powers to impose and regulate sanctions 
for those sportspersons who have transgressed, including playing suspensions, fines and 
payment of compensation. Anderson (2013: 57) sees sports bodies as having a greater 
impact in deterring and regulating ‘violence’ than the criminal courts: 
There is little doubt that a speedy, consistent and fair internal disciplinary 
regime within a sport is the most effective deterrent against unnecessarily 
violent play, as opposed to the more distant and unpredictable applicability of 
the criminal law. Such matters are clearly better dealt with ‘in-house’ because 
that is where the expertise lie and it is where long-term preventative measures, 
such as rule changes, can be implemented in a coherent way in order to ensure 
that such ill-discipline will not occur again in the future. 
 
Although he accepts that, “[i]n theory the best way to deal with ‘sports violence’ and deter 
athletes from injuring other athletes is through internal controls in the sport”, Jahn (1988: 
250) reminds us that commercial interests and the associated internal politics of sport 
mitigate the use of strident penalties. This is reminiscent of the Marxist perspective adopted 
by Stone (1955), Rigauer (1981), Adubato (2016), and Tyler Shipley in Black (2013), as 
discussed in Section 6.2.4. Here, it may be suggested that the direction of discipline in a 
sport may be influenced by the interests of the commercial elite. Thus, disciplinary action 
may not necessarily take the form of the most effective and appropriate means for 
regulation. As such, Jahn (1988: 250) suggests that the sanctions implemented by the 
sporting bodies are often “largely ineffective in deterring athletes from ‘violence’”. 
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6.5.2.  Civil Law and Sport 
 
The previous section discussed the use of internal sporting disciplinary bodies as an 
alternative means of regulation in sport in comparison to the use of criminal law. Despite 
such a method being backed by scholars (Cohen 1990; Anderson, 2013), it seems as though 
it is still susceptible to criticism, particularly when it comes to the interests of such bodies 
(Jahn, 1988, Black, 2013). The ensuing section will consider the use of civil law in 
regulating ‘violent’ acts on the pitch. 
The Court of Appeal in Barnes refers to “the possibility of an injured player 
obtaining damages in a civil action from another player, if that other player caused him 
injuries” (911). It could be said that the tort of negligence is the most likely avenue of civil 
recourse when it comes to those who have been injured by others during the course of play 
in sport. Lord Woolf suggests that “[t]he circumstances in which criminal and civil remedies 
are available can and do overlap” (911), thus, it should come as no surprise that grounding 
negligence encounters similar issues to that faced by the criminal law. Fafinski (2005) 
concurs, commenting on the closeness of civil and criminal doctrines in determining 
liability of ‘sports violence’, suggesting these similarities extend to the complications they 
face when deciding the circumstances which may initiate liability.  
In Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866, the first English civil case to address the issue 
of negligence between participants, and thus the duty of care owed to each other, the Court 
of Appeal looked to the Australian case of Rootes v Shelton [1968] ALR 33 for guidance, 
and quoted Barwick CJ: “By engaging in a sport...the participants may be held to have 
accepted risks which are inherent in that sport...but this does not eliminate all duty of care 
of the one participant to the other” (34). However, similar to how the criminal courts have 
“been reluctant to allow for a precedent to be created whereby the existence of sports, and 
their inherent characteristics, would be duly impinged upon” (Livings, 2016: 272), so have 
 
 
83 
the civil courts. This viewpoint has been granted statutory force; with the Compensation 
Act 2006 urging courts to consider whether a claim might “prevent a desirable activity from 
being undertaken at all ... or discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection 
with a desirable activity” (S. 1.). Nonetheless, Jahn (1988: 253) advocates that in addition 
to offering compensation to the injured person, the civil tort of law also presents “the best 
way to deter violent conduct among athletes”, as it “imposes financial liability on the athlete 
... and this will hit him where it hurts the most – in his pocket”. Furthermore, this financial 
liability may also stretch to the player’s club through vicarious liability if its commission is 
sufficiently linked to the player’s employment.  
Potentially the most famous case of ‘violence’ on the rugby pitch going through the 
civil courts is the case of Smoldon v Whitworth [1996] ELR 249. Here, the claimant sued 
another player and the referee after a he was catastrophically injured from a collapsed scrum 
during a rugby union match. The claim against the other player was dismissed, on the 
grounds that the player had not done anything deliberate to collapse the scrum, and thus had 
not breached their duty of care to the claimant. Yet, when considering the duty of care of 
the referee, it was found that the referee had not exercised their duty of care to prevent the 
collapsing of scrums. Thus, Smoldon was awarded £1.9 million compensation for the 
incident in 1999. This is an example of how civil law can be used as a method for deterrence 
in sports. Indeed, the possibility for such significant amounts of compensation make it an 
attractive technique. Yet, the potential for receiving such sums are very unlikely when it 
comes to the frequently seen ‘violent’ acts in rugby. The case of Smoldon was a particularly 
distinctive case, where the claimant had suffered a momentous life changing injury at the 
hands of another’s negligence. Those cases where consequences are not as severe will 
receive only fraction of the compensation awarded in Smoldon. Moreover, as mentioned 
previously, the issues associated with forming liability in criminal cases extend to the civil 
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law domain. Establishing that a duty of care had been breached requires that the defendant 
be proven to have passed the confinements of consent, as the boundaries for one’s duty of 
care run parallel to those of consent. As such, the complexities encountered when attempting 
to define consent in a sport, are also confronted in civil law. 
When considering alternative methods of dispute resolution in sport, it seems that 
there is no escape of the maladies associated with commercialism and consent. 
Nevertheless, Gardiner (2007: 29) suggests that “the reality of potential civil liability seems 
to have had a positive effect on the promotion of safety and good practice in sport”. As such, 
future research as to how independent and reliable regulation can be acquired outside of the 
criminal law may prove valuable.   
 
6.6. Summary 
 
Delineating the boundaries of consent is an arduous task, and one that cannot be defined 
through use of the official rules of the sport alone. Indeed, subscribing to such an approach 
would make defining ‘legitimate sport’ relatively straightforward (MRLA, 1976). Yet, 
scholars have been quick to remind us that such a notion is “untenable” (McCutcheon, 1994: 
273), providing that “the courts have been clear that transgression of the rules will not 
automatically attract criminal liability, and neither will it necessarily preclude the 
availability of the defense consent” (Livings, 2006: 497). Such conclusions are not purely 
limited to the academic sphere. The court in Brown (pp. 914-915) advocates that “even if 
the conduct justifies not only being penalised but also a warning or even a sending off, it 
still may not reach the threshold level required for it to be criminal”. As such, the courts 
have seemed to imply conformity to Gardinder’s (2012) and Livings’ (2006: 500) idea of a 
playing culture, whereby they “take account of all of the relevant circumstances of the sport, 
including the level of ability of the players concerned, in order to determine at what point 
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criminal liability should be imposed”. In Barnes, Lord Woolf alludes to the presence of a 
playing culture when making verdicts in cases within the sporting arena:  
 
[T]he fact that the play is within the rules and practice of the game and does not 
go beyond it, will be a firm indication that what has happened is not criminal ... 
conduct outside the rules can be expected to occur in the heat of the moment, 
and even if the conduct justifies not only being penalised but also a warning or 
even a sending off, it still may not reach the threshold level required for it to be 
criminal. (P. 914-915) 
 
Despite the potential of the playing culture standard, it encounters issues. The first is one of 
definition: it may be difficult to know exactly what the culture is in any particular set of 
circumstances. For Lumer (1995: 269), “[o]ften it is not clear what game the players have 
agreed to play, and even the players themselves may have divergent opinions about this”. 
Furthermore, the playing culture “appears paradoxical, and indeed oxymoronic” (Livings, 
2006: 501). Livings (2006: 501) expands suggesting that “the greater the degree of 
flexibility, the less predictable the outcome; the more certain a rule, the less this allows for 
flexibility”. This may be true, however, it seems that the playing culture standard offers a 
valuable tool to be considered when attempting to define a player’s consent in sport.  
The issues arising when attempting to interpret consent in contact sports makes 
applying criminal offences to incidents of participator ‘violence’ incredibly difficult. 
Fulfilling the mens rea requirements of the statutory assaults becomes troublesome when 
intent and recklessness have to be proven against the backdrop of a sport with ‘violence’ at 
its core. The House of Lords’ judgment in Woolin held that intention may be inferred where 
the defendant viewed the outcome as a ‘virtual certainty’. As such, asserting indirect 
intention on the part of a rugby player making a tackle or committing a foul which seemingly 
injures the opponent, demands satisfaction of ‘virtual certainty’ that outcome would have 
occurred. Anticipating that there might be a risk, even a risk with a high probability, will 
not be enough. Establishing that a player knew with ‘virtual certainty’ that their actions 
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would have caused the outcome is arduous. Such complexities are also found when 
attempting to establish recklessness. Lord Woolf in Barnes gives a relatively 
straightforward characterisation of recklessness in sports, stating:  
 
“Recklessly’ in this context means no more than that the defendant foresaw the 
risk that some bodily harm (however slight) might result from what he was 
going to do and yet, ignoring that risk, the defendant went on to commit the 
offending act. (915) 
 
If Lord Woolf’s opinion in Barnes is the exhaustive means of recklessness, it is inevitably 
the case that many sportspersons will potentially be in a permanent state of prima facie 
liability. However, it could be argued that the Court of Appeal in Barnes omitted an 
important qualifying clause that is central to what many would view to be the accepted test 
of recklessness.  
Ormerod (2007: 118) acknowledges such concerns, suggesting that “[n]ot all risk-
taking constitutes recklessness”; the risk taken must also be deemed “unreasonable” in the 
circumstances. As such, the unreasonable limb of recklessness provided in the Law 
Commission 134 (LCCP 134) was suggested to provide an effective framework for 
establishing liability in contact sports. the reasonableness of risk would be determined in 
reference to the activity, meaning that “[g]ratuitously aggressive and dangerous conduct ... 
may well be characterised as the unreasonable taking of a risk, even within the extended 
limits of normally acceptable behaviour that apply when playing a contact sport” (para 
10.16). Thus, the ‘general test’ of recklessness would be: “whether the defendant took a risk 
of injury of which he was aware, and in the circumstances, it was unreasonable for him to 
take that risk” (para 46.1). Adopting such an approach would make it applicable to a broad 
spectrum of sports and contexts. Moreover, it operates under a loose definition of sport, 
which also accommodates the player’s consent through a holistic appraisal of the 
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acceptability of the conduct in a particular circumstance.  
Despite the potential that the unreasonableness limb of reckless holds, there are 
some who promote the use of alternative regulatory mechanisms as a more effective means 
of regulating contact sports. In Barnes, Lord Woolf discusses such possibilities:  
In determining what the approach of the courts should be, the starting point is 
the fact that most organised sports have their own disciplinary procedures for 
enforcing their particular rules and standards of conduct. As a result, in the 
majority of situations there is not only no need for criminal proceedings, it is 
undesirable that there should be any criminal proceedings. Further, in addition 
to a criminal prosecution, there is the possibility of an injured player obtaining 
damages in a civil action from another player, if that other player caused him 
injuries through negligence or an assault. (911) 
 
Anderson (2013: 57), when referring to the internal disciplinary bodies of a sport, suggest 
that [t]here is little doubt that a speedy, consistent and fair internal disciplinary regime 
within a sport is the most effective deterrent against unnecessarily violent play, as opposed 
to the more distant and unpredictable applicability of the criminal law. Yet, Jahn (1988: 
250) reminds us that the interests of such bodies are directed by the commercial elite, and 
thus may not truly reflect the most effective means of deterring ‘violent’ play.  
Jahn (1988), on the other hand, refers to the compensatory remedials of the civil law 
as “the best way to deter violent conduct among athletes”, as it “imposes financial liability 
on the athlete ... and this will hit him where it hurts the most – in his pocket”. Furthermore, 
this financial liability may also stretch to the player’s club through vicarious liability if its 
commission is sufficiently linked to the player’s employment. However, the issues 
associated with forming liability in criminal cases also extend to the civil law. As such, 
establishing that a duty of care had been breached requires that the defendant be proven to 
have passed the confinements of consent, as the boundaries for one’s duty of care run 
parallel to those of consent. Therefore, grounding liability in civil law cases can encounter 
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just as many issues as that of the criminal court. Accordingly, it is suggested that further 
research is needed into how alternative regulatory mechanisms, such as internal disciplinary 
bodies and the civil law, can improve to provide effective means for regulating participator 
‘violence’ in contact sports.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RFU: DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURE  
 
5.1. The Process of Professionalism in Rugby Union 
 
Since the inauguration of the RFU in 1871, rugby union has been a sport which has long 
celebrated and emphasised its amateur ethos. Following the split between the South of 
England (rugby union) and the North (rugby league), rugby union fought hard to maintain 
its amateur values in the face of the threat posed by the incipient professionalisation in the 
North (Dunning and Sheard, 2005). For Dunning and Sheard (1979), the public school elite 
reinforced an amateur ideology that rested on three fundamentals. Firstly, the pursuit of 
playing rugby should be an end in itself; individuals should play the sport simply for the 
pleasure afforded. Secondly, the idea of ‘sportsmanship’ in victory or defeat was 
emphasised. Players should display self-restraint, and above all, show respect by masking 
emotion despite the result of a game. Finally, the notion of ‘fair play’ was endorsed. 
Dunning and Sheard (1979: 153) refer to “the normative equalisation of game-chances 
between contending sides, coupled with a stress on voluntary compliance with the rules and 
a chivalrous attitude of ‘friendly rivalry’ towards opponents”.  
Despite the struggle to maintain amateur ideals, rugby union’s turn to 
professionalism was seen by some as inevitable (Howe, 1999). The development of 
competitive league rugby, such as the introduction of the WRU Challenge Cup in 1971, 
drove the standards of the game higher and higher, and with this, the commitment required 
from players intensified (Howe, 1999). Howe (1999) also discusses how commercial 
interest in rugby grew as the popularity of the game developed. For Howe (1999), the 
increased access to consumers which larger competition brought, led many local businesses 
to want to contribute to their local club, in the hope that it would grant exposure for their 
 
 
91 
enterprise. The duet of increased competition and demand on players, and the growing 
interest commercially eventually led to the announcement of rugby union as an ‘open’ game 
in 1995.   
The direct impact of professionalism on the disciplinary structures of the RFU, 
particularly in relation to ‘violence’ on the pitch, would seem far more appropriate in the 
scope of the current discussion. However, there is a dearth of literature reviewing such a 
relationship. As such, the following discussion will observe how the rule structures of rugby 
altered concurrently with the development of professionalism, while also looking to how 
professionalism has affected the bureaucracy of sport in general, and how this is reflected 
in the current procedures of the RFU. 
If we are to observe how the rule structures of rugby have transformed since the 
birth of professionalism, it becomes apparent that a large proportion of rule changes have 
been to make the sport a more compelling entity for commercial interest, largely through 
making the game more enjoyable to watch for spectators. Howe (1999) provides an 
illustration of this direction for change in his consideration of Welsh rugby union. In 1992, 
the International Rugby Board, now named World Rugby, increased the points awarded for 
scoring a try from four to five, believing that, by making it worth more than a penalty, teams 
would be encouraged to play more of a running style of rugby. By 1994-95, clubs in the 
Welsh Premiership were competing for places in the European Club Championships, and 
so competition between teams was intense. During this period, Howe (1999: 170) describes 
how “players began to break the rules deliberately by being off-side or killing the ball, 
preferring to give away a chance of a penalty goal rather than allow a try to be scored, as a 
result of their poor play”. Consequently, those teams with skilled goal kickers were 
dominant. As a counter measure, the Welsh Rugby Union (WRU) introduced bonus points 
for scoring a sufficient amount of tries against your opponent, in an attempt to bring back a 
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more enjoyable, running game. Because of this, the game was “forced to be more fluid and 
thus more entertaining, increasing the amount of media coverage” (Howe, 1999: 170). Here, 
it is obvious that both the IRB and the WRU did their upmost to ensure that rugby remained 
a commercially attractive investment for fans and corporations.  
Not only did professionalism produce more commercial pressure for the governing 
bodies of rugby, but it also evoked a response for the safety of players. Murray et al (2014) 
suggest that since the IRB have attempted to make the game more fluid and fast paced, the 
physical demands of the game have increased, proposing a fourfold increase in tackles and 
rucks per game. The increase in physical demands, combined with the increased fiscal 
capabilities of clubs, meant that the size, speed and power of player’s sky rocketed (Duthie 
et al., 2003). Therefore, teams with the tallest and heaviest players outperformed their 
counterparts, as Sedeaud et al (2012) noted in their study of the Rugby World Cup 2011. 
However, this increase in body size and power has been accompanied by an escalation in 
injury risk and prevalence (Murray et al., 2014). This inflation of injury prevalence and risk 
may be reflected in World Rugby’s recent efforts to clamp down on dangerous play (Rugby 
World; 2013; and World Rugby, 2016), largely through the harsher sanctions when it comes 
to contact with the head (Smith, 2017).  
 
5.2. RFU Disciplinary Objectives  
 
The RFU has developed an extremely sophisticated disciplinary system. Much of the system 
has been altered to resemble a more legalistic approach, an approach which is seen as 
necessary under the newfound pressures of professionalism. A discussion on the 
disciplinary structure and processes can be found in Section 5.3. But, if we are to understand 
the disciplinary mechanisms of the RFU, first we must explain their disciplinary objectives, 
as this reveals an insight into the context of each element of the system.  
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In their Regulation 19 (s. 19.1.5), the RFU provide a clear overriding objective for 
the discipline of the game:  
[T]o maintain and promote fair play, protect the health and welfare of players 
(and others involved in the game), ensure that acts of foul play and misconduct 
(on and off the field of play) are dealt with expeditiously and fairly by 
independent means within the game and that the image and reputation of the 
game is not adversely affected. Furthermore, to achieve consistency in the way 
in which discipline is administered and uniformity in the manner in which the 
assessment of seriousness of foul play is conducted.  
 
 
Upon observation, it is clear that the RFU have very broad, yet basic, disciplinary goals. Put 
simply, the RFU are looking to create an environment where fair play and player welfare is 
protected, and the system for punishing acts of foul play are dealt with fairly and 
consistently. The notion of the system being equitable plays a huge part, so much so that 
the RFU state that “[d]isciplinary hearings shall be conducted in a fair and just manner and 
in accordance with the fundamental principles of natural justice” (Regulation 19, s. 19.1.6), 
continuing to suggest that “in the interests of achieving a just and fair result, procedural and 
technical considerations shall take second place to the overriding objective of being just and 
fair” (Regulation 19, s. 19.1.6). Here displays the biggest difference between the 
disciplinary structure of the RFU and the legal structure of the criminal law. The RFU look 
first and foremost to the fair regulation of the game, not allowing “findings or decisions be 
invalidated by reason of any defect, irregularity, omission or technicality, unless … [it] 
raises a material doubt as to the reliability of the proceedings” (Regulation 19, 19.1.6). 
Indeed, the legal system is the forefront of justice, and obviously has the notion of just 
litigation at heart. However, many of the processes within the legal system are heavily 
influenced by technicalities, meaning sometimes justice cannot always be served. This 
disparity between the two is acknowledged by the RFU since they advocate that disciplinary 
hearings must “recognise that neither a disciplinary panel nor an appeal panel is a court of 
law” (Regulation 19, s. 19.1.6). This is also perhaps best encapsulated in the contrasting 
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levels of guilt between the two. The law requires that it be proven beyond reasonable doubt 
that the act occurred, and for some offences, that the individual intended to cause the 
outcome of the act. Whereas the RFU only demands that the act occurred on the “balance 
of probabilities” (Regulation 19, 19.5.6), thus, making it much easier to find culpability.  
 
5.2.1. Ensuring that Disciplinary Objectives are Met 
 
In order to achieve the just and consistent disciplinary system which the RFU defines in 
their objectives, they incorporate a strict set of provisions whereby all RFU disciplinary 
members and constituent body members must abide. Such provisions are clearly set out in 
Regulation 19. The following discussion will examine the structure of RFU discipline, 
outlining the process for nominating a player for disciplinary hearings (known as citing in 
the rugby sphere). Furthermore, the process for sanctioning players will be explored, 
making particular reference to the low, mid and top range system adopted by the RFU.  
 
5.3. Structure of RFU Disciplinary System 
 
Before the structure of the disciplinary system is explored, it should be noted that all the 
information provided in the following discussion, excluding figure 1, can be found in the 
RFU document Regulation 19 and its relevant appendices. The RFU disciplinary system 
consists of numerous individuals under a hierarchical umbrella. The structure of individuals 
and their web of responsibilities can be found in Figure 1. As can be seen from the diagram, 
the web of responsibilities is very complex, with each individual having multiple chains of 
interdependency. Nonetheless, it is clear that the RFU Head of Discipline is the chief 
stakeholder in the process. Currently, the RFU Head of Discipline is former England 
international rugby player David Barnes, who took over the role in July 2017. Barnes’ role 
is to oversee the whole disciplinary process, offering guidance to the RFU Disciplinary 
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Officer, National Schools and Youth Development (NSYD) Officer and the Head of 
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Judiciary in all disciplinary matters. Moreover, Barnes also has the power to perform 
hearings in relation to misconduct from anyone involved with the RFU, such as council 
members, referees, clubs and players.  
The RFU Head of Judiciary, currently occupied by Philip Evans QC, is responsible 
for providing an independent process of adjudication. The Head of Judiciary “determines 
the criteria for appointment and terms and conditions of the independent members of the 
rugby judiciary” (Regulation 19, s. 19.1.16). In other words, the Head of Judiciary has the 
responsibility of ensuring that an independent and appropriate panel is appointed for 
disciplinary and appeal hearings. For instance Philip Evans QC will ensure that “[n]o person 
with an interest in the proceeding shall … sit on a disciplinary panel” (Regulation 19, 
19.2.4).  
The NSYD Officer heads up all disciplinary proceedings involving misconduct in 
the youth or school sector. Ian Skillen JP is currently in the role, and will offer guidance to 
constituent body disciplinary panels on any cases involving youth or schools. Skillen will 
also regularly meet with the Head of Discipline to discuss the direction of youth and schools 
discipline within the RFU. The RFU Disciplinary Officer will offer guidance to all panels 
on the procedures of a hearing. Such guidance has been documented in Regulation 19 
Appendix 5, and mainly focuses on delineating the entry point of a hearing. As such, 
whoever sits in the role of RFU Disciplinary Officer requires experience in areas of the law, 
particularly the mens rea of establishing accidental, reckless or intentional conduct, while 
also understanding the procedures of providing and weighing the impact of evidence.  
At the lower end of the system are the clubs, referees and disciplinary panels who 
cite and punish misconduct on the pitch. When there has been a form of misconduct, the 
first point of regulation is the referee. The referee will make an immediate decision as to the 
severity and as such the punishment of the act, awarding either a penalty, yellow card (ten 
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minute suspension from the game) or red card (permanent suspension from the game). 
Those incidents where a red card is given will go directly to a hearing in front of a panel. If 
the game in which the incident occurred is in the National Leagues 2 or the Women’s 
Premier 15s and above, or serious injury resulted from the act, or the incident is being 
investigated by the police, then the hearing will be headed by an RFU Disciplinary panel. 
All hearings outside of the parameters mentioned will be dealt with by a Constituent Body 
Disciplinary Panel instead.  
A citing may occur “where there is an allegation that a player committed an act of 
foul play but was not awarded a red card for the act” (Regulation 19, Appendix 4.2). For 
Levels 3-12, Premiership A League and all Women’s Matches (save for Women’s Premier 
15s 1st XV), all citing must be made to the relevant Constituent Body. Here, the club must 
show that either the match official made the wrong decision, or if the incident was not seen 
by a match official, “it must be shown that had the match official seen the act, a red card 
would have been awarded” (Regulation 19, Appendix 4.4.5). If either of these can be proven 
on the balance of probabilities, then a Constituent Body Disciplinary Panel will go ahead 
with the hearing. In contrast, for Levels 1 and 2, and Women’s Premier 15s (1st XV), a club 
participating in a match can refer any incidents they deem worthy of revaluation to the citing 
commissioner within 4 hours following the conclusion of the match (8 hours for 
Championship and Women’s Premier 15s). Before bringing a citing complaint, the citing 
commissioner must be “satisfied that in his/her opinion the act of foul play merited the 
award of a red card” (Regulation 19, Appendix 4.9). If the citing commissioner warrants the 
act of foul play worthy, he/she will then refer the incident to the RFU Head of Discipline, 
where it can then be dealt with by the relevant RFU Disciplinary Panel.  
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5. 4. Sanction Entry Points  
 
The RFU adopt an entry point system when delineating the sanctions for misconduct on the 
pitch. A complete guide to the minimum and maximum length of suspension for all forms 
of foul play is provided in the RFU Regulation 19 Appendix 2. However, it is beyond the 
scope of the current discussion to examine all forms of misconduct, as such the following 
section will explain how the entry point system works, and the factors impacting the length 
of suspensions using reference and examples from Regulation 19 Appendix 2.  
Table 2 is an excerpt taken from Regulation 19 Appendix 2 of the entry points for 
conduct contrary to law 9.11 and 9.12 of World Rugby’s Laws of the Game (this is not an 
exhaustive list of acts discordant to law 9.12, it is only an extract from the larger document). 
It is clear from the table that each act has a lower end, mid-range and top end entry point, 
with the minimum starting suspension increasing with each range. A disciplinary panel shall 
undertake an assessment of the seriousness of the player’s conduct which constitutes the 
offending and shall categorise the offence as being at the lower end, mid-range or top end 
of the scale of seriousness in order to identify the appropriate entry point for consideration 
of a particular incident(s) of foul play. Regulation 19 (s. 19.11.8) provides an extensive list 
of features to which a disciplinary panel should pay reference to when making their 
decision. Such a list includes, but is not limited to, the mens rea of the act, the nature and 
manner of the offence (body parts used – studs, fists etc, area of impact on the victim – 
head, neck etc.), whether it was retaliation and the timing of such, whether it was self-
defence, extent of injury caused, and impact of the offence on the match.  
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Table 3: Sanctioning table for Laws 9.11 and 9.12. Source: The RFU Disciplinary document Regulation 19 
Appendix 2 
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Having identified the applicable entry point for consideration of a particular 
incident, the disciplinary panel will continue to identify any relevant off-field aggravating 
factors and determine what additional period of suspension, if any, above the applicable 
entry point for the offence should apply to the case in question. Aggravating factors will 
include the player’s status as an offender of the laws of the game, the need for a deterrent 
to combat a pattern of offending, and any other off-field aggravating factors which the panel 
see relevant. Thereafter, a disciplinary panel will identify all relevant off-field mitigating 
factors and determine if there are grounds for reducing the period of suspension and the 
extent, if at all, by which the period of suspension should be reduced. Such mitigating 
factors may include the presence and timing of admitting culpability by the offender, the 
offender’s disciplinary record, the youth and inexperience of the offender, and the conduct 
of the offender at the hearing.  
It should be noted that, in alliance with s. 19.11.12, disciplinary panel cannot apply 
a greater reduction than 50% of the relevant entry point. In assessing the reduction 
applicable for mitigating factors, the disciplinary panel shall start at 0% reduction and apply 
the amount, if any, to be allowed as mitigation up to the maximum 50% reduction. Finally, 
excluding those actions constituting a yellow card, in cases where a player’s actions 
compose mid-range or top end offending, a disciplinary panel may impose any period of 
suspension including a suspension for life if the offence had the potential to result, or did in 
fact result, in serious consequences to the health of the victim. Nonetheless, panel members 
are advised to acknowledge the maximum entry point set out in Regulation 19 Appendix 2 
as guidance when making their decision.  
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5.5. Summary 
 
The development of rugby union from its amateur roots, into the cultivated hands of 
professionalism, has caused not only the rule system of the sport, but also the disciplinary 
structure of its bodies to develop in accordance. As Figure 1 displays, the RFU has 
developed a particularly sophisticated disciplinary structure, and one which aims to create 
an environment where fair play and player welfare is protected, and the system for punishing 
acts of foul play are dealt with fairly and consistently. In establishing such a system, RFU 
discipline has had to adopt legalistic characteristics, whereby evidence and independent 
panels decide the fate of transgressors. Yet, the RFU are keen to declare that “neither a 
disciplinary panel nor an appeal panel is a court of law” (Regulation 19, s. 19.1.6), which is 
perhaps best encapsulated in the contrasting levels of guilt between the two. The law 
requires ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, whereas the RFU only demands the “balance of 
probabilities” (Regulation 19, 19.5.6).  
In an attempt to follow through on their disciplinary objectives, the RFU adopted 
World Rugby’s entry point method, whereby each act of transgression is characterised and 
given a lower, mid and top level of sanction (RFU Regulation 19, Appendix). This is 
dependent of course on the circumstances of the foul play, nevertheless, it provides a clearer 
and more stringent system for regulating the game. When considering whether the RFU are 
currently meeting their objectives, particularly that of consistency, an analysis of four cases 
during the 2017-18 season can be found in Chapter 8. Here, details of both the sanction 
afforded, and the facts attributing to such, will be examined.  
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CHAPTER 7 
METHODOLOGY 
 
7.1.  Design  
 
Nine semi-structured interviews and an online questionnaire were used in the study to gain 
an insight into the perspectives of the participants in relation to the regulation of on-field 
sport ‘violence’. Forcese and Richer (1973: 176) suggest a combination of both devices 
“would embody a richness of data not possible with one technique alone”. Both semi-
structured interviews and questionnaires rely on language and the interpretation of its 
meaning, as such, they “tend to involve close human involvement and a creative process of 
theory development” (Walliman, 2006: 37).  
The present study could be considered, what Guba and Lincoln (1989) refer to as, a 
fourth-generation evaluation, insofar as the study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
current regulatory procedures for on-field ‘violence’ adopted by the RFU. Moreover, it is 
hoped that the result of such an evaluation will offer areas for improvement, and thus move 
the sport forward. By focusing inquiries on the RFU, CPS of England and Wales, and the 
Laws of England and Wales, one could suggest that the external validity of the study will 
suffer. However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to generalise to other national bodies’ 
regulatory practices or to any other sports beyond that analysed in this study. Triangulation 
of data sources was achieved by comparing the perspectives of current professional players, 
premiership referees, legal professionals and current RFU disciplinary panel members to 
reveal underlying themes. Triangulation helps “map out, or explain more fully, the richness 
and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint” (Cohen 
et al., 2007: 141).  
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All RFU disciplinary panel members, referee’s and legal professionals were 
contacted via an email which included an explanation of the study and why they have been 
chosen as a candidate, and a question of whether they would happily be involved. Finally, 
a link to the online questionnaire was sent to two current premiership rugby clubs who then 
forwarded it to players within the first team.  
 
7.1.1.  Interviews  
 
Interviews were chosen as they centre around a goal which aims “to expose differences, 
contradictions and, in short, the complexity of unique experiences” (Bennett, 2002: 151). 
Emotionalists consider interviews to elicit authentic accounts of subjective experience, with 
Miller and Glassner (2016: 133) suggesting they “provide us with a means for exploring the 
points of view of our research subjects, while granting these points of view the culturally 
honoured status of society”. Orbuch (1997: 455) takes this further, proposing interviews 
offer a means of determining “culturally embedded normative explanations [of events and 
behaviours, because they] represent ways in which people organise views of themselves, of 
others, and of their social world”.  
The process of interviewing - including collecting information, evoking stories, 
learning about meanings, experiences, relationships and emotions – reveals information that 
may not be evident from observation alone. Pugh (2013: 42) agrees, suggesting interviewing 
“allows … access to an emotional landscape that brings a broader, social dimension to 
individual motivation”. However, I would argue that interviews do much more than simply 
provide information on subjective and cultural meanings. Analysis of language offers two 
convoluted findings: evidence of the contexts and situations of the phenomenon under 
investigation, and the cultural frames individuals adopt to understand such experiences. 
When combined, they can offer valuable theoretical understandings. Personal accounts of 
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experiences are imperative in social research as language shapes meaning, but also “permits 
intersubjectivity and the ability of wilful persons to create and maintain meaningful words” 
(Miller and Glassner, 2016: 135).   
Semi-structured interviews were selected over open-ended, as undoubtedly, the 
direction an interview will follow – in relation to its structure and guidance - will be heavily 
influenced by the research itself and previous research on the topic area. As such, using the 
research to direct interaction between interviewer and interviewee meant that unique and 
appropriate areas could be discussed, while also maintaining the possibility for those 
accounts not directly influenced by research to be revealed (Lamont and Swidler, 2014).  
 
7.1.2. Questionnaires  
 
An online questionnaire was created and sent to two current premiership rugby teams for 
players to complete. Indeed, questionnaires are cost-effective and swift, while also having 
the ability to reach a large sample, possibly over a broad geographical area in a short period 
of time (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). However, they also elicit responses which are 
unaffected by interviewer effects. David and Sutton (2011: 243) suggest that during an 
interview (or any conversational interaction) “[t]he responses given by the interviewee can 
be affected by the presence of the interviewer, who influences the replies made by their 
wording of questions, their tone of voice, their mannerisms or their general characteristics”.   
The questionnaire adopted an online format for three primary reasons. Firstly, the 
questionnaire could be distributed to a large number very quickly – by simply sending a link 
to participants. Secondly, parameters of the questionnaire could be set using online tools. 
For instance, in the present study, once the participant had started the questionnaire, they 
were required to complete every question before they could submit, meaning it was ensured 
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that there would be some form of response to every question. Thirdly, the researcher can be 
notified once a respondent has completed the survey, to which the researcher can then access 
the results instantly; subsequently speeding up the analysis process.  
The questionnaire consisted of twenty-one open ended questions, in which the 
respondent could write as much as they desired in response to each question. Furthermore, 
the questionnaire was divided into three sections, all representing the exploration of a 
different topic within the study. The first section, headlined ‘Dangerous Play in Rugby’, 
focused its questions around the players’ definitions and experiences with dangerous play. 
It was hoped that through answering such questions players would reveal how dangerous 
play is viewed from the eyes of the players, and how prominent it may be as a facet of their 
culture. The second section had the ‘Regulation of Dangerous Play’ as its focal. This section 
examined the players’ perceptions of the current regulatory procedures adopted by the RFU, 
while also exposing their views on how increased criminalisation might affect the game. 
Finally, the third sector, titled ‘Legitimate Sport’, hoped to uncover the players thoughts on 
what they consider to be acceptable ‘unwritten conventions’ (Dunning and Sheard, 2005: 
29) in the game of rugby. Through answering this, it may help make the boundaries 
demarcating acceptable and unacceptable, and thus legal and illegal, clearer.  
 
 
7.1.3. Sampling  
 
The present study adopted a purposive sampling method (Bryman, 2016). Purposive 
sampling is non-probability form of sampling, whereby the goal is to sample participants 
strategically, so that those sampled are both relevant and valuable to the research questions 
being used. Bryman (2016: 408) suggests that in purposive sampling, “sites, such as 
organisations, and people within sites are selected because of their relevance to the research 
questions”. The study took a priori purposive sampling or as Bryman (2016: 410) calls it, a 
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“non-sequential approach”, in that the criteria for participant selection was established prior 
to the commencement of the research. Hood (2007: 152) also refers to purposive sampling 
in her “generic inductive qualitative model”, insofar as she suggests it is relatively open-
ended, emphasising the generation of theories and concepts, yet does not involve the 
iterative tone of grounded theory.  
Adopting a non-probability sampling method over that of a probability sample can 
of course affect external validity (David and Sutton, 2011). By choosing a sample which is 
not representative of general population, the results of the study cannot be assumed 
generalised across the wider population. However, it is not the purpose of the present study 
to generalise its results to that of other nations, governing bodies, or other sports. Nor is it 
focused on making assumptions about the views of the wider population of legal 
professionals, referees, players and disciplinary panel members based on the opinions of 
those involved in the study. Sjoberg and Nett (1968: 152) justify the use of non-probability 
sampling techniques by suggesting the “value system and power structure of both the 
society within which the researcher functions and the special universe he is studying” can 
make certain units within the population more desirable for research than others. In other 
words, the opinions of those in the present study offer more value to answering the research 
question than those who might be incorporated in a probability sample.  
 
7.2. Participants  
 
A total of twenty participants were used in the study, nine of which were interviewed, while 
the other eleven were current professional players who completed the online questionnaire. 
Out of the nine who were interviewed, three were legal professionals, two were currently 
referees in the Aviva Premiership, and four were presently RFU disciplinary panel 
members. It should be noted that some of the participants were involved in more than one 
category. For instance, there were numerous legal professionals who were also involved in 
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the disciplinary system of the RFU. As such, these individuals were able to provide a unique 
viewpoint from both perspectives.  
 
 
7.2.1. Justification  
 
Four legal professionals, all of whom were mature in the criminal side of the law, were 
approached and interviewed for the study due to their personal and long-lasting experience 
with how the criminal law is applied to ‘violence’ cases, in particular those cases occurring 
during the course of play in sport. It was thought that their detailed knowledge and 
experience would prove valuable when considering the issues and most effective ways of 
attaching criminal liability to egregious cases of ‘violence’ in rugby. Additionally, referees 
hold a particularly intriguing insight into the said study, as they are the primary officiators 
during matches and as such implement disciplinary measures during the course of a game. 
Therefore, two referees currently officiating games in the Aviva Premiership offered their 
opinion on the RFU’s disciplinary methods, and how they believe, if needed, a relationship 
might form between the RFU and CPS. Similarly, the four members of the RFU disciplinary 
panel members are at the forefront of regulation in English rugby union. They offer a 
perspective from the viewpoint of those who decide the acceptability of an act, the 
punishment, and how far the criminal law gets involved with ‘violence’ cases.  
It was decided that the outlook of professional players would also prove valuable to 
the study. Players are directly involved in the committing and punishing of violent acts, and 
as such will be the most affected by any changes to the current disciplinary model. 
Therefore, players would offer a bottom up viewpoint, a perspective which lies concealed 
when looking from the top up alone.  
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7.3. Analysis  
 
The analysis process was conducting in a two-phase procedure. The first centres around 
transcription and idiographic profiling, while the second has the generation of themes and 
concepts at its core. Both phases are discussed below.  
 
7.3.1. Phase One  
 
The audio recorded interviews with all twelve participants were transcribed verbatim by 
the researcher. Each transcript was then read repeatedly, with the audio recording playing 
concurrently so that the researcher could gain a clearer sense of the meaning and emotion 
portrayed by the participants. During the reading process, potential codes and units were 
noted, alongside the researcher’s initial thoughts about the interview in regard to the 
substance and conducting of the interview itself. As a result of the transcription process, 
multiple page idiographic profiles - which summarised the general theme and direction 
of the interview – were created for each participant. Such profiles provided a holistic 
appraisal of the interview, ensuring that during the coding process the overall meanings 
conveyed by each participant was not lost.  
 
 
7.3.2. Phase Two  
 
The second phase of data analysis incorporated thematic analysis. In particular, Braun 
and Clarke’s (2006) guiding principles were considered, while also acknowledging 
insights from Attride-Stirling (2001) and Gioia et al., (2012). Braun and Clarke (2006) 
describe thematic analysis as one of the core methods adopted by qualitative researchers, 
due to its flexibility across theoretical approaches. Thematic analysis boasts further 
elasticity as it can be used both inductively and deductively. Patton (1980: 306) suggests 
that in inductive analysis, “the patterns, themes, and categories of analysis come from the 
data; they emerge out of the data rather than being imposed on them prior to data 
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collection and analysis”. Because the study is both exploratory and analytical in nature - 
insofar as it looks to give a voice to the participants views on the regulation of ‘violence’ 
in rugby, while also using such views to analyse existing concepts from the literature – 
the study utilised a mix of both inductive and deductive analysis. As such, the coding 
process will encompass an amalgam of Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) and Charmaz’s 
(2006) approach to coding. Walliman (2006: 133) describes codes as: “labels or tags used 
to allocate units of meaning to the collected data … and provides a first step in 
conceptualisation”.  
The coding process generally followed three stages, with each stage adopting a 
different form of coding to sift through the data effectively. Firstly, Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1990: 61) open coding was used as a process of “breaking down, examining, comparing 
conceptualising and categorising data”. Bryman (2016: 574) furthers, suggesting that 
during the open code stage, those codes identified as “concepts” are grouped into 
categories in preparation for further grouping in later stages. Focused coding (Charmaz, 
2006: 57-58) was then implemented, to which those concepts identified as being the most 
dominant during the open coding stage were categorised into themes which “make the 
most analytical sense” and group the data both “incisively and completely”. Finally, 
theoretical coding was applied. Theoretical codes, as Charmaz (2006: 63) proposes, “lend 
form to the focused codes” by conceptualising the links between dominant themes, 
moving the “analytical story [of the data] in a theoretical direction”. Throughout this 
stage, external literature was consulted in case it could enhance the story being developed. 
Additionally, throughout the coding process, what Strauss (1987) calls ‘in vivo codes’ 
were used. This refers to the use of the subjects’ natural language in the creation of codes, 
rather than the researcher using their own terminology and creating ‘socially constructed 
codes’.  
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Once themes had been established, they were all reviewed to ensure that they could 
be substantiated based on the data contained. This meant that the researcher checked 
whether the codes within each theme were well supported and consistent based on the 
meaning units of each code. Furthermore, an effort was made to ensure that themes were 
independent, insofar as they could no longer be coupled with other themes. This confirmed 
that each theme captured its own portrayal of the data. It should be noted that throughout 
the analysis process the idiographic profiles created in phase one were repeatedly consulted. 
This was to ensure that the codes reflected the true meaning behind the participants views 
 
7.4. Ethics  
 
When undertaking sociological research, or any research for that matter, Singleton 
and Straits (1999) emphasise two areas taking the focal of ethical concern: the ethics of 
treatment of participants and the ethics of data collection and analysis. The former refers to 
the appropriate treatment of participants, in that “[b]asic ethical principles in our cultural 
and legal tradition demand that research participants be treated with respect and protected 
from harm” (Singleton and Straits, 1999: 514). Whilst the latter demands that researchers 
are honest in their analysis and observations; placing the pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding above personal gain or the promotion of a particular philosophy or ideology” 
(Singleton and Straits, 1999: 513). The ensuing sections will focus on the ethical concerns 
of the study in reference to the two factors outlined above.  
 
 
7.4.1. The Ethics of Treatment of Participants  
 
Harm 
 
Throughout the study, the British Sociological Association’s (BSA) Statement of Ethical 
Practice (2017) was consulted. The overarching ideology of the BSA statement was that 
indeed sociologists, similarly to other researchers, commit themselves to the advancement 
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of knowledge, however such a goal, in itself, does not grant an entitlement to override the 
rights of others. 
 The possibility for inflicting harm – physically, psychologically and socially - 
should be considered in all studies. Singleton and Straits (1999: 515) compare this to the 
Hippocratic oath taken by physicians, suggesting that researchers should “abstain from 
whatever is deleterious”. At times, research can incorporate sensitive topics, particularly 
when exploring new areas, insofar as the researcher may probe deeper to gain unique 
underlying perspectives. In light of this, sensitive topics, or the potential for, were 
acknowledged and taken into consideration when creating questions prior to the 
commencement of the study. Moreover, all participants were made aware of the topic under 
exploration through a participant information sheet, whilst a copy of the interview schedule 
was made available to them for observation prior to the study. It was hoped that by doing 
so, the researcher would be made aware of topics or questions proving noxious for the 
participants.  
 
Consent  
 
Despite in covert ethnographic research studies, “participation in sociological research 
should be based on the freely given informed consent of those studied” (BSA, 2017: 5). As 
such, the BSA’s (2017: 5) recommendations of explaining “in appropriate detail, and in 
terms meaningful to the participants, what the research is about, who is undertaking and 
financing it, why it is being undertaken, and how it is to be distributed and used” will be 
adopted. Therefore, informed consent was gathered from all participants. Furthermore, a 
participant information sheet, providing full details of the study, was distributed to all 
participants. Of course, all participants were made aware that they could withdraw from the 
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study at any time without reason, and that any information provided by the subjects could 
be destroyed at their request.  
 
Privacy 
 
Singleton and Straits (1999: 522) refer back to the Hippocratic oath, suggesting researchers 
should follow that “[w]hatever … I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be 
spoken of abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all such should be kept secret”. 
Following on from this, it was ensured that Ruebhausen and Brim’s (1996: 432), right to 
privacy was adopted in the present study. Such a right involves:  
 
The freedom or the individual to pick and choose for themselves the time and 
circumstances under which, and the extent to which, their attitudes, beliefs, 
behaviours and opinions are to be shared with, or withheld from others 
 
 
In many circumstances, and particularly in the present study, the issue of privacy is 
invariably linked to issues of anonymity and confidentiality (Bryman, 2008). Indeed, it is 
vital that participants have the option to be promised anonymity (Sarantakos, 2005). 
However, due to the particular cachet of those involved in the study, and the potential weight 
behind their views, all those being interviewed where asked if their names could be included 
in the study. Of course, if anonymity was desired by a participant, then a pseudonym was 
used as a point for reference throughout the thesis. In regard to the professional players 
approached in the online questionnaire, no names or potentially revealing information was 
asked for amidst the questions. Therefore, replacement numbers (such as Player 1) will be 
adopted throughout the duration of the study.  
 
Data Storage and Archiving  
 
All interviews were audio recorded for transcription at a later date, after which recordings 
were destroyed. This information was provided to the participants through the participant 
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information sheet. Furthermore, participants were asked to consent to the audio recording 
of interviews via an informed consent form. If consent was not granted, recording of the 
interview through note taking would then be proposed as an alternative. Both transcriptions 
of interviews and questionnaire responses were stored on a password protected computer, 
as recommended by the BSA (2017), both of which were destroyed once analysis of data 
had been completed.  
 
 
The Ethics of Data Collection and Analysis  
 
The ethics of data collection and analysis was referred to as early as 1977 by Cournand, 
who suggested that researchers should be “unremittingly honest” by avoiding “the 
undisciplined introduction of subjective elements into their perceptions” whilst also 
preventing “their desires and aversions from penetrating their observations of the 
phenomena that they study and their analysis of these observations” (Cournand, 1977: 700). 
Put simply, Cournand (1977) is referring to the significance for researchers to be honest in 
their recording and analysis of results; not letting personal opinion influence the outcome 
of the study. Thus, in alignment with this, the completed thesis was made available to the 
participants to ensure that all quotes, ideas, and themes generated from the research is that 
of the participants. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
8.1. Overview of Results  
 
As mentioned in in the previous chapter, thematic analysis was performed on the views of 
nine interviewees and eleven individuals who completed an online questionnaire to expose 
underlying themes within the data. A mixture of inductive and deductive analysis (Patton, 
1980) revealed four major themes. These were: 1) dangerous play is part of the game; 2) the 
criminal law has a role, but the RFU may be more suited to regulate; 3) discplinary sanctions 
and cards are effective but inconsistent; and, 4) establishing a formal link between the law 
and the RFU could be the answer.  
The data produced displayed inconsistences which would be expected with 
triangulation of subjects. Such inconsistencies should not be viewed as a weakness, as 
diversity in opinion allows one to uncover deeper meaning from the data (Cohen et al., 
2007). In summary, the opinion which regarded interference from the law as inessential and 
undesirable was pervasive among participants. Yet, interestingly, the professional players 
seemed to have more recognition of the need for legal intervention than the referees, legal 
professionals and disciplinary panel members. Explanations of such a trend may come in 
the form of ‘unwritten conventions’ (Dunning and Sheard, 2005), insofar as the players may 
have a deeper understanding of what is regarded as acceptable by those playing rugby, and 
as such, can acknowledge a point to which the RFU fails to offer suitable castigation.  
Each key theme, and how they can be related to the literature is discussed below. It 
should be noted that components of certain themes were unique to the study, meaning there 
was little or no previous academic research on the topic. Thus, reference to literature was 
limited, and so discussion focused on the views of participants and how these might be 
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developed. For the purpose of confidentiality, when referring the opinion of a participant, 
they will be referred to by their role in accordance to the study (e.g. legal professional 1).  
 
`8.2. Dangerous Play Part of the Game  
 
The intrinsic physicality and dangers in rugby union are well documented and universally 
acknowledged (Murray et al., 2014). World Rugby encapsulated its recognition of such 
dangers in its foreword to the 2015 edition of World Rugby’s (2015:3) Laws of the Game: 
“Rugby Union is a sport which involves physical contact. Any sport involving physical 
contact has inherent dangers”. Moreover, in Brown, the House of Lords attempt to dissociate 
the violent conduct in sport to that of sado-masochism, proposing that in contact sport “any 
infliction of injury is merely incidental to the purpose of the main activity”. This regard for 
innate ‘violence’ in rugby is reiterated on numerous occasions by participants. One of the 
Legal Professionals interviewed discussed how physicality and dangerous play is part of the 
game when asked about the implicitly of ‘violence’ in rugby:  
 
I think it is an inevitable part of the sport. I say that because when you have a 
gravely physical contest that is rugby union, it is inevitable that with such 
ferocity of contact that you will end up in repeated situations of what is 
dangerous play. (Legal Professional 1) 
 
 
Another participant, this time an RFU disciplinary panel member, reinforced the notion of 
a naturally dangerous sport:  
 
[I]n any contact sport there are dangers of getting involved, and you know 
somebody just needs to tackle someone slightly wrong and it’s dangerous. But 
I think it is inherent in the actual game. (Panel Member 1) 
  
These two statements seem to be reflections of the overall mind set of the participants, who 
also displayed similar opinions towards the acceptability of dangerous play in sport, 
suggesting it to be inherent to the nature of the game. Yet, one player went further, 
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suggesting that “coaches and fellow players want you to be physical, and sometimes if that 
means playing a bit dangerously, then it is just part of the game”. This statement not only 
reaffirms the acceptance of dangerous play, but also reinforces the Marxist ideas discussed 
in Chapter 4. The desire for, and encouragement of, physicality, and the acceptance of its 
by-products - in this instance dangerous play - by coaches brings us back to the notion that 
players are simply a commodity; a tool in the coach’s armory. Here, the wellbeing of a 
player seems to be secondary to the success of the team. Moreover, although no participants 
directly referred to such Marxist views as having an impact on their view of dangerous play, 
it could be said that if the coaches are willing to accept the potential repercussions of 
physicality, then the players are too, as the coaches, being in charge of who plays, are 
directly in control of the success of their careers. Such an assumption would not only explain 
why so many players referred to dangerous play as being simply part of the game but would 
also reflect Mead’s (1934) and Blumer’s (1969) concept of symbolic interactionism. 
According to Mead and Blumer, players would attach meaning to their coach’s viewpoint, 
a meaning which in this case would refer to increased physicality, and a disregard for its by-
products, as a vehicle to success.  
Despite the demonstration of Marxist and symbolic interactionist ideas, players were 
also quick to reassure that modern rugby union is a much less ‘violent’ game than it was in 
the past. Many players pointed towards “[n]ew and improved laws and enforcement” that 
have “increased the visibility and punishing of foul play”. Whilst others referenced how 
“athletes are always getting bigger, stronger and faster, and therefore there are more bigger 
collisions”. This viewpoint coincides with evidence suggesting that professionalism 
instigated the development of players physically and tactically (Duthie et al., 2003; and 
Murray et al., 2013).  This sentiment, that the sport is becoming increasingly stringent on 
dangerous play, may seem at first glance to be antithetical to the Marxist interpretations 
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discussed previously. Yet, when considering the ideas of Norbert Elias’ (1969) discussed in 
Chapter 4, namely the sportisation of games, it is unsurprising that the civilising trend of 
society is starting to seep into contact sports. Nevertheless, a more sophisticated rule 
structure surrounding dangerous play does not necessarily mean players are not treated as 
commodities. Rather than be pushed to display dangerous play or ‘violence’, players seem 
to be encouraged to be as physical as possible. Here, the message is still the same, that 
players’ bodies are devices used by agents to achieve success.  
Numerous scholars acknowledge the acceptance of a certain level of dangerous play, 
however the limits of such acceptance is of considerable debate. The Michigan Law Review 
Association (MLRA, 1976) argue that the rules of the game offer a simple delineation of 
consent, whereby all infractions of such rules can be labelled as ‘liable’ in the criminal court. 
Indeed, this would offer simplicity, yet, Livings (2006: 497) reminds us that “the courts 
have been clear that transgression of the rules will not automatically attract criminal 
liability, and neither will it necessarily preclude the availability of the defense consent”. 
This has led some to look beyond the official rules of a sport, rather referring to the 
‘unwritten conventions’ (Dunning and Sheard, 2005) for directions as to what is acceptable 
in a sport.  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the unwritten conventions constitute parameters that are 
not easily understood by reference to the rules alone, but rather, include the non-formal, 
accepted standard to which those involved adopt and adhere. These unwritten conventions 
have been the center for much discussion in both court rooms and academic discourse. As 
early as the late nineteenth century case of Bradshaw - where Lord Justice Bramwell made 
reference to “the rules and practice of a game” (83) as the delineating constructs of consent 
– the courts, in at least embryonic form, started to develop some notion of these unwritten 
conventions as extending to play beyond the formal rules of a sport, and into its playing 
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culture. The extent of these unwritten conventions is of particular importance, as this could 
be seen as the point to which the law can intervene. One referee explained how they view 
the presence of intention as being the differentiating factor: 
 
I think the difference would be if a player did it deliberately rather than if he 
does it recklessly, that would be the big difference in my view. If someone did 
something intentionally, and I can only think of a couple off the top of my head, 
that is where people would expect a heftier sanction. (Referee 1)  
 
 
The players also saw intention as holding significant value when delineating acceptability, 
with players referring to “deliberately trying to harm someone”, and “any action done with 
the intent to harm another player” as being points to which an act is no longer tolerable. Yet, 
some players also associated an amalgam of the level of injury and the presence of intention 
with acceptability. One player stated that if “[a] player is deliberately trying to injure another 
player and has damaged their quality of life” it is unacceptable. Another noted that those 
acts “where a deliberate action is taken with intent by a player [and] has resulted in 
significant injury (life changing injuries) for another player” should be considered by the 
courts. The ideas expressed in these answers to the questionnaire, reinforce the findings of 
James (2001), who concluded a universal agreement across sports, insofar as the line of 
acceptability is breached when serious injury is inflicted deliberately. Indeed, this is not an 
objective standard whereby criminal liability can be clearly established. Yet, it is a 
ubiquitous perspective which reflects the opinions of those immersed in the playing culture 
and can be of assistance when deciding criminal proceedings.  
In summary, dangerous play was thought of by many as part of the game; a mere 
appendage of the fierce physicality brought to existence with the growth of professionalism. 
The apparent encouragement of such physicality by coaches, and the disregard for its 
repercussions, reflected Marxist ideas, whereby the players’ bodies seemed to be merely a 
tool for the coach’s success. The fact that the players consistently referred to dangerous play 
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as simply part of the game, suggests that they also buy into this premise, an assumption 
which would be explained by Mead’s (1934) and Blumer’s (1969) ideas on symbolic 
interactionism. Here, mainly due to the coach’s encouragement, players would view 
physicality, and the accompanying by-products (e.g. dangerous play), as a vehicle towards 
a lucrative sporting career, and thus a normal facet of the sport. Despite the appearance of 
Marxist values, players made it clear that the sportisation (Elias, 1971) of rugby union is 
still on the rise, as new rules are incorporated to tackle dangerous and foul play. 
Nevertheless, a more sophisticated rule structure surrounding dangerous play does not 
necessarily mean players are not treated as commodities. Rather than be pushed to display 
dangerous play or ‘violence’, players seem to be encouraged to be as physical as possible. 
Here, the message is still the same, that players’ bodies are devices used by agents to achieve 
success. 
Participants contradicted the idealistic and outdated view that the breadth of consent 
should be coterminous with and defined stringently by the rules of the given sport (MLRA, 
1976). In contrast, participants reiterate Dunning and Sheard’s (2005: 29) concept of 
‘unwritten conventions’, whereby those not only participating in rugby union, but also 
involved through alternative means such as coaches, manages and media representatives, 
accept and consent to a level of ‘violence’ beyond that permitted by the rules. The limits of 
such unwritten conventions were found in the presence of intention and serious injury. Here, 
participants repeatedly referred to how intent to cause harm, or serious injury, breached the 
lines of acceptability. The occurrence of severe injury is secondary to the presence of intent, 
but, when found together, the act reaches the upmost threshold of unacceptability.  
The following section will pay focus to how cards and bans were seen as effective 
deterrents, but are used inconsistently by the RFU, thus negating their efficacy. The reasons 
for such inconsistencies were pointed towards the subjective interpretation of what 
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constitutes dangerous play by the referee, and similarly the subjectivity of the disciplinary 
panel when making their regulatory decisions.  
 
8.3. The RFU May be More Suitable  
 
The following section will pay focus to how cards and bans were seen as effective 
deterrents, but are used inconsistently by the RFU, thus negating their efficacy. The reasons 
for such inconsistencies were pointed towards the subjective interpretation of what 
constitutes dangerous play by the referee, and similarly the subjectivity of the disciplinary 
panel when making their regulatory decisions. The previous section discussed the 
overwhelming opinion that the occurrence of dangerous play was seen as adjunct to the 
nature of the game, insofar as those involved in playing and running the sport had a high 
level of acceptance for the dangerous behaviors common to the game. Participants displayed 
a high tolerance to dangerous behaviors not only within the rules but also beyond. 
Nevertheless, participants also showed a limit to such tolerance; the presence of intention, 
with or without the occurrence of serious injury. Thus, subjects exhibited a point to which 
they thought the law needed to interfere. As such, one theme which emerged in the data was 
the view that the courts have a role to play in regulation, however such a role is only in the 
most serious of cases. A referee emphasised this point:  
 
I think there is a role to play. So, if someone goes well beyond what is 
acceptable. You know, I guess take it to the extreme, if someone gouges 
someone and blinds them, that probably takes it to different level. (Referee 1) 
 
One legal professional considered why the courts need to have a role in regulation, paying 
tribute to the required omnipresence of the law: 
 
[T]hey are the ultimate arbitrator on what is right and wrong in society, and it is 
right that they have some sort of supervisory jurisdiction over sport when things 
go beyond the realms of acceptability. (Legal Professional 2) 
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Another legal professional also contemplated the fact that the rugby pitch cannot act as a 
zone of legal exemption:  
The fact is there is no difference on the pitch or off the pitch about offences of 
‘violence’ in the criminal law. When you walk across the whitewash and go 
onto a pitch, you are not subject to different laws, you are subject to the same 
laws. And that means, if you ... [pause] … let’s start with punching and breaking 
somebody’s nose. You are equally culpable for assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm, as if you did it in the street. Similarly, if you stamp on somebody 
and knock his eye out, that is GBH etc. So, there is no difference in law 
whatsoever (Legal Professional 3). 
 
 
The comments of these two legal possessional were echoed in the views of the players. One 
player justified why they thought those actions which are deliberate need to be regulated by 
the courts by proposing the question: “they are completely unacceptable in every facet of 
life, why should it be acceptable in rugby?”. Another player similarly suggested that 
deliberate acts which cause serious injury “have no place in the game of rugby or society”. 
Both the responses of the legal professional and the players hold remnants of the famous 
line uttered by Lord Justice Bramwell in Bradshaw: “No rules or practice of any game 
whatever can make lawful that which is unlawful by the law of the land” (84). Moreover, 
Kuhlmann’s (1975: 784) remarks seem as applicable today as they were in 1975, that “it 
seems fair to say that the legislature, as representatives of the people, decide what conduct 
shall be considered criminal. To allow a private, profit-seeking group to make such 
decisions is tantamount to a grant of a part of the state’s jurisdiction”.  
The comments made by participants illustrate the preeminent opinion that there is 
role for the law in rugby, however such a role is only in the most serious of cases. 
Participants were ardent in their assurance that the courts should only interfere in the most 
extreme of cases, and that all other incidents are to be handled by the RFU. The idea that it 
may prove more effective to keep the regulation of sporting incidents within the regulatory 
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domain of sporting bodies is a concept contemplated throughout academic discourse. Cohen 
(1990: 322) discusses how the law is not the exhaustive means for finding justice, and that 
the “[v]arious alternative dispute resolution methods, including civil mechanisms, game 
officiating, league fines and suspensions” may actually “control violent behavior in sports 
more effectively than the imposition of criminal liability”. Such a notion has even reached 
the courtroom, with the Court of Appeal in Barnes making it clear that the law may not 
always be the most effective method of dealing with incidents on the sports field:  
 
In determining what the approach of the courts should be, the starting point is 
the fact that most organised sports have their own disciplinary procedures for 
enforcing their particular rules and standards of conduct. As a result, in the 
majority of situations there is not only no need for criminal proceedings, it is 
undesirable that there should be any criminal proceedings (911). 
 
 
The stance taken by Lord Woolf in Barnes and Cohen (1990), was also a ubiquitous opinion 
among the participants. For many, the RFU and its disciplinary procedures were more than 
capable of dealing with most, if not all cases on the rugby field. One legal professional made 
the proposition that the RFU can in fact deal a more severe punishment to a rugby player 
than could the result of criminal proceedings: 
 
[A]nd in those circumstances [a fight on the pitch] most people who play rugby 
will suggest that it being dealt with by the disciplinary process is better than 
going to court. Going to court in those circumstances ends up with a fine, a 
financial penalty, and in the rugby sense you would be stopped from playing, 
which is probably worse for rugby players than paying a fine (Legal 
Professional 3) 
 
 
The reasons for advocating the powers of the RFU disciplinary mechanisms as more 
effective than that of the law were diverse in direction. Yet, correlation was found in three 
factors: easier to find guilty and therefore deal suitable punishment using the RFU; the law 
is reluctant to get involved; and, using the law as a regulatory instrument creates another 
level of inconsistency. Each factor is discussed in turn below. 
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8.3.1. Ease of Establishing Culpability 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the RFU and criminal law hold many similarities – such as the 
requirement of an independent panel of adjudicators, the demand for a decision to be made 
based on the available evidence – however one significant differentiator is the level of guilt 
required for indictment. When attempting to prosecute an individual under the law, the 
courts must conclude that the act occurred beyond all reasonable doubt. When establishing 
beyond reasonable doubt, it must be agreed that the individual met the mens rea and actus 
rea requirements. In other words, an individual cannot be prosecuted by simply fulfilling 
the actus rea (performing the act), it must also be proved that the individual met the mens 
rea (mindset) requirements. In contrast, the RFU demands a much lesser level of guilt. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the RFU insist that an act be proved to have occurred on the balance 
of probabilities (Regulation 19, s. 19.5.6). Here, an RFU disciplinary panel only needs to 
look at the evidence and establish that it was likely that the act of foul play occurred, not 
that it definitely did occur. Furthermore, mens rea does not need to be established in order 
to find an individual guilty, it only determines the weight of the sanction. One of the legal 
professionals interviewed summed up the variant levels of guilt between the law and RFU, 
and how dealing with dangerous play within the RFU may prove more effective: 
 
Now, you will have punches which break things, which are less capable of proof 
in the criminal crown court, because in the crown court you have to prove … 
mens rea. So, you have to show you intentionally intended to do the act of 
causing the injury, and that is quite difficult in the sporting context. So, for 
instance, if you high tackle somebody with a swinging arm, and that arm goes 
across the face and smashes the nose of the opponent, that is dangerous play and 
it is violent play. But, it would be very difficult to prove in court that is was an 
act that had the mental element of it. The mens rea would be difficult to prove. 
On a rugby pitch there is no mens rea, you don’t have to prove it. The 
assessment is: was it dangerous, yes or no? And, mens rea is only relevant to 
sanction, not to proof of offence. (Legal Professional 3) 
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In short, the RFU can more easily establish culpability in those circumstances where the 
mentality of the culprit is ambiguous. For many, this was a key component when 
considering interference from the law, with one disciplinary panel member displaying their 
dissent towards the police having more involvement:  
 
No, I think you are going down a dangerous road. If clubs have to start to liaising 
with police … [pause] … two levels of guilt, you can’t do it. You can’t say x is 
committing an offence on the balance of probability to a police force that wants 
beyond all reasonable doubt. You can’t mix it. I think the policing comes from 
within, and I think the policing comes from the clubs. (Disciplinary Panel 
Member 3) 
 
 
Not only did participants consider the RFU to have more capability to punish than the 
criminal law, the punishments issued by the RFU were also seen as more relevant and 
calculated than that of the law. One of the legal professionals described the bans dealt by 
the RFU as “weighed properly”, and that they “reflect rugby opinion”. While the players 
referred to the lack of specialty in the criminal law, with one player disapproving of the 
law’s involvement by saying “a lot of the time it is judged by people who have never played 
rugby in their life”. Such remarks are reminiscent of Livings (2006: 502) statement that 
“tribunals and disciplinary bodies presided over the sporting authorities are better qualified 
to adjudicate over maters arising from sporting situations”. Whilst Gardiner’s (2005, cited 
in Livings, 2006: 502) proposition that “[c]riminal law is very much a last resort, and one 
that should consistently defer to robust internal disciplinary sporting punishments” can also 
be traced throughout the participants comments.  
One disciplinary panel member provided examples of the expertise in the RFU, and 
how it makes it better suited than the criminal law to deal with cases on the pitch: 
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If it happens on the field of play, it has to be dealt with by the RFU. … [I]f you 
look at the top of the RFU food chain, you know, you have high court judges. 
You’ve got James Dingemans who has just stepped down because of work. He 
was on the Western circuit. He was a high court judge for goodness sake. I think 
the RFU has got all the right people to deal with it. … So, if there was an eye 
gouging one which was so serious he lost his sight in his eye, it would be Philip 
Evans QC … might be David Barnes, but it would also be Barry O’Driscoll, 
consultant eye surgeon … they would have a specialist input. And, in some 
cases they would maybe even put a former player on. (Disciplinary Panel 
Member 3) 
 
In summary, the RFU was seen by many as a more effective adjudicative tool for regulating 
on-field ‘violence’ in rugby union. The two levels of guilt between the RFU and criminal 
law was a major factor bolstering such an argument. The fact that the law is required to 
prove beyond all reasonable doubt that not only the actus rea but also the mens rea was 
fulfilled, whereas the RFU only has to prove on the balance of probabilities that the actus 
rea was satisfied, meant for many that the RFU could provide both greater castigation and 
deterrent. Furthermore, numerous participants regarded the RFU to comprise of better suited 
expertise, whereby those with not only a specialist knowledge of the law, but also the 
playing culture of rugby, are involved in the discipline process. As such, it could be 
concluded that it is the opinion of the participants in the current study that the RFU should 
deal with all but the most serious of cases on the pitch. Such severity was suggested in 
Section 8.2 to consist of intention to cause serious injury, whether such injury was caused 
seemed to be irrelevant.  
 
8.3.2. Reluctant Involvement of the Criminal Law 
 
Involvement of the criminal law in incidents in the sporting arena have been scarce, with a 
majority of those arising either due to the severity of the act or because of mass public 
interest. Yet, the reasons for such discretion have suffered from a paucity of evidential 
research. Those commentators who have discussed the concept of prosecutorial discretion 
 
 
127 
in sport, have largely focused, as did the previous section of the present review, on the 
efficacy of sporting regulatory bodies to punish and deter incidents of on-field ‘sports 
violence’ (Cohen, 1990; Gardiner, 2005; and, Livings, 2006). However, a key theme which 
emerged from the data related to the lack of police resources to investigate and provide 
evidence at all levels of the game. One disciplinary panel member considered how, with the 
current climate of police resource expenditure, regulation by the law, and therefore the 
police, would be impractical:  
 
If you go to regulate the game with the police, you can only do so if you’ve got 
witnesses and evidence. Now, that is a big problem that we find. I get some 
racial cases, I get some stamps, and it’s getting sufficient evidence to do it. To 
say to regulate by the police, there is no way you’re going to get police watching 
rugby matches. I wouldn’t think the police would be too over keen on getting 
involved because their resources are stretched thin and I think they would 
appreciate that rugby union do treat these cases very seriously. (Disciplinary 
Panel Member 2) 
 
 
The strain on police resources since the dawn of austerity has been a topic of debate in 
academic and political discourse (Heaton, 2009). Since the election of a coalition 
government in 2010, the UK has been functioning within a framework of austerity (Elliot-
Davies et al., 2016). The 2010 Spending Review drew attention to a number of cuts to public 
services, one of which was a 14% reduction in police funding by 2015 (Her Majesty’s 
Treasury, 2010). The release of the 2010 Spending Review was following what Heaton 
(2009: 112) describes as a time where “the police are at, or close to, their capacity of service 
delivery”, and thus, the further cuts laid out it the 2010 Spending Review will only strain 
such capacity farther. A result of seven years of austerity since the release of the 2010 
Spending Review, is a police workforce of 121,929, the lowest number recorded since 
comparable records began in 1996 (Home Office, 2018).  
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As such, it comes as no surprise that the sphere of ‘sports violence’ has remained 
aloof from the breadth of police responsibility. As the disciplinary panel member noted in 
the previous passage, if the courts were to take on rugby union as an area within their 
jurisdiction, either police would have to be present at every game of rugby in the country, 
or they would have to find an alternative means of inserting their supervision into games. 
Another disciplinary panel member – referring to his experience working with legal 
professionals and a book written by a barrister – discusses how the legal system “can’t cope 
and you’ve got seven or eight months before it even thinks of going to trial”. Such a 
statement is comparable to the figures released in Courts Statistics Quarterly 2014 (Ministry 
of Justice, 2014), where the average case took 24 weeks (6 months) to be completed, with 
some areas of the country taking up to 68 weeks (17 months) to complete a case. However, 
just 19% of this time was actually spent in the courtroom (Ministry of Justice, 2014).  
Yet another complication to having increased police intervention, is the lack of 
evidence available for establishing a prima facie case. It has already been established that 
having the police at every game is unrealistic and impractical, so another suggestion might 
be to accept and investigate every case which is reported to the police. A disciplinary panel 
member proposed that currently, the police do not investigate every case, largely due to the 
lack of evidence available:  
 
We have had the cases where the police have been involved. I mean I had an 
age grade one, an abandoned schoolboy under 15 game, and they reported it to 
the police. The police went through the process, but it’s down to the lack of 
evidence, and you have got to have evidence. … If the police do get involved, 
the police won’t take any action. I haven’t seen any evidence, that doesn’t mean 
that they don’t do it, but I have not seen any evidence where the police have 
taken action. (Disciplinary Panel Member 3).  
 
Both the thoughts of participants and the literature reinforcing such notions, makes it clear 
that the police cannot attend and investigate every incident the public desires, predominantly 
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because of impracticality and lack of evidence. Indeed, nothing is stopping spectators of a 
game from reporting dangerous or potentially violent conduct to the police. However, 
attaching liability to an incident still requires a certain level of evidence. Evidence the police 
would trouble to find in a lot of instances. This again reinforces the opinions discussed in 
the previous section, that the law should only become involved in those cases of extreme 
severity – namely the presence of intent with or without the occurrence of serious injury.  
 
8.3.3. Increased Legal Intervention May Increase Inconsistency  
 
An interesting, but less prominent theme which emerged from the data was a view from a 
disciplinary panel member that increasing the criminal law’s adjudicative interference in 
rugby would increase the inconsistency of regulation in rugby union. This notion was based 
on the fact that World Rugby attempt to make regulation in rugby consistent, by making 
each governing body regulate similarly. However, the disciplinary panel member points out 
that because legal systems can differ slightly between countries, it would be nearly 
impossible to maintain a consistent regulatory atmosphere:  
 
Everything revolves around World Rugby. All sanctioning revolves around 
World Rugby. … If you have got France, they will just laugh you out of court. 
You see the French operation … [pause] … you can have a local council in 
France that will just ignore what the national body says. … [W]hat World Rugby 
is trying to do is have the same system in place. As soon as you say the English 
courts are here, well what are the Scottish courts going to do? You know. You 
are into a very, very complicated realm (Disciplinary Panel Member 3) 
 
 
This is a helpful consideration, considering the current objectives of both World Rugby and 
the criminal justice system of England and Wales is to maintain a consistent and fair 
regulatory system (World Rugby, 2014; and, Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 2007), 
which may be put under jeopardy by the small differences between national justice systems. 
To put this into context, in South African criminal law, the notion of intent is based on a 
slightly different definition to that of English law (Kwanje, 2016). The South African 
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system relies on the defendant having knowledge that an unlawful act may occur, whether 
this be a direct intention, or an acknowledgement that it is a possibility (Kwanje, 2016). 
This would make it harder to prosecute in ‘sports violence’ cases, as there is no formal 
clarity as to what is and isn’t legal in rugby union. Therefore, establishing that the defendant 
knew that he/she was, or possibly could, commit an unlawful act would be very difficult. 
This is in comparison to English criminal law, whereby the defendant must be proved to 
have foresaw that the requisite harm would occur as a result of their actions, not that what 
they were doing was unlawful (OAPA, 1861).  
The idea that increased or more formalised intervention from the law could threaten 
global consistency in the regulation of rugby union was a small, but important theme in the 
data. It is not the scope of the current research to suggest methods for creating a consistent 
transnational relationship between criminal justice systems and World Rugby, however, it 
could be suggested that such a goal is both unrealistic and unattainable. This may be an area 
of interest for future research on the regulatory relationship between the law and sporting 
governing bodies.  
 
8.4. Disciplinary Sanctions and Cards are Effective but Inconsistent  
 
Section 8.4 discussed how there was a consensus of opinion among those interviewed and 
questioned that the RFU was better suited to regulate all but the most serious incidents of 
dangerous play on the rugby pitch. One reason for such a position was that the bans “reflect 
rugby union” because of the specialist expertise involved in the sanctioning process. 
However, a prominent theme in the data was that bans and cards are effective when used 
properly, but the current usage is inconsistent – making their efficacy fruitless. The below 
discussion will provide two separate analysis. The first will be a case review, insofar as the 
sanctions and procedures of various cases will be compared, looking for similarities and 
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differences, and the reasons for any deviations. Here, four cases will be analysed, two of 
which will be incidents of striking, whereas the others will be cases involving dangerous 
tackles. The second will take a look at the participant’s opinions, outlining any points which 
align with either that found in the first analysis, or that discussed elsewhere in the study.  
 
 
8.4.1. Success of the RFU Disciplinary Objectives  
 
As mentioned previously in Chapter 5, an area of focus for the RFU is to ensure consistency 
in their disciplinary proceedings (Regulation 19, s. 19.1.5). Such consistency can come in 
the form of sanctions, procedures of hearings and the use of appropriate red cards by 
referees. Unfortunately, there is no previous research on the whether the RFU, or any other 
rugby judiciary, is meeting their disciplinary objectives. As such, perhaps the most effective 
method for assessing whether the RFU have achieved a consistent disciplinary system is to 
compare the sanctions and procedures of various cases, looking for similarities and 
differences, and the reasons for any deviations. The following discussion will compare four 
cases; two of which will be incidents of striking, whereas the others will be cases involving 
dangerous tackles.  
The first comparison is of two incidents where the defendant struck another player 
in the head, one with his fist, and the other with his shoulder. In October of 2017, Sam 
Tuitupou of Coventry RFC was given four weeks suspension following a red card for 
punching another player (RFU, 2017). The referee described the incident as follows:  
 
Following a breakdown two players emerged holding each other: The Coventry 
number twelve (with his back to me) and the Cambridge replacement centre. 
With no obvious provocation seen, the Coventry number twelve punched the 
Cambridge player with a closed right fist to the face. The Cambridge player fell 
to the ground (RFU, 2017: 1). 
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This statement reveals what the referee initially saw during the game. However, after 
reviewing video footage of the incident, the referee added:  
We viewed the footage several times. It clearly showed the Player using his 
elbow at the beginning of the incident … The Player then punched with his right 
fist causing the opposition player to fall to the ground. The Player then moved 
away from the immediacy of the incident and another opposition player ran to 
him to remonstrate with him. The two players became engaged in a melee (as 
described by the referee). The Player struck out again with his right fist and 
punched a different opposition player who was also yellow carded for his 
intervention (RFU, 2017: 1). 
 
This incident involved two punches to two different opposition players, both of whom had 
not thrown any punches at the defendant. One of the punches had hit an opposition player 
with such force that it knocked him to the ground. Such an incident could very easily be 
regarded as violent, and completely unacceptable in the game. The panel viewed the 
incident as a top range offence, due to the contact with the head, number of blows and the 
intentional nature of the act. However, decided to start at the lower end of eight weeks due 
to the relatively minor resultant injuries, and the limited effect it had on the game (RFU, 
2017: 4). The panel then went on to award the maximum mitigation of fifty percent, 
mentioning the players conduct at the hearing, disciplinary record, admittance of 
culpability, the remorse shown by the player, and the player’s off-field circumstances as 
relevant factors for mitigation. Furthermore, the panel saw no aggravating factors worthy 
of increasing the sanction (RFU, 2017: 4-5).  
In contrast, the second matter also involved striking, however this time it was with 
the shoulder. The incident occurred in January of 2018, when Joe Marler of Harlequin F.C 
struck an opponent player in the head with his shoulder, and consequently received a six 
week ban (RFU, 2018). The referee described the event in their disciplinary report:  
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Harlequins had possession around the halfway line, moving the ball from right 
to left towards the centre of the field. They took the ball into contact with 2/3 
Sale Sharks players effecting the tackle and bringing Kyle Sinckler (Harlequins 
No 3) to ground. One of these players was Tj Ioane (Sale No 20) who went to 
ground and rolled out to Sale’s left hand side of the tackle. At this point Joe 
Marler (Harlequins No 1) who was in support of the ball carrier appeared to 
illegally target Tj Ioane on the ground far enough away from the tackle not to 
be a clear out. I immediately stopped the game as I wanted to review the incident 
to see the point of contact to determine the level of sanction. On the screen it 
was quite clear to me that Joe Marler had tucked his arm and struck Tj Ioane 
directly to the head with his shoulder. I decided on a red card for Joe Marler, 
which the TMO and AR1 agreed with (RFU, 2018: 1). 
 
 
 
Similar to the previous act, the behaviour of Joe Marler was completely unacceptable in the 
sport of rugby, and could be seen to have deserved the red card awarded. However, the 
decision to grant a six week ban for this incident, but only a four for the earlier one, seems 
unreasonable. The panel decided that the act falls into mid-range offending, whereby the 
starting suspension is six weeks for striking with the shoulder. They decided against a top 
end entry due to the lack of injury caused (RFU, 2018: 4). The panel also decided that the 
addition of a week should be added to the suspension, considering Marler’s disciplinary 
record to be an aggravating factor. However, the panel then removed the added week, on 
grounds of mitigation – regarding the conduct of the defendant at the hearing and 
immediately after the commencement of the game as adequate mitigating factors (RFU, 
2018: 4-5). 
The two incidents are very different, despite both referring to incidents of striking. 
The first involved multiple, forceful striking to the head of numerous players, in an 
unprovoked off the ball attack. Whereas, the second was a targeted, careless attempt to 
protect the ball in a ruck. Indeed, both actions require tough disciplinary castigation, yet, it 
is difficult to see the second as demanding a more severe punishment. The ensuing discourse 
will investigate two similar cases of dangerous tackling, but resulting in two very distinct 
judgements.  
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The first case occurred on the 18 February 2018, in a match between London Wasps 
and Exeter Chiefs. Gabiriele Lovobalavu of London Wasps was suspended for four weeks 
following a citing for a dangerous tackle (RFU, 2018). The incident occurred in the last play 
of the game, as Exeter made a half break up the pitch. Lovobalavu made the tackle, which 
resulted in the Exeter player knocking the ball into touch. The referee had not initially 
viewed the tackle worthy of any sanction, and drew the game to a close following the tackle. 
The tackle was reviewed post game, and the referee made the following observation when 
viewing the footage:  
 
The front-on camera view shows that the Wasps 13 puts his head down as he is 
about to complete the tackle. His head initially makes transient contact with the 
upper chest of Exeter 12, with the back of his head going just under 12's chin. 
The right shoulder of Wasps 13 makes a direct hit on the left side of Exeter 12's 
jaw, the force of which visibly rattles 12's head. Although the right arm of 
Wasps 13 does make contact with the shoulder of Exeter 12, the point of his 
shoulder makes connection with the side of 12's head as first point of impact. 
The back of Wasps 13's head makes transient contact with the chin of Exeter 12 
at most (RFU, 2018: 2). 
 
In the citing commissioner’s report, they mentioned that the Exeter player “was unaware as 
to where contact had been made and apparently had not been conscious of an impact with 
his head” (RFU, 2018: 2). Moreover, no reaction was noted from the Exeter or Wasps 
players at the time. Due to the incident involving contact with the head, the panel established 
mid-range entry, and thus starting on a sanction of six weeks. After mitigation, the panel 
reduced the sanction by two weeks when considering the conduct of the player at the 
hearing, clear disciplinary record and acknowledgement for the dangers of such a tackle 
(RFU, 2018: 6).  
Charlie Ewels of Bath Rugby was cited for a dangerous tackle in a match on the 29  
October 2017, however, the citing was reduced to a yellow card following a review by the 
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disciplinary panel (RFU, 2017). The citing commissioner described the incident in their 
report:  
 
During a Gloucester attack down the left flank, No 13 (Henry Trinder) passed 
the ball to his fullback and then got tackled by Bath No 5 (Charlie Ewels) 
immediately afterwards. Although the pass had been completed before the 
tackle, Ewels was fully committed and didn’t have clear sight of the pass. 
However in the actual tackle, Ewels makes contact directly to the head with his 
arm, in an accelerated swinging arm motion. He started high and made a direct 
hit to the head (RFU, 2017: 1). 
 
 
The report then continues to mention that:  
[T]here was a reaction by some of the Gloucester players, with No 15 motioning 
to the referee (Tom Foley). Foley did not have a clear line of vision but the 
assistant referee did have a better angle and the TMO (Stuart Terheege) 
intervened and they reviewed the incident. Both Terheege and Foley agreed it 
was a high tackle and decided it was penalty only (RFU, 2017: 1).  
 
The citing commissioner concluded, proposing:  
 
This tackle was dangerously high, it had force (with a swinging arm) and contact 
was made directly to the side of the head; the player left for the field to be 
medically assessed. With all that has been already outlined with this tackle, it 
has passed the red card threshold and therefore I am citing Charlie Ewels for a 
dangerous tackle, contrary to Law 10.4(e) (RFU, 2017: 1). 
 
 
The citing commissioner insisted that it was a red card offence and thus demanded an 
appropriate sanction. Moreover, the commissioner also stated that “the Player used a 
swinging arm which made contact to the side of the head around the lower jaw area” and 
that “there was an element of force to that contact, whereby Gloucester 13 received medical 
attention and had to undergo an HIA” (RFU, 2017: 2). Despite such notions from the 
commissioner, the panel disagreed that it was a red card offence, and thus, in accordance 
with RFU Regulation 19, Appendix 4, paragraph 15, concluded that an on-field yellow card 
be recorded on the Player’s disciplinary record.  
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Upon analysis of the cases discussed, it seems clear that the RFU is failing to 
maintain a consistent disciplinary system. The two incidents of dangerous tackles are an 
example of such inconsistency. The case involving Lovobalavu was ambiguous, with many 
failing to see any wrong doing in the tackle (RFU, 2018). Whereas Ewels tackle was widely 
regarded as a clear red card offence, which was asserted by both the citing commissioner 
and the players within the game (RFU, 2017). Therefore, it is confounding as to why one 
act has received an entirely different result to the other. Similarly, the cases of striking 
mentioned previously also reveal unpredictable disciplinary conclusions. The case of 
Tuitupou was blatantly unacceptable, having no relation to any part of the game (RFU, 
2018). Yet, Tuitupou received a two week shorter ban than Joe Marler, whose action could 
be said to have been a careless attempt to protect the ruck. Furthermore, it could be 
suggested that referees are inconsistent when awarding cards for dangerous play. The fact 
that both Charlie Ewels and Gabiriele Lovobalavu did not receive any form of card for their 
conduct, despite later being deemed worthy, is evidence of this.  
After reviewing the evidence, it could be said that indicators – in this case the 
outcome of hearings – are pointing towards an inconsistent disciplinary system within the 
RFU. This is antithetical to the objectives stated in their disciplinary document, Regulation 
19. It is not within the scope of this discussion to suggest reasons for such inconsistency, or 
how it may be avoided. That is a topic reserved for future research. Yet, examination into 
the training of citing commissioners and panel members may help understand how such 
variance is existent.  
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8.4.2. Cards and Bans are not Being Used Effectively 
 
The previous section reviewed four cases, concluding that the current RFU disciplinary 
system seems to be inconsistent, insofar as both bans and cards are not awarded under a 
universal logic. The ensuing section will seek to test this further, using the sentiments of the 
participants as evidence.  
As mentioned previously, a prominent theme in the data was that the use of both 
bans and cards are effective when used appropriately. One of the referees suggested that 
cards are an effective tool for deterring foul play on the pitch, using the tip tackle as an 
example:  
 
I think a good example is the tip tackle from playing the man in the air. There 
has been a clear change in player behavior because of the increase in yellow and 
red cards. It has deterred players from lifting tacklers and from playing the man 
in the air. So, I do think it can have a big effect. You know, things like tripping 
five or six years ago was a bit more prevalent, that has now gone from the game, 
you very rarely see it. So, I think yellow and red cards do deter and punish 
(Referee 1). 
 
 
 
Numerous players were found in agreement with the referee, proposing they “will 
encourage people to do it [dangerous play] less”, with one making similar comparisons to 
the referee when suggesting, “I think it is a strong deterrent. … [s]uch things as the tip tackle 
have been completely abolished, this used to be a common tackle”. Despite such praise for 
the effectiveness of the disciplinary card system by the players, one disciplinary panel 
member expressed their grievance with the inconsistency of their issuing by referees:  
 
I get frustrated by referees who give yellow cards to offences that should be red. 
I get frustrated by referees who ignore the rules of the game and decide to do it 
their own way (Disciplinary Panel Member 1). 
 
 
Another disciplinary panel member discussed how the issuing of cards can vary from game 
to game, a phenomenon which is not desirable: 
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Well you’re still in a dangerous world of subjective judgement, and what you 
are trying to do is get … [pause] … you don’t want somebody getting a yellow 
card in one game, and getting a red card in another game, but that is what you’re 
getting (Disciplinary Panel Member 3) 
 
 
The comments here are reflections of those made in the previous section, whereby it was 
concluded that the RFU appears to have a sophisticated yet inconsistent system, largely due 
to the subjective judgement of those involved. Here, the disciplinary panel member is 
referring to the inconsistency when issuing cards – an issue identified when comparing the 
details of Gabiriele Lovobalavu’s case to that of Charlie Ewels’.  
Similarly, bans were seen as having significant deterrent effects, yet, the length of 
bans in accordance with the severity of the incident was seen as widely unpredictable. One 
disciplinary panel member highlighted such inconsistencies, referring to how subjective the 
disciplinary process can be, and therefore, how big an impact the personal views of the panel 
members can have on the outcome:  
 
[W]hat you’re trying to do is … [pause] … somebody who gets sent off in 
Cheshire gets the same sanction as somebody who is sent off in Durham. Now, 
I can tell you now that they won’t. I’ve been to our national training. Now, in 
our national training you get CB [Constituent Body] panels from all over the 
country. … So, they put a case up, and everyone has to decide what entry point 
they would put this (the case). You would be amazed. … [Y]ou get some people 
who put in 14 weeks, and others who are going to put in 4. (Disciplinary Panel 
Member 1) 
 
 
The comments in this passage are congruent with that of one of the players, who suggest 
that they “can potentially punish accidental or reckless … dangerous play too harshly”. The 
statements of both the disciplinary panel members and the players reflect the analysis 
presented in the preceding section, insofar as the awarding of cards and sanctions seems to 
be unpredictable, whereby some incidents are awarded far harsher sanctions than others, 
despite potentially being similar or even less severe in nature.  
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The participants in the present study refer to the subjectivity of the referee and 
disciplinary process as explanations for an inconsistent disciplinary operation. However, 
Austin Healey, Aviva Premiership commentator, pundit and former professional player, has 
chosen another avenue of explanation. Writing for the Telegraph (2018), Healey suggests 
that, “Rather than being outcome based, the disciplinary process seems to be all about 
protecting rugby’s precious reputation rather than the players themselves”. Healey (2018) 
continues, attributing such an attitude to the attempt to “present this holier-than-thou picture 
to sponsors, television and the children of the world”. In reference to the protection of the 
image of the game, Healey (2018) proposes that the outcome is predetermined, thus, the 
disciplinary process is merely a tool for deciding weight of sanction. The standpoint of 
Healey (2018) is alluring, and much of what he discusses aligns with the following evidence. 
Firstly, as noted in Chapter 5, the RFU advocate in their disciplinary objectives that 
proceedings should be such “that the image and reputation of the game is not adversely 
affected” (Regulation 19, s. 19.1.5). Moreover, a legal professional, who is also heavily 
involved with RFU discipline, when discussing the role of the RFU disciplinary process, 
suggests it is there to “uphold the image of the game”, continuing to suggest that “there is a 
risk that lawyers get all lawyerly about it rather than looking at what the disciplinary process 
is trying to do, which is protect the image of the game”. Secondly, as mentioned previously 
in Chapter 5, the RFU disciplinary process does not require mens rea as proof of offence, 
only for weight of sanction. As such, the panel only needs to establish that the offence 
occurred to find the individual culpable. For instance, World Rugby have announced a 
“zero-tolerance approach to reckless and accidental head contact in the sport” (World 
Rugby, 2016). Thus, the panel only needs to concede that contact was made with the 
head, no matter how trivial, to find an individual guilty. Of course, the speculations of 
Healey (2018) are mere theories, expounded in an exasperated expression of discontent. 
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Yet, they forge a compelling argument when compared to the facts presented, and 
therefore deserve to be took seriously. 
The present section discussed how the participants regarded cards and bans to be 
extremely effective methods of punishment and deterrence but are issued inconsistently. 
A similar assumption was also made in Section 8.4.1., when four cases in the 2017-2018 
season were compared. Explanations for such inconsistency focused on the subjective 
nature of disciplinary proceedings, with one panel member proposing that sanctioning 
can vary between counties. Indeed, the RFU disciplinary process relies heavily on the 
idiosyncrasy of individuals, as does much of the criminal law. However, the allegations 
laid out by Healey (2018) cannot be ignored. Could the disciplinary process be setting 
the image of the game as a priority in their disciplinary dealings? According to the 
disciplinary objectives as mentioned by a legal professional interviewed and the RFU 
document Regulation 19, as well as the lack of mens rea evidence required for liability, 
it may well be possible. Perhaps this question could be a topic of interest in further 
research.  
 
8.5. Is a Link Between the RFU and CPS the Answer?  
 
Within the present discussion, there has been much consideration of how the RFU is 
better suited and more effective in regulating dangerous play on the rugby pitch, and the 
law should only interfere in the most egregious incidents. Participants proposed that the 
bounds of the RFU’s suitability can be found with the presence of intent, with or without 
serious injury. However, despite recognising that there is a role to play for the law, many 
participants placed this role at the victim’s discretion. In other words, the law should only 
become involved in a case if the victim is the instigator of such involvement. This was 
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justified by a legal professional as being “the way of the land”. Another legal professional 
discusses how such a process works, and why it is needed:  
 
Well, there is no clear route to go to court for anybody except for a claimant 
who feels aggrieved and he complains to the police. So, whether you’re in a 
punch up outside a pub on a street in Newcastle on a Friday night and the 
police aren’t there, if somebody smashes and punches you in the face and 
breaks everything, then as you’re lying in your bed in hospital, you’ll say: ‘I 
want to press charges’, and that is how it happens. … So, there is no 
difference, it has to be a matter of an individual complainant going to the 
police. (Legal Professional 3).  
 
Indeed, most criminal investigations are initiated by a complaint from a victim, as 
otherwise the police have no way of knowing the offence was committed. However, a 
number of participants pointed towards an alternative means of the laws interference. 
Numerous players cited RFU referral as a potential method for directing certain cases to 
the police. One player stated that “if the courts were to be involved it should be through 
direct referral from the RFU to ensure a streamlined process that takes all the relevant 
factors into account”. Another advocated that criminal intervention should only ensue “if 
referred to by a rugby (disciplinary) panel”. It should be noted, that players who endorsed 
an RFU referral system, emphasised the need for it to be “rugby based” with “input from 
people who can relate”. This may be found in the form of ex-players, coaches and medical 
professionals providing their specialist opinion in the court room, as a way of aiding in 
delineating the breadth of an individual’s consent. This is an intriguing concept, and one 
that has suffered from a significant dearth of both academic and RFU examination. As 
such, in the absence of being able to discuss any academic literature on this idea, the 
following analysis will consider how an RFU referral system may take form.  
A referral system may hold the key to tackling the paucity of on-field ‘violence’ 
cases making their way into the court room. Such referral could perhaps take place at the 
point to which a panel has received and reviewed a case and has deemed the incident too 
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severe for the RFU to handle itself. At this point, the RFU could then contact the police 
and refer the case to them, thus, the police would become the lead investigators. This 
would require a formal relationship between the RFU and CPS, whereby routine 
communication and sharing of evidence would be at the forefront. Furthermore, once the 
police have received the evidence, they can then assess the likelihood of successful 
prosecution, whereby if the evidence seems insufficient, the case can be passed back to 
the RFU for sanctioning. However, despite offering elements which may smooth the 
process, it may also encounter similar problems to the current system. A legal 
professional interviewed indicates the complications of needing the victims: 
  
[T]he police never want to take anything forward unless the member of the 
public is really keen to do it. So, that is why they basically really on direct 
referral. … Could the RFU be better at referring stuff out to the police? 
Probably. But, you’d have the same issue with the victim potentially not 
wanting to be involved. So, I think at the moment the balance is probably 
right, because, particularly in cases where you don’t have video footage, you 
need evidence of the victim otherwise you are stuffed. (Legal Professional 2) 
 
The comments made by the legal professional highlight how important the victim’s consent 
is when making a criminal investigation, particularly at the lower levels where the videoing 
of games is not as common. At the higher levels - such as levels 1, 2, and 3 - it is typical for 
games to be recorded, usually for the purpose of performance analysis. Therefore, 
establishing a credible case for the prosecution would prove much easier. Moreover, there 
may not be any need for compliance of the victim, if the incident is clear cut, and an offence 
can easily be discerned, then the police would have it within their interests to bring a case 
against someone who has clearly committed an illegal act. Yet, in the absence of video 
footage, the only evidence would be found in witness statements – either from the referee(s), 
players, spectators and coaches. As such, the victim would need to play a pivotal role in 
delineating whether an illegal act occurred, who the committed the illegal act, and the 
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circumstances surrounding the incident. It could be said that the requirement for the victim’s 
consent renders the referral system no different to that of going to the police individually, 
as is the current method. However, the fact that police involvement has been instigated by 
RFU concerns, may embolden the victim to become more involved, and view legal 
intervention as necessary.  
 In conclusion, participants accentuated the role of the criminal law to that of only 
the most severe incidents. For some, such a role was established in the form of an RFU 
referral system, whereby the RFU can refer cases they feel are egregious and outside their 
breadth of responsibility, to the police. Such a system found complications, as participants 
referred to the requirement of the victim’s consent and compliance in cases where evidence 
may be ambiguous or limited. Indeed, the RFU referral theory is susceptible to scrutiny, as 
would be expected with its current embryonic form. Yet, it also offers potential for 
equilibrium between the law and rugby union, providing the possibility of fluidity in 
regulation, and equitable legal intervention.  
 
8.6. Summary  
 
Participants within the study saw dangerous play as an integral part of the game, a facet of 
the inherent nature of the sport. Such views were reminiscent of the ‘unwritten conventions’ 
discussed by Dunning and Sheard (2005).  Indeed, dangerous conduct is permitted as a by-
product of the game, however participants discussed a limit to such conduct. Participants 
considered the limits of acceptability to be found in the presence of intention, with serious 
injury serving as an escalator to further unacceptability when paired with intention to harm. 
When an act egregiously surpasses the limits of this acceptable conduct, the participants 
believed that this is when the criminal law should become involved. In short, the law should 
only intervene in the most serious of cases which display intention to cause serious harm.  
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Other than in these most extreme examples, participants considered the RFU to be 
better suited to dealing with incidents on the pitch for a number of reasons. Firstly, the RFU 
can more easily find culpability for dangerous conduct, as the RFU is not required to fulfill 
the mens rea requirement as to whether the incident occurred. Mens rea merely helps define 
the sanction. Secondly, due to lack of resources and the difficulty associated with 
establishing culpability, the law is seemingly reluctant to get involved in most cases of 
dangerous play. Finally, one disciplinary panel member proposed that increased legal 
intervention would create greater inconsistency overall. Here, they suggested that if the law 
was to get involved in every country then inconsistency would be found in the variances of 
law between countries. This would be antithetical to the purpose of both the law and World 
Rugby, who strive to create consistency in regulation.  
Moreover, the disciplinary sanctions issued by the RFU and the disciplinary cards 
given by referees were viewed as effective methods of punishment and deterrent in English 
rugby union, as they stop players doing what they love whilst also having severe 
implications – such as losing significant sums of money, potentially hindering their team’s 
performance. Yet, despite the positive effect of sanctions and cards, they are issued 
inconsistently. Participants referred to how the subjectivity which defines when and how 
they are issued greatly affects their consistency. For instance, an act which was awarded a 
yellow card in one match may be given a red in another, largely due to the referee’s personal 
opinion on the incident. Healey (2018) also stated that the interests of the game can greatly 
influence the outcome of sanction. Here, Healey referred to how the RFU look to protect 
the game by manipulating their disciplinary outcomes to best reflect their objectives. This, 
in contrast to the RFU’s objectives, creates not only an inconsistent but also an unjust system 
where players are not being judged independently.  
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Lastly, participants proposed an RFU referral system as a means of creating a fluid 
relationship between the law and the RFU. Such a system could perhaps take place at the 
point to which a panel has received and reviewed a case and has deemed the incident too 
severe for the RFU to handle itself. At this point, the RFU could then contact the police 
and refer the case to them, thus, the police would become the lead investigators. 
Participants saw such a system as prudent, as well as a way of ensuring those egregious 
acts on the pitch are dealt with appropriately.  
The following chapter will conclude the thesis, referring to the literature 
examined in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, as well as the views of the participants provided in 
this chapter. The conclusion will lay out the findings and discuss how such results affect 
what we currently know, and how they can be taken forward to improve our 
understanding further.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
9.1. Overview of Study  
 
This study has explored legal interference in on-field ‘violence’ cases in English Rugby 
Union. The seemingly sporadic intervention by the criminal law in on-field ‘violence’ 
incidents was examined, whilst also considering the complications encountered when 
attempting to apply criminal proceedings to the realm of participator ‘violence’. Such an 
investigation also assessed the propriety of the RFU’s disciplinary system, with the aim of 
revealing any deficiencies. Throughout the analysis, it was hoped that the opinions of 
participants would provide unique insights into the said topic, thus allowing for a more 
relevant and sports specific analysis. The aim of the thesis was to present a detailed account 
of the difficulties associated with applying the criminal law to participator ‘violence’, whilst 
also utilising the perspectives of those currently involved in the regulation of participator 
‘violence’ to provide a possible resolution to finding equilibrium between the law and on-
field ‘violence’ in rugby union.  
 
9.2. Concluding Remarks 
 
Through the investigation of such objectives, a consistent outlier was the difficulty 
associated with establishing criminal liability to incidents of ‘sports violence’. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, defining ‘violence’ can prove enigmatic. The diverse facets of constructing a 
definition are all interpreted variably by scholars hoping to make a definition individualised 
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to their academic domain. Therefore, Smith (1988: 1) proposed that, “the concepts of 
‘violence’ have come to have so many meanings that they have lost a good deal of their 
meaning”. Correspondingly, both Smith (1988), and the more contemporary Hamby (2017), 
attempt to establish a definition of ‘sports violence’ in accordance with the playing culture 
of sport.  
Such ambiguity of definition was found to be absent when comparing interpretations 
of ‘violence’ by World Rugby and the criminal law. Those behaviours included in World 
Rugby’s Laws of the Game were found to fall effortlessly under definitions of unlawful acts 
in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which led to an inquiry as to why legal 
interference has been so inconsistent. It became apparent that the mens rea requirement for 
finding someone culpable created issues when applied to ‘sports violence’. The intent 
component of the mens rea is incredibly arduous, as proving that an individual deliberately 
caused the outcome to another is difficult in itself, let alone in a setting where aggressive 
and ‘violent’ behaviours are implicit to the very nature of the game. Similar complications 
were found when attempting to apply recklessness to the sporting arena. However, what 
was perhaps more decisive, was the fact that reckless acts were frequent to the sport of 
rugby. Thus, there would be a proliferation of incidents, which could be suggested to be 
within the ‘unwritten conventions’ (Dunning and Sheard, 2005) of rugby union, in the 
courts.  
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The unwritten conventions described by Dunning and Sheard (2005) were found to 
extend well beyond the formal rules of the sport. For many participants, dangerous play was 
seen as simply part of the game. Utilising theory, namely Marxism and symbolic 
interactionism, to understand why participants may adopt this viewpoint it became apparent 
that under capitalist influence, sport reinforces and perpetuates capitalistic ideology, such 
as achievement, competition, and persistence (Carrington, 2008). Players may then attach 
meaning to such an ideology, insofar as they believe that by demonstrating such traits they 
may have a more lucrative sporting career. Thus, for the sake of recommendations, although 
arduous, it may prove prudent to focus research on how agents of sport (e.g. media, 
sponsors, coaches, parents) present this ideology, and therefore how it might be altered to 
further limit dangerous play in sports.  
The participant’s boundaries of such conventions were found to align with James’ 
(2001) findings, at the presence of intention. Here, intention was seen as well outside the 
acceptable limits of legitimacy, whilst the occurrence of severe injury from the deliberate 
act was seen to push the incident even further outside such confinements. The demarcation 
of acceptability by participants could be suggested to provide an insight into the breadth of 
consent in rugby union. Consequently, if only those actions outside the limits of a player’s 
consent are considered to be criminal, then it would be futile for the law to get involved in 
anything but those cases where intent can be established.  
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The complications of establishing culpability was discussed by participants, who 
discussed the variant levels of guilt between the criminal law and the RFU. As noted in 
Chapter 5, the RFU insist that an act be proven to have occurred on the balance of 
probabilities (Regulation 19, s. 19.5.6). Here, an RFU disciplinary panel only needs to look 
at the evidence and establish that it was likely that the act of foul play occurred, not that it 
definitely did occur, as is required within criminal law. Furthermore, mens rea does not 
need to be established in order to find an individual guilty, it only determines the weight of 
the sanction. This makes it much easier to constitute guilt in comparison to the beyond all 
reasonable doubt requirements of the criminal law.  
Ease of accountability was not the only factor influencing participants gravitation 
towards RFU regulation over the criminal law. For many, increased police involvement was 
seen as both impractical and unrealistic. The implementation of a 14% reduction in police 
funding under the conservative government (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2010) has resulted in 
a severely depleted police workforce of 121,929, the lowest number recorded since 
comparable records began in 1996 (Home Office, 2018). As such, participants were 
confident that the police would not only struggle to meet the demands of participator 
‘violence’, but would also be reluctant to spare what little resources they do have on 
something which could easily be regulated by private organisations.  
Furthermore, one disciplinary panel member made an important proposition relating 
to too much involvement of the criminal law: that such involvement would greatly increase 
inconsistency of regulation between nations. The nuances between national judicial systems 
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would create vast inconsistencies when regulating violent play on the pitch. An example 
was provided of the South African judicial system, which relies on the defendant having 
knowledge that an unlawful act may occur, whether this be a direct intention, or an 
acknowledgement that it is a possibility (Kwanje, 2016). This would make prosecuting 
much difficult compared to the law in England and Wales, whereby the defendant must be 
proved to have foresaw that the requisite harm would occur as a result of their actions, not 
that what they were doing was unlawful (OAPA, 1861).  
This is a pertinent speculation, considering the current objectives of both World 
Rugby and the Criminal Justice System of England and Wales is to maintain a consistent 
and fair regulatory system (World Rugby, 2014; and, Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 
2007). Thus, the idea that increased or more formalised intervention from the law could 
threaten global consistency in the regulation of rugby union was a small, but important 
theme in the data. It is not the scope of the current research to suggest methods for creating 
a consistent transnational relationship between criminal justice systems and World Rugby, 
however, it could be suggested that such a goal is both unrealistic and unattainable. This 
may be an area of interest for future research on the regulatory relationship between the law 
and sporting governing bodies 
Nevertheless, despite propounding the use of the RFU disciplinary system over that 
of the law, complete prosecutorial discretion was seen as imprudent, with many still 
acknowledging there was a role to play for the law. Such a role was to regulate only the 
most serious of incidents. Severity was based on the definitions of acceptability discussed 
previous; the presence of intent, with or without serious injury. Participants justified why 
the courts should have a role, echoing the words of Lord Justice Bramwell in Bradshaw, 
that “[n]o rules or practice of any game whatever can make lawful that which is unlawful 
by the law of the land” (84). This is an imperative concept, considering the law should 
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embody an omnipresent entity, stemming its limbs into all areas of society. The form of 
such a role, however, was found to be illusive, with many participants referring to the 
orthodox view that the law should only become involved when instigated by the victim. Of 
course, the consent of the victim is crucial in many incidents of criminal investigation. Yet, 
a small number of players proposed an alternative means of dictating interference from the 
law: an RFU referral system.  
Such a system would allow an RFU disciplinary panel to refer any cases they feel 
are outside their breadth of suitability to the police for investigation. The police then have 
the option to take the case ahead or return it to the RFU where sanctioning can continue. 
Indeed, the system is susceptible to complications, as participants referred to the 
requirement of the victim’s consent and compliance in cases where evidence may be 
ambiguous or limited. Scrutiny is expected of an concept in such embryonic form. Yet, it 
also offers potential for equilibrium between the law and rugby union, providing the 
possibility of fluidity in regulation, and equitable legal intervention.  
As mentioned, the RFU and its disciplinary system was viewed by participants to 
constitute the most suitable tool for regulating most dangerous play on the pitch. However, 
the RFU system was not without criticism. Participants referred to the disciplinary sanctions 
and cards used by the RFU as effective punishments, but inconsistently used. This 
standpoint is reflected in the case analysis provided in Section 8.4.1. Here, the cases of Sam 
Tuitupou, Joe Marler, Gabiriele Lovobalavu, and Charlie Ewels were compared. Analysis 
revealed that the length of sanction given was disproportionate to the incident. For instance, 
the Sam Tuitupou incident was an outlandish, and completely unacceptable attack on 
numerous opposition players. Yet, he received a two-week shorter ban than what could be 
described as a careless attempt to protect the ruck by Joe Marler. The analysis was limited 
to only four cases, and so the generalisability could be questioned. However, both the 
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conclusion of the analysis and the statements provided by the participants concurred with 
the views of Healey (2018).  
Writing for the Telegraph (2018), Healey suggests that “[r]ather than being outcome 
based, the disciplinary process seems to be all about protecting rugby’s precious reputation 
rather than the players themselves”. Healey (2018) continues, attributing such an attitude to 
the attempt to “present this holier-than-thou picture to sponsors, television and the children 
of the world”. In reference to the protection of the image of the game, Healey (2018) 
proposes that the outcome is predetermined, thus, the disciplinary process is merely a tool 
for deciding weight of sanction. Healey’s (2018) speculations reinforce the presumption 
that the RFU is inconsistent in its disciplinary proceedings. It is not within the scope of this 
thesis to discuss remedies for such inconsistency, however, one may begin by analysing the 
training given to disciplinary panel members. Moreover, future research may provide a 
critique of the current disciplinary objectives, and the weight of such objectives on the 
structure of the system.  
In conclusion, the RFU seems to be better suited to dealing with all but the most 
egregious incidents of on-field ‘sports violence’. The borders of suitability were found to 
be breached when intent to cause serious harm was present, such as purposefully striking 
another players head in the attempt to seriously injure them. For participants, this was the 
point to which the criminal law should interfere. Such interference could perhaps be 
inaugurated through an RFU referral system, whereby the RFU can transfer cases it feels 
are outside of its responsibility to the police for investigation. Furthermore, the disciplinary 
devices used by the RFU – sanctions and cards – were seen as both effective deterrents and 
punishments for acts of dangerous play on the pitch. However, their issuing was seen as 
inconsistent and in need of reform. Despite this, it is still maintained that the RFU should 
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deal with most cases on the pitch, with the courts playing a role with the most serious 
incidents.  
 
9.4. Limitations  
 
This thesis was limited by the nature and number of personnel included in the sample. All 
those incorporated in the study either had personal involvement with the RFU or with sport 
in general, whether it be as a participant or regulator. This of course provided specific 
knowledge of the topic under consideration, and so allowed for underlying themes to 
emerge. However, using subjects who were so closely linked to sport may have permitted 
for a biased viewpoint, insofar as subjects may have had a predisposed opinion in favour of 
internal regulation. Nevertheless, legal professionals associated with sport were chosen for 
the study as they were able to provide expert insider knowledge, understanding and 
experiences of the application of the law to sport, and the associated processes and practices.  
In reflection, including individuals outside of the sport – such as legal professionals 
not involved with sporting affairs – may have eliminated such bias, and granted access to 
viewpoints from a purely legal perspective. 
 
9.3. Implications of the Study and Further Research 
 
This research has the capacity to inform the regulatory bodies of the RFU on the most 
appropriate means of regulating ‘violence’ in English rugby union. Moreover, the data 
yielded from the study may aid in understanding how a relationship between the RFU and 
the CPS can be established or possibly redefined. Although this study could not offer a 
categorical answer to how such relationship ought to be shaped, I urge those involved in the 
regulation of rugby union to consider the potential of the RFU referral system and focus 
further research on how to tackle the complications associated with its appliance to the lower 
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levels of the game. Moreover, it has become alarmingly obvious that the RFU disciplinary 
system is inconsistent; antithetical to the very aims of the system itself. Indeed, the present 
thesis could not accurately outline the source of such inconsistency, however, targeting the 
training of disciplinary panel members may prove prudent in the fight towards a more 
consistent regulatory process.  
From an academic perspective, this work will add to the body of research viewing 
the alliance between sports and the law as necessary and unavoidable. Moreover, this study 
may spark the start of a new field of research within sports law, where the lines between 
criminal liability and sporting deviance in rugby union are further explored. Here, it is hoped 
that the discourse presented in this thesis is built upon to develop knowledge in an area that 
is currently vastly under researched.   
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Appendix 1 – Interview Schedule – Disciplinary Panel Members  
 
Introduction  
 
1. When did you first get involved with regulating rugby?  
2. What level of rugby do you regulate?  
3. What do you enjoy about regulating rugby? 
4. Is there anything you do not enjoy about regulating rugby? 
5. Why did you get involved with regulating rugby?  
 
Dangerous Play in Rugby  
 
1. How would you define dangerous play in rugby?  
2. What is your view on dangerous play as part of the game?  
3. What is your opinion on some academic’s/physio’s/media representative’s 
concerns that the level of dangerous play in rugby is increasing alarmingly?  
4. What is your experience with players/coaches accepting dangerous play on the 
pitch? 
5. What is your experience with players/coaches encouraging dangerous play on the 
pitch?  
6. How does the degree of injury suffered during a dangerous act affect the 
acceptability of the act? 
 
Regulation of Rugby  
 
1. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of yellow and red cards to deter and 
punish dangerous play on the rugby pitch?  
2. In the Case of R v Calton, a young rugby player was convicted of inflicting 
grievous bodily harm and sentenced to 12 months. Calton kicked an opponent in 
the face as they were getting up off the floor after a ruck, resulting in a fractured 
Jaw. What are your thoughts on the judgement of this case?  
3. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of bans and fines to deter and punish 
dangerous play on the rugby pitch? 
4. What are your thoughts on the courts having more of a role in regulating 
dangerous play on the rugby pitch? 
5. Which dangerous acts, if any, do you feel should or need to be regulated by the 
courts rather than the RFU?  
6. Why do you think the act(s) you mentioned in the previous question deserve a 
response from the courts rather than the RFU? 
7. How do you judge which cases to get involved in? Is there a line dictating your 
intervention into ‘violence’ on the pitch?  
8. Do you have an opinion on whether the RFU and courts should have a 
relationship?  
9. To what extent does this relationship go, and how do you feel this relationship 
could be formed?   
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Legitimate Sport  
 
1. Are there unwritten rules in rugby in relation to dangerous play?  
2. If yes, at what point does an act fall outside the acceptable behaviour of these 
unwritten rules? 
3. Do some players intentionally cause harm to their opponents?       
4. If yes, why do you think some players intentionally cause harm to their opponents?  
5. If no, what stops players from intentionally causing harm to their opponents? 
6. How much do you think the ability of the individual affects the amount of 
dangerous play in a game of rugby?  
7. How much do you think the atmosphere of a game affects the amount of dangerous 
play in a game of rugby? 
8. How would you take into the ability and/or atmosphere of the game when making 
your regulatory decisions? 
9. Some academics suggest that not all play within the laws of rugby are always 
acceptable. What is your opinion on this?    
10. To what extent do you think expectations of dangerous play varies between 
individual players?  
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Appendix 2 – Interview Schedule – Referees  
 
Introduction  
 
1. When did you first get involved with refereeing rugby?  
2. What do you enjoy about refereeing rugby? 
3. Is there anything you do not enjoy about refereeing rugby? 
4. Why did you get involved with refereeing rugby?  
 
Dangerous Play in Rugby 
 
1. How would you define dangerous play in rugby?  
2. What is your view on dangerous play as part of the game?  
3. What is your opinion on some academic’s/physio’s/media representative’s 
concerns that the level of dangerous play in rugby is increasing alarmingly?  
4. What is your experience with players/coaches accepting dangerous play on the 
pitch? 
5. What is your experience with players/coaches encouraging dangerous play on the 
pitch?  
6. How does the degree of injury suffered during a dangerous act, affect the 
acceptability of the act? 
Regulation of Dangerous Play  
 
1. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of yellow and red cards to deter and 
punish dangerous play on the rugby pitch?  
2. In the Case of R v Calton, a young rugby player was convicted of inflicting 
grievous bodily harm and sentenced to 12 months. Calton kicked an opponent in 
the face as they were getting up off the floor after a ruck, resulting in a fractured 
Jaw. What are your thoughts on the judgement of this case?  
3. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of bans and fines to deter and punish 
dangerous play on the rugby pitch? 
4. What are your thoughts on the courts having more of a role in regulating 
dangerous play on the rugby pitch? 
5. Which dangerous acts, if any, do you feel should or need to be regulated by the 
courts rather than the RFU?  
6. Why do you think the act(s) you mentioned in the previous question deserve a 
response from the courts rather than the RFU? 
Legitimate Sport  
 
1. Are there unwritten rules in rugby in relation to dangerous play?  
2. If yes, at what point does an act fall outside the acceptable behaviour of these 
unwritten rules? 
3. Do some players intentionally cause harm to their opponents?       
4. If yes, why do you think some players intentionally cause harm to their opponents?  
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5. If no, what stops players from intentionally causing harm to their opponents? 
6. How much do you think the ability of the individual affects the amount of 
dangerous play in a game of rugby?  
7. How much do you think the atmosphere of a game affects the amount of dangerous 
play in a game of rugby? 
8. Some academics suggest that not all play within the laws of rugby are always 
acceptable. What is your opinion on this?    
9. To what extent do you think expectations of dangerous play varies between 
individual players?  
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Appendix 3 – Interview Schedule – Legal Professionals  
 
1. Introduction 
 
1. When did you first get involved with ‘sports violence’ cases?   
2. Have you ever been involved with cases regarding ‘violence’ on the rugby pitch? 
What level of rugby have you been involved with? (Semi/Pro, Leagues?) 
3. What do you enjoy about regulating ‘violence’ in sports? 
4. Is there anything you do not enjoy about regulating ‘sports violence’? 
5. Why did you get involved with regulating ‘violence’ in sports?  
 
Dangerous Play in Rugby  
 
1. How would you define dangerous play in rugby?  
2. What is your view on dangerous play as part of the game?  
3. What is your opinion on some academic’s/physio’s/media representative’s 
concerns that the level of dangerous play in rugby is increasing alarmingly?  
4. What is your experience with players/coaches accepting dangerous play on the 
pitch? 
5. What is your experience with players/coaches encouraging dangerous play on the 
pitch?  
6. How does the degree of injury suffered during a dangerous act, affect the 
acceptability of the act? 
7. What extent of ‘violence’ do you believe players on the pitch expect?  
 
Regulation of Rugby  
 
1. How can you establish the mens rea for ‘violence’ cases in rugby? How do you 
establish intent and recklessness? 
2. In the Case of R v Calton, a young rugby player was convicted of inflicting 
grievous bodily harm and sentenced to 12 months. Calton kicked an opponent in 
the face as they were getting up off the floor after a ruck, resulting in a fractured 
Jaw. What are your thoughts on the judgement of this case?  
3. Do you think there is a set of criteria which the courts can use to establish the 
boundaries of an individual’s consent (conditions of the game, nature of the act, 
extent of force, act closely related to play?) 
4. Are there any public policy reasons for the prosecutorial discretion of ‘sports 
violence’, or in particular for those cases in rugby?  
5. Are there any other issues affecting the viability of prosecution under s. 47, s. 20 
and s. 18? 
6. Are there any other offences for which a violent player may be liable to 
prosecution?  
7. Do you think the current bans and fines are enough to deter and punish ‘violence’ 
in rugby?  
8. What is the RFU’s current relationship with the courts in relation to ‘violence’ on 
the pitch?  
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9. Do you have an opinion on whether the RFU and courts should have a 
relationship?  
10. To what extent does this relationship go, and how do you feel this relationship 
could be formed?  
11.  What are your thoughts on the criminal legal system having more of a role in 
disciplining on-pitch ‘violence’?  
12. Do you think the RFU is suitable in dealing with all on-field ‘violence’ cases in 
rugby? If so, why? If not, why? 
13. Do you think the CPS is suitable in dealing with all on-field ‘violence’ cases in 
rugby? If so, why? If not, why? 
 
Legitimate Sport  
 
1. Are there unwritten rules in rugby in relation to dangerous play?  
2. If yes, at what point does an act fall outside the acceptable behaviour of these 
unwritten rules? 
3. Do you think some players intentionally cause harm to their opponents?       
4. If yes, why do you think some players intentionally cause harm to their 
opponents?  
5. If no, what stops players from intentionally causing harm to their opponents? 
6. How much do you think the ability of the individual affects the amount of 
dangerous play in a game of rugby?  
7. How much do you think the atmosphere of a game affects the amount of 
dangerous play in a game of rugby? 
8. How would you take into the ability and/or atmosphere of the game when 
making your regulatory decisions? 
9. Some academics suggest that not all play within the laws of rugby are always 
acceptable. What is your opinion on this?    
10. To what extent do you think expectations of dangerous play varies between 
individual players?  
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Appendix 4 – Online Questionnaire  
 
Deviant or Criminal? On-Field ‘sports 
violence’ in English Rugby Union and 
the Involvement of Criminal Law 
The below questionnaire forms part of the research evidence examining the relevance 
and effectiveness of using the courts to regulate on-field dangerous play in rugby union. It 
is hoped a deeper understanding of the views and opinions of professional players will 
provide a valuable insight into the following research questions:  
1. Is the RFU, and its current regulatory methods, effective at regulating on-field 
dangerous play in rugby?  
2. Would increased or total criminalisation benefit professional rugby in any way?  
3. What ways could the current prosecution process for dangerous play be made 
clearer and more viable?  
4. Is the idea of an adaptable playing culture a viable method for simplifying the 
prosecution process and making the relationship between the RFU and Crown 
Prosecution Service more effective?  
It should be noted, no names or potentially revealing information will be asked for during 
the questionnaire, to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of answers. The answers 
received will only be used for the purpose of the thesis, and will be destroyed following 
completion of the thesis 
* Required 
 
 
Dangerous Play in Rugby 
 
1. How would you define dangerous play in rugby? * 
 
2. What is your view on dangerous play as part of the game? * 
 
3. What is your opinion on some academic's/physio's/media 
representative's concerns that the level of dangerous play in rugby is 
increasing alarmingly? * 
 
4. What is your experience with other players/coaches accepting 
dangerous play on the pitch? * 
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5. What is your experience with other players/coaches encouraging 
dangerous play on the pitch? * 
 
6. How does the degree of injury suffered during a dangerous act, 
affect the acceptability of the act? * 
 
Regulation of Dangerous Play 
 
1. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of yellow and red cards to 
deter and punish dangerous play on the rugby pitch? * 
 
2. In the Case of R v Calton, a young rugby player was convicted of 
inflicting grievous bodily harm and sentenced to 12 months. Calton 
kicked an opponent in the face as they were getting up off the floor 
after a ruck, resulting in a fractured Jaw. What are your thoughts on 
the judgement of this case? * 
 
3. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of bans and fines to deter 
and punish dangerous play on the rugby pitch? * 
 
4. What are your thoughts on the courts having more of a role in 
regulating dangerous play on the rugby pitch? * 
 
5. Which dangerous acts, if any, do you feel should or need to be 
regulated by the courts rather than the RFU? * 
 
6. Why do you think the act(s) you mentioned in the previous question 
deserve a response from the courts rather than the RFU? * 
 
 
Legitimate Sport 
 
1. Are there unwritten rules in rugby in relation to dangerous play? * 
 
2. If yes, at what point does an act fall outside the acceptable 
behaviour of these unwritten rules? * 
 
3. Do some players intentionally cause harm to their opponents? * 
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4. If yes, why do you think some players intentionally cause harm to 
their opponents? 
 
5. If no, what stops players from intentionally causing harm to their 
opponents? 
 
6. How much do you think the ability of the individual affects the 
amount of dangerous play in a game of rugby? * 
 
7. How much do you think the atmosphere of a game affects the 
amount of dangerous play in a game of rugby? * 
 
8. Some academics suggest that not all play within the laws of rugby 
are always acceptable. What is your opinion on this? * 
 
9. To what extent do you think expectations of dangerous play varies 
between individual players? * 
 
